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Abstract 
 
In the last six years, the American states have been the protagonists of a renewed push 
for sovereignty that has involved the enactment of different types of legislation to avoid 
the implementation of the federal health law within the state. George Mason 
University’s professors Paul L. Posner and Timothy Conlan have identified the causes 
of state resistance in the ideological conflicts reflecting growing political polarization 
in Washington: “Federal programs have become a new battleground for states to 
demonstrate their fidelity to very different ideologies and political alliances.”1  The 
literature has upheld the legislative push against the reform as “capable of contributing 
under certain conditions to safeguarding federalism principles.”2 This research 
contributes to the literature on contemporary assertions of state sovereignty because it 
argues that the state legislative activity in opposition to federal law is a mechanism that 
cannot only safeguard federalism but can also enrich constitutional debate. This study 
combines an understanding of political science and legal method in an effort to provide 
a multi-disciplinary dimension to an understanding of the contemporary states’ rights 
phenomenon.  
  
                                                   
1 Paul L. Posner & Timothy J. Conlan, European-Style Federalism’s Lessons for America, GOVERNING 
(Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.governing.com/columns/smart-mgmt/col-europe-variable-speed-
federalism-lessons-america.html.  
2 John Dinan, Contemporary Assertions of State Sovereignty and the Safeguards of American 
Federalism, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1637 (2010-2011). 
 
  
v 
 
Preface  
 
As Senior District Judge Roger Vinson pointed out in Florida v. United States 
Department of Health and Human Services the political and legal dispute about the 
Affordable Care Act “is not really about health care system at all”. It is, he argued, 
“principally about our federalist system, and it raises very important issues regarding 
the constitutional role of the federal government.”3  This statement is at the core of the 
present research which is not  ̶ as may initially be supposed ̶ a study of the Affordable 
Care Act or an analysis of the Sebelius decision. It is instead a study of the oppositional 
strategies put in place by the state legislatures to push back on the health reform, and 
as such a work that contributes to the growing literature on state sovereignty movements 
in the United States. In order to understand the contribution of this work, it is important 
to keep in mind that the state legislative opposition to the Affordable Care is viewed 
primarily as a case study intended to inform a broader analysis of contemporary 
sovereignty claims in the United States. This is in line with recent federalism scholarly 
work in the United States, in particular with the work of scholars contributing to 
Publius: the Journal of Federalism, for which I have worked as peer-reviewer. Publius 
is a leading American Journal funded in 1973 by Prof. Daniel Elazar, a preeminent 
scholar of federalism. The present work has been presented to numerous conferences 
in Europe and in the United States, including at the Section on Federalism and 
Intergovernmental Relations of the American Political Science Association 2017 
Annual Meeting, where it was reviewed by federalism scholars and received a positive 
feedback.   
                                                   
3 Fla. ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1263 (N.D. Fla.) 
(2012).  
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Introduction: Legislative Opposition to the Affordable Care Act  
 
  
Is the United States heading towards of a constitutional moment4 that will re-define the balance 
of powers between Washington and the states? 
During the Obama presidency, republicans increasingly opposed the expansion of federal 
power and played the constitutional politics’ game5 transforming the debate over the 
significance of public policies in legal contests that often involved opposite views of the 
constitutional balance of powers between states and the national government. The most 
instructive example of such a trend was the battle over the health care reform; its 
constitutionality was challenged in federal courts and reached the Supreme Court which ruled 
that the reform was partly constitutional in the National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius (NFIB)6 case. However, the decision did not resolve the political dispute which is still 
ongoing.7 The controversy over the Affordable Care Act (ACA), popularly known as 
Obamacare, represents the tip of an iceberg that is the continuing dispute over the proper 
interpretation of constitutional provisions relating to the vertical distribution of powers that is 
                                                   
4 The idea of constitutional moments is to be attributed to BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 
FOUNDATIONS 3-33 (1991). Prof. Ackerman studied the impact of popular movements on higher law making 
and reconceptualized American constitutional development as the product of a ‘dualist democracy’ that 
alternates moments of ordinary lawmaking to constitutional moments (Founding, Reconstruction, and the New 
Deal) which, he argues, have been driven by popular mobilization.  
5 This is another expression used by Prof. Ackerman to indicate ‘the series of political movements that have, 
from the Founding onward, tried to mobilize their fellow Americans to participate in the kind of engaged 
citizenship that, when successful, deserves to carry the special authority of We the People of the United States.’ 
Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989).  
6 567 U.S. 519 (2012).  
7 Prof. Super argued that the litigation in the Supreme Court was important but by no means dispositive of these 
issues. See David A. Super, The Modernization of American Public Law: Health Care Reform and Popular 
Constitutionalism, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 873 (2014). See also DANIEL BELAND, PHIL ROCCO & ALEX WADDAN, 
OBAMACARE WARS: FEDERALISM, STATE POLITICS, AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 17 (2016): “Sharp 
disagreements between actors at the federal and state level can permit political controversy to persist long past 
the point of enactment”. President Donald Trump promised a repeal of the ACA but failed to repeal and replace 
it in Congress.  
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at the heart of American federalism. This work defines the controversy as a “battle for the 
contours of the constitution” that took place not only in court, with prolonged legal challenges, 
but was previously fought at legislative level by state legislatures that —attempting to protect 
their individual interests—introduced different types of legislation aimed at challenging the 
ACA.  
The present research investigates the legislation and related constitutional arguments used by 
certain state legislatures between 2010-2016 to challenge the constitutionality of the ACA and 
contributes to the literature on state oppositional strategies in the United States.  
In doing so, it emphasizes the interaction of policy interests and constitutional litigation in 
American federalism and invites cross-disciplinary discourse between political science and 
legal scholars. 
Research aim and objectives 
The aim of this research is to investigate the legislative measures put forward by some state 
legislatures to oppose the ACA as a recent example of state strategies to push back on federal 
government policies. This is to contribute to the legal/political theories concerning the value of 
state sovereignty legislation as a mechanism for safeguarding federalism.  
Research Objectives 
The objectives of this investigation are three-fold:  
1. To examine the text of legislative measures against the ACA and classify them 
according to the constitutional provision/doctrine that they put forward to justify their 
claims; 
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2. To identify the organizations and interest groups that promoted the introduction of 
oppositional legislative measures to the ACA; 
3. To investigate the use of state legislation to promote constitutional understanding and 
highlight the interaction of policy interests and constitutional principles in the 
American system.  
Research Questions 
The focus of this research is the state legislative opposition to the ACA. I have identified 
relevant legislation considered between 2010-2016 and prepared a taxonomy in order to 
illustrate the strategies that state legislatures have used to oppose the implementation of the 
individual mandate provision within their borders. The general research questions that I 
considered are: 
1. How have state legislatures opposed the implementation of the ACA?  
2. Is it possible to find patterns of opposition across the states? 
3. Which constitutional doctrines/devices have state legislatures used to legitimate their 
opposition to the ACA?  
These questions are peculiar to the ACA opposition. However, they raise much broader 
questions involving constitutional law, the balance of American federalism and the 
contribution of state legislatures to national policies. The breadth of this research goes beyond 
the study of the opposition to the health reform. It constitutes an investigation of the 
constitutional history and controversies surrounding the legislative measures used by the states 
which are studied as both strategies to safeguard federalism and attempts to shape the contours 
of the constitution. Further questions that the research addresses are: 
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4. What is the role of state opposition in the dynamics of federal and intergovernmental 
relations in the U.S.?  
5. To what extent could be argued that the introduction of such bills constituted an 
attempt to influence constitutional adjudication? 
The answers to these questions have been sought in the legislative history of bills passed by 
the state legislatures, in the transcripts of committees’ proceedings and in the identifiable links 
between the arguments put forward by the bills and by the relevant constitutional litigation. 
Research territory and theoretical background  
This research is framed by the theoretical investigation of contemporary American federalism. 
In particular, it draws on that branch of federal studies that investigate the mechanisms by 
which state governments advance their interests vis- à -vis the national government. The vast 
majority of work in this area has interpreted state interests as ‘safeguards of federalism’ and 
focused on the political8 and the judicial mechanisms9 by which states influence national 
policies. Prof. John Nugent’s study Safeguarding Federalism: How States Protect Their 
Interests in National Policy Making10  is a milestone in the field as it laid the foundations of 
the study of the role of extra-judicial actors in the protection of state rights. Recent studies have 
expanded the territory of ‘safeguards of federalism’ and considered also the legislative 
mechanisms by which states advance their interests. At the forefront of the studies of legislative 
                                                   
8 The line of enquiry concerning the political safeguard of federalism finds first theorization in the work of 
Herber Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and 
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). He argued that states had a strategic role 
in the selection of the Congress and the President and that such role would contribute to the “safeguard of 
American federalism”. His findings were later developed in JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE 
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 
(1980). Also, see Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000). 
9 “Judicial review works in conjunction with the political process to maintain the proper balance between federal 
and state powers”. See John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313 (1997).  
10 JOHN NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICY 
MAKING (2009). 
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response to federal policies is the work of Prof. John Dinan from Wake Forest University, who 
considers contemporary assertions of state sovereignty as “valuable opportunities for states to 
wield influence in the U.S. federal system” and “capable of contributing under certain 
conditions to safeguarding federalism principles”. 11 The present research project has been 
inspired by the work of Prof. Dinan; it continues his line of enquiry on the value of states’ push 
back to Washington and extends his findings on sovereignty statutes12 and constitutional 
amendments13 to cover other forms of push backs, namely Anti-Commandeering bills14 
interstate compacts bills, 15  and art. V constitutional convention calls.16  
The theoretical background that informs this work is the conception of “variable speed 
federalism”, a new model of intergovernmental relations theorized by Prof. Timothy Conlan 
and others to indicate an emerging trend of “geographic diversity in the application of federal 
laws and policies in the United States.”17 States increasingly bargain implementation of 
national policies and the result of the bargaining -coupled with Washington’s tolerance of state 
diversity- is the geographically diverse implementation of federal policies. The present project 
interprets anti-ACA legislation as evidence of a call for geographical differentiation of policies, 
and expands the theory of variable speed federalism with a constitutional theory sensitivity. 
More specifically, where Prof. Conlan and others have analyzed the opposition to federal 
policies from the perspective of its impact on intergovernmental relations, this work analyzes 
the impact of the opposition on constitutional understanding. Where there has been a push for 
                                                   
11 Dinan, supra note 2, at 1635.  
12 Id.  
13 John Dinan, State Constitutional Amendments and Individual Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 76 ALB. L. 
REV. 2105 (2012-2013).  
14 Chapter three of this work. 
15 Chapter four of this work. 
16 Chapter five of this work.  
17 Timothy Conlan, Paul L. Posner & Mariely Lopez-Santana, Unsafe at Any Speed? The Emergence of Variable 
Speed Federalism in the United States and the European Union. APSA 2014 Annual Meeting Paper (2014), 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2454136. See also Timothy J. Conlan & Paul 
L. Posner, American Federalism in an Era of Partisan Polarization: The Intergovernmental Paradox of 
Obama’s "New Nationalism, 46 PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM 281 (Summer 2016).  
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a shift in the dynamics of American federalism, I will argue, we should also seek for a 
corresponding push for changing the contours of the constitution. Writing for Publius, the most 
influential journal on federalism studies in the United States, Prof. James Read has argued that 
polarization has also affected constitutional understanding: “[p]olarization of constitutional 
understanding in this domain is arguably more consequential for the future character of 
American politics than polarization on policy questions.”18 Can the polarization of 
constitutional understanding— as typified by the states’ opposition legislation to the ACA— 
be interpreted as a push for constitutional change? Referring to Ackerman’s theory of 
constitutional moment19 and the literature on constitutional change and constitutional culture,20 
this work claims that there are signals of an emergent push for change in constitutional 
understanding and interprets the legislative opposition to the ACA as an extra-judicial attempt 
to trigger a constitutional moment. Drawing on the criticism to Ackerman’s work,21 this work 
expands the definition of constitutional moment and suggests that the fact that the reform has 
been the target of persistent constitutional criticism and state legislatures have enacted statutes 
to question its constitutionality is in itself a call for constitutional change that has already 
started to shape the constitutional culture around states- national government relations.  
The basic assumption is that a major role is not exclusively played by the judiciary but that 
non-judicial actors can also seek to contribute to the broad construction of constitutional 
                                                   
18 James H. Read, Constitutionalizing the Dispute: Federalism in Hyper-Partisan Times, 46 PUBLIUS: THE 
JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM 338, 337- 365 (Summer 2016). 
19 ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 266-27. In his book “We the People”, Prof. Ackerman argued that the 
Constitution is not only changed via Art. V processes but it is affected by constitutional moments, expressing 
the distinction between times of deep public reflection on constitutional fundamentals and times of ordinary 
politics. According to Ackerman, there are four stages that characterize a constitutional moment. The first is a 
signaling phase, when the movement earns support and the reform is placed at the center of sustained public 
scrutiny. The second phase is the proposal for constitutional reform. The third phase is mobilized popular 
deliberation which can be rejected by the higher lawmaking system. However, if the movement emerges from 
its “institutional trial”, the fourth phase is legal codification where the Supreme Court translates constitutional 
politics into constitutional law.  
20 See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case 
of the De Facto Era 2005-06, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006). 
21Juliano Zaiden Benvindo, The Seeds of Change: Popular Protests as Constitutional Moments, 99 MARQ. L. 
REV. 363 (2015). 
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meaning. Prof. Fisher, for example, has investigated the contribution of Congress and the 
President to constitutional interpretation22 and Prof. Paulsen has argued that the Executive has 
co-equal interpretive authority with the courts (and with Congress).23 Larry D. Kramer has 
gone further by discussing constitutional interpretation as the idea that ordinary citizens, rather 
than the courts, are participants, “mobilizers”, whose activities create and shape legal norms in 
routine social and political interactions.24 This work will claim that the literature on non-
judicial interpretation suffers from a remarkable oversight that is an understanding of how state 
legislatures potentially shape constitutional discourse and related litigation. Remarkably, in his 
book “Safeguarding Federalism: How States Protect Their Interest in National Policymaking” 
John Nugent covered various strategies used by state officials to pursue states’ interest but did 
not cover state rights legislation.25 The finding of this work will suggest that the germs of 
constitutional evolution should be sought in the laboratories of democracy, the states where 
political or constitutional issues are discussed before they arrive in Washington.26 
 
Method and Interpretive framework  
 
This research examines legislative challenges to the ACA considered by the state legislatures 
between 2010 and 2016. Data have been collected using two main databases: 
                                                   
22 LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS A POLITICAL PROCESS (1988).  
23 Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 
217 (1994).  
24 Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, 92 CAL. L. REV. 959, 972 (2004).  
25 NUGENT, supra note 10.  
26 The term ‘laboratories of democracy’ was coined by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis in New State 
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932): “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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1. the National Conference of State Legislatures databases of legislation filed in 
response to the ACA (one for 2011-2013, one for 2014 and one for 2015-2016) 
available to the public on its website.27 
2. LexisNexis State Net, a 50-state legislation tracking platform available under 
subscription.  
The databases have been interrogated to find state legislation opposing the ACA. The National 
Conference of State Legislatures databases have been interrogated first.  As explained above, 
there are three different databases for the years 2011-2013, year 2014 and years 2015-2016. 
The 2011-2013 and 2014 provided a filter criterion for “Challenges, Opt-outs and Alternatives” 
and the 2015-2016 database a similar filter for “Free Market; Challenges and Alternatives”. 
The interrogation returned a pool of 634 bills. The most significant unifying characteristic of 
these measures soon appeared to be their tendency to phrase objections to federal policy, or 
assertions of state authority, in constitutional terms. From this consideration emerged the idea 
of exploring the reasons why state legislatures engaged in constitutional debate and of  
understand the patterns of such engagement. Thus, I selected bills engaging with constitutional 
rights or theories and classified those bills in five different categories according to the 
constitutional principle or doctrine they used: 
1. Neo- nullification bills declaring the ACA null and void within the borders of the state 
and, in some cases, also providing a penalty for state and federal officers implementing 
the reform; 
2. Health Care Freedom acts that do not explicitly declare the ACA null and void but 
establish that residents of the state will not be compelled to purchase health insurance. 
                                                   
27 The database for bills considered between 2011- 2013 is available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/health-reform-database-2011-2013-state-legislation.aspx. The database for 
bills considered in 2014 is available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/new-health-reform-database.aspx. 
The database for 2015-2016 is available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/health-innovations-
database.aspx.  
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The main difference between nullification and health care freedom bills is that the latter 
do not explicitly nullify federal law; 
3. Anti-Commandeering bills and resolutions. These measures oppose the ACA 
claiming that the federal government cannot commandeer the states to use their 
resources;  
4. Interstate Compact bills that provide for the creation of the so-called Health Care 
Compact (HCC), a compact of states joining efforts to develop their own health care 
regulations in opposition to federal law; 
5. Art. V Convention resolutions that propose an ad-hoc constitutional amendment to 
repeal the Obama Affordable Care Act in full. 
 
This classification constitutes the backbone of the present research project. For each category 
of anti-ACA measure, I conducted at least one case study that illustrates how state legislators 
have made use of the related constitutional doctrine/ provision to oppose the implementation 
of the law. Each case study possesses its own significance and at the same time contributes to 
the overall interpretative framework.  
The case studies involved the analysis of the legislative history of opposition measures, the 
identification of organizations that promoted them and a discussion of the constitutional 
controversies surrounding their passage. The legislative history of bills has been investigated 
both on the State Net database and on state legislatures’ websites online public archives. State 
Net enables the researcher to compare the text of different versions of bills and provides details 
on the sponsors of a particular measure.  The online archives of some state legislatures provide 
minutes and videos of committee meetings and the House and Senate journals.   
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The present research used an interpretive approach, described by Mark Bevir as an approach 
that rests on a philosophical analysis of the meaningful nature of human action.28 The analysis 
of the use of constitutional arguments in measures challenging the ACA (the human action) 
ultimately seeks to disclose meaning-making practices and theorize how those practices 
contributed to the polarization of constitutional understanding and the rise of a constitutional 
moment (philosophical analysis).  
Research challenges 
 
The major challenge of this research project related to the availability and reliability of the 
ancillary data on the legislative measures that I collected. The NCSL and the State Net 
databases are authoritative sources of information with regard to bill details (including different 
text versions and sponsors), but they are not always a reliable tracker of the legislative status 
of a bill which can potentially change day by day. The availability of information on the status 
of a bill was of fundamental importance for my case studies especially at the early stages of 
the research when some of the bills I considered were still pending in the state legislatures. To 
remedy and ensure accuracy of data, the legislative history of each bill has been cross-checked 
on the website of the state legislatures and in some cases I sought the help of state legislative 
analysts to access committee reports. 
The websites of the grassroot organizations that promoted the introduction of bills such as the 
Tenth Amendment Center and the Convention of States have also been an incredibly useful 
source of information because they are often updated as events unfold and can provide alerts 
                                                   
28 Mark Bevir and R. A. W. Rhodes, Interpretation as Method, Explanation, and Critique: A Reply, 6 BRIT. J. 
POL. & INT’L REL. 156, 157 (2004). 
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to the introduction of future bills.  The obvious issue with the information found on politicized 
websites is reliability; all information gained from those websites has been double-checked 
with official data from the legislature websites.   
A secondary (but not negligible) challenge has been the difficulty of appraising the “influence” 
of legislation on constitutional debate. The main objective of this project was to demonstrate 
that the state legislation considered against the ACA had had some impact on the Sebelius 
constitutional litigation; however, the influence of state legislation on constitutional debate is 
as yet unknown research territory. Existing research has focused on the concepts of 
constitutional culture and the influence of social movements on constitutional change29 but has 
not devised methods to describe the interactions between legislatures and the courts as they 
diverge from standard patterns of judicial law making. To address this methodological concern, 
I directed my enquiry towards the identification of similarities of legal arguments in the 
legislatures and in the courts and devised an interpretative framework to justify those 
similarities.   
 
Structure 
This work is composed of five main chapters.  
Chapters I-V present a taxonomy of state legislation against the ACA between 2010-2016. 
Each of the chapters considers a category of state legislation, offers insights into the 
constitutional controversies that surround the enactments of such legislation and includes case 
studies in selected state legislatures.  
                                                   
29 See Siegel, supra note 20, at 1324. 
  
12 
 
Chapter I considers ACA neo-nullification bills. It explores recent instantiations of 
nullification, outlines the history of the nullification doctrine and investigates contemporary 
nullifiers’ political rhetoric and constitutional understanding (or misunderstanding) in an effort 
to distinguish its present ideology and political function from the original framework. Particular 
emphasis is placed on investigating the legislative process that led to the enactment of North 
Dakota Senate Bill 2309 (2011).  
Chapter II describes the phenomenon of the enactment of Health Care Freedom Acts between 
2010-2012 across the 50 states and its close relation to the subsequent lawsuits. The case 
studies of Arizona, Virginia and Missouri Health Care Freedom Acts investigate the link 
between state legislation and federal lawsuit and therefore provide a new lens to interpret the 
motivations of the proponents of such legislation.   
Chapter III turns the attention to Anti-Commandeering bills and resolutions. Anti-
commandeering is a legal doctrine which forbids the federal government from commandeering 
state governments and allows the states to decide whether or not it is appropriate to deploy state 
resources to adopt a federal regulatory system. The chapter outlines the legislative history of 
Anti-Commandeering measures and questions whether they influenced the presentation of the 
legal issue to the courts.  
Chapter IV is dedicated to the examination of the proposal for a Health Care Compact (HCC), 
a compact of states joining efforts to develop their own health care regulations in opposition to 
federal law. The chapter outlines the history of this constitutional device, analyzes the influence 
of interest groups in the introduction of HCC bills in the state legislatures and examines the 
legal issues surrounding the enactment of an interstate compact. 
Chapter V investigates the recent phenomenon of state applications for an Art. V Convention. 
The chapter makes particular reference to Colorado’s Art. V Convention proposal to repeal the 
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ACA and discusses contemporary legal issues surrounding this constitutional procedure that 
has never been used before. 
The conclusions discuss the significance of data and theorize the legislative opposition as one 
strategy that states can use to influence constitutional discourse. Also, in light of the new 
political scenario under Trump’s presidency, this research opens up to new research projects 
in the field of federalism and in particular to the study of blue states’ strategies to oppose federal 
immigration policies with particular reference to sanctuary jurisdictions.  
 
Contribution to knowledge 
The literature has widely investigated the opposition to the ACA as an ideological and legal 
backlash against federal policies at national level. Nonetheless, scholarly work has largely 
disregarded the role performed by state legislatures and in particular the numerous legislative 
measures considered by the states to undermine the implementation of the reform. In 
attempting to fill those gaps, this study contributes to different literatures across the spectrum 
of political sciences and constitutional law.  
The contribution of this work is three-fold:  
1. The original taxonomy of state legislation against the ACA contributes to our 
knowledge of the strategies used by the state legislatures to oppose federal regulations 
and complements the investigation of the mechanisms by which state governments 
advance their interests in the American federal system.  
2. The innovative interpretation of state legislation as means of extra-judicial 
constitutional interpretation contributes to the literature on the sources of constitutional 
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construction interpreted as a method of elaborating constitutional meaning in the 
political realm.30   
3. It presents an argument for the recognition of the role of state legislatures as 
protagonists of the process that leads to constitutional adjudication. 
 
Respectively, chapter I contributes to the literature on nullification with an in-depth analysis of 
the legislative process that led to the enactment of a nullification bill, contributing to the debate 
on the theoretical underpinnings of contemporary nullification efforts. Where the literature31 
argued that nullification is linked to secession and that its theoretical framework resides in a 
critique of the judicial supremacy, this work indicates that current nullification efforts are a 
transformed strategy aimed at influencing the judicial process and have lost their linkage to 
secession as well as the state interpretive legitimacy theoretical framework.  
Chapter II’s contribution resides in the demonstration of the link between state legislation and 
federal lawsuits, two strategies of federalism that the literature often addresses separately. It 
sheds light on the similarities of the arguments put forward by the Health Care Freedom acts 
in Virginia, Missouri and Arizona and the legal arguments used in the Sebelius case. 
Furthermore, the textual analysis of Oklahoma and Alabama Health Care Freedom Acts reveals 
an unexpected collaboration between the two state legislatures that passed identical Health 
Care Freedom acts.  
                                                   
30 Keith E. Whittington theorized constitutional construction as a mechanism by which constitutional meaning is 
elaborated. He investigated how political struggles produce settlements that are resistant to change and dedicates 
one chapter of his book to the states’ construction following the nullification crisis. In particular, he argued that 
the nullification crisis was ‘a corollary to a larger understanding of federalism, and it arose out of a creative 
process of continuing constitutional adjustment.’ See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (2001).  
31 SANFORD LEVINSON, NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION IN MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT (2016).  
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Chapter III contributes to the literature on extra-judicial interpretation as it analyzes how state 
legislatures promoted a narrow interpretation of the Tenth Amendment by passing Anti-
Commandeering resolutions whose arguments reverberated in court challenges. 
Chapter IV contributes to the literature on interstate compacts as it investigates the proposal of 
utilizing this constitutional device for the purpose of creating a joint health care system between 
the states in opposition to the federal scheme. The health care compact has been discussed by 
bloggers and newspapers but never investigated from an academic point of view.   
Chapter V contributes to the literature on Art. V Convention in its investigation of the Colorado 
proposal for a Convention to repeal the ACA. The chapter, prepared on the basis of data 
collected during a research trip to the National Conference of State Legislatures in Denver in 
March 2016, explores the concerns expressed by the states legislatures around the procedural 
aspects of an Art. V Convention.  
The conclusions draw on the contributions of the preceding chapters and suggest a new lens 
for interpreting state legislative opposition as a means of enriching constitutional debate.  
Overall, this thesis contributes to an understanding of the contemporary strategies used by the 
states to safeguard federalism and is directly relevant to the understanding of the role of state 
legislatures in the constitutional bargaining process.   
 
Ethical Considerations 
The research conducted for this work consists mainly of content analysis of bills and legislative 
measures that are publicly available on legal databases and state legislatures’ websites.  The 
analysis of publicly available legislative measures does not create any ethical issues. This work 
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has benefitted from discussion with American political science scholars with full understanding 
of the task that I was engaged upon. 
On May 11th 2015, I conducted a Skype interview with Michael Maharrey, the Tenth 
Amendment Center’s communications director. The interview, discussed in chapter one, has 
been tape-recorded with the consent of the interviewee who also agreed that the content of the 
interview could be reported in my work. The 52 minutes tape-recording of the full interview is 
on file with the author and can be accessed upon request.  
For the chapter on Anti-Commandeering bills and resolutions, on 28th April and 8th May 2017 
I conducted an interview by email with Senator Scott Beason of Alabama. The interviewee 
authorized me to quote his statements in my work. The full text of the interview (846 words) 
is on file with the author and can be accessed upon request.   
Both interviews were carried out in compliance with the University’s ethical guidelines and 
since full consent has been obtained from the interviewees, they do not raise any issues of 
ethical concern.  
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Chapter One: Neo-nullification Resolutions and Bills32 
Introduction 
Between 2010-2014, legislators in 39 states introduced statutes and resolutions that, in virtue 
of Tenth Amendment’s alleged rights, declared specified federal health-care regulation 
unconstitutional and consequently considered that provision null and of no effect within their 
borders. Despite the considerable number of introduced ACA nullification bills, none has been 
enacted in its original form. In many cases the bills did not even reach the discussion stage; in 
others, the language moderated and the nullification bill was transformed in a sovereignty 
declaration. The enactment of these so called ‘sovereignty bills’ has also been defined by 
Austin Raynor as “the new state sovereignty movement”. 33     
Much of the academic discussion around present-day nullification explains current nullification 
efforts in terms of a revival of pre-civil war nullification claims.34 I argue, instead, that present 
nullification attempts do not constitute a revival of the traditional nullification doctrine but a 
transformed legislative strategy aimed at influencing the judicial process.    
This chapter explores the past and present of nullification and offers an insight into its 
constitutional theory in an effort to distinguish its ideological roots from the present 
development and ultimately contrast its current political function with the original framework.  
                                                   
32 Extracts from this chapter were included in a paper presented at the Edinburgh Postgraduate Law Conference 
in December 2014 and then published in the Edinburgh Student Law Review. Ilaria Di Gioia, When Liberty 
Subverts Federalism: Is Nullification of Federal Law Legitimate? in 4 Edinburgh Student L. Rev., 155-168 
(2015). 
33 Austin Raynor, The New State Sovereignty Movement, 90 IND. L.J. 613 (2015). 
34 See Sanford Levinson, The Twenty-First Century Rediscovery of Nullification and Secession in American 
Political Rhetoric: Frivolousness Incarnate or Serious Arguments to Be Wrestled With?, 67 ARK. L. REV. 17 
(2014) that calls nullification “zombie constitutionalism”; James H. Read and Neal Allen, Living, Dead, and 
Undead: Nullification Past and Present 1 AM. POL. THOUGHT 263, 274 (2012) defines nullification as “an 
antebellum relic”; Ryan S. Hunter, Sound and Fury, Signifying Nothing: Nullification and the Question of 
Gubernatorial Executive Power In Idaho, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 659, 692 (2013) defines nullification as “a 
discredited theory risen from the grave”.  
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Section I is the result of data collection. It provides a portrait of the 2010-2014 nullification 
phenomenon and guides the reader through the analysis of data. Section II explores the 
ideological origins of state legislative resistance to national policy. Section III presents the 
Tenth Amendment Center and the American Legislative Exchange Council, two organizations 
that have promoted nullification bills across the states and evaluates their influence. Section IV 
investigates the legislative process that led to the enactment of a nullification bill through a 
case study conducted on North Dakota Senate bill 2309 (2011). Section V discusses the 
constitutional controversy surrounding nullification and reveals that, despite the common roots 
in the works of Jefferson and Calhoun, today’s resistance demonstrates a substantial 
development of the ideological framework and the political meaning of nullification.  
I. The Neo-Nullification Phenomenon 
The first group of statutes that I have identified in the original pool of bills challenging the 
ACA between 2011 and 2014 consists of 183 bills that declare the federal law void within the 
state borders and block state enforcement or participation with the federal health reform.  I 
defined this group of bills as “neo-nullification bills”.  
The definition illustrates the main finding of this research project: the present day nullification 
movement should not be interpreted as reiteration of a political discourse that belongs to early 
American history and eventually led to secession and civil war. Instead I argue that it is better 
understood as a transformed sovereignty doctrine whose major goal is to empower the states 
in relation to constitutional interpretation. I expressly chose not to define them simply as 
“nullification bills” because their reference to the nullification doctrine is mitigated by 
different objectives dictated by contemporary constitutional concerns which have resulted in 
a more cautious language and approach. 
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In particular, state legislatures used this category of bills to block (nullify) the operation of the 
individual mandate within their borders, adopting measures that in some instances prohibited 
state agencies or employees from enforcing the ACA provisions relating to the requirement 
for individuals to purchase health insurance and maintain minimum essential health insurance 
coverage. At the basis of these bills is a common allegation: healthcare regulation should be 
the exclusive province of the states; no police power is conferred to the Congress by Art.1 sec. 
8 of the U.S. Constitution and therefore states have the power to invalidate the individual 
mandate within their borders.  
As shown in the table below, 2011 saw the highest amount of introduced bills: 116 in 38 
legislatures. The figure dropped severely in 2012 to 21, increased on a small scale in 2013 with 
29 bills and then decreased again in 2014 to 17.  
Year Introduced neo-
nullification 
bills 
Enacted neo-
nullification bills 
Percentage of enacted 
neo- nullification bills 
State legislatures that 
considered neo- 
nullification bills 
2011 116 12 10% 38 
2012 21 0 0% 9 
2013 29 0 0% 15 
2014 17 2 12% 10 
Tot.  183 14 7% 39 
 
The high number of nullification bills considered in 2011 (116 bills) clearly represented the 
fears that followed the enactment of the ACA in March 23, 2010. The text of those statutes 
reveals a desperate attempt to protect residents from the implementation of the Act, and in 
particular from the requirement of the individual mandate. A typical example is the text of the  
  
20 
 
Alabama House Bill 60 (2011) enacted on June 9th 2011: 35  
In order to preserve the freedom of all residents of Alabama to provide for their 
own health care, a law or rule shall not compel, directly or indirectly, any person, 
employer, or health care provider to participate in any health care system. A person 
or employer may pay directly for health care services and shall not be required to 
pay penalties or fines for paying directly for lawful health care services. 
Another example is the text of the Indiana Act No. 461 (2011): “a resident of Indiana may not 
be required to purchase coverage under a health plan. A resident may delegate to the resident's 
employer the resident’s authority to purchase or decline to purchase coverage under a health 
plan.”36 
The map below, created by the author with a map creator software, shows the number of bills 
considered by the state legislatures in 2011. It demonstrates that nullification was spread all 
over the United States, with different intensity. Texas is the state with the highest number of 
nullification bills (10) followed by South Carolina (6) and Illinois (6).  
                                                   
35 H.R. 60, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011). If the Governor fails to return a bill to the house in which is 
originated within six days after it was presented to him (Sundays excepted), it becomes a law without his 
signature.  
36 S. 461, 117th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011). 
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The big decline in 2012 (21 bills) is, in my opinion, due to two main factors: apprehension 
caused by the imminent elections and the expectation of a Supreme Court ruling on the 
healthcare reform.37 These two circumstances created a sort of suspense and worked as 
deterrent for state legislature actions. Only 9 legislatures, curiously located in the east, 
continued to consider nullification bills perhaps in the hope of influencing the judicial process. 
The republican controlled legislature of Minnesota and the democratic controlled legislature of 
New Jersey led the movement respectively with 4 and 3 proposed bills each. In Minnesota, 2 
bills were authored by Rep. Mary Franson, who seems to be a convinced supporter of 
nullification as she also introduced a bill (HF3094) to nullify the federal Environmental 
Protection Agency’s power in Minnesota in March 2014. In New Jersey, one bill was authored 
                                                   
37 The Sebelius case was argued in March and decided in June 2012. 
Map 1: Neo-Nullification bills 2011  
  
22 
 
by Sen. Doherty, a Tea-Party supporter who publicly endorsed Ron Paul and the nullification 
movement during a speech in September 2011.38 The other two bills were authored by Rep. 
Allison Littell McHose,39 who campaigned fiercely against the Affordable Care Act and likely 
used nullification as a mean to achieve that objective. The “transitional” nature of this year is 
ultimately confirmed by the fact that no nullification bill survived the legislative process.  
 
 
                   
 
  
                                                   
38 Video of the speech is available on YouTube. RonPaulMobileApp, Michael Doherty endorses Ron Paul, Ron 
Paul speaks to supporters - 9/26/2011 YOUTUBE (Sept. 6, 2011), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9u2ZdjOei8A. 
39 Allison McHose’s website http://www.alisonmchose.com/ contains explicit reference to her battle against the 
health care reform, including an invitation to sign a petition to defund the Act. 
Map 2: Neo-nullification bills 2012 
  
23 
 
The slight increase in 2013 (29 bills) represents the reaction of the states to the Sebelius ruling: 
four legislatures (Minnesota, Alabama, Kentucky and New Jersey) abandoned the cause but 
five (Iowa, Missouri, Mississippi, South Carolina and West Virginia) continued to make 
pressure and even increased the number of proposed nullification bills, despite awareness that 
nullifying the ACA would have now meant challenging the Supreme Court’s authority.40 Eight 
legislatures (Washington, Oregon, Indiana, Pennsylvania, Maine, Tennessee, Georgia and 
Florida) resumed the 2011 battle with a reduced number of bills. The case of Oklahoma is 
exceptional, it moved from one nullification bill in 2011, to 0 in 2012 and finally to 5 bills in 
2013. Such an outbreak was paving the way for the 2014 Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Burwell 
lawsuit that aimed at dismantling the ACA by challenging the legality of IRS subsides in 
federal exchanges.41  Notable also is the legislature of Louisiana that did not consider a 
nullification bill in 2011 and 2012 but came up with a bill authored by Rep. Hollis in 2013. 
The bill received 54 votes and 41 nays42 but failed to get the two-thirds vote required for a 
constitutional amendment. 
                                                   
40 This is particularly true for South Carolina that passed from 2 to 5 proposed bills. 
41 51 F.Supp.3d 1080 (E.D. Okla. 2014). The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma concluded 
that the IRS rule authorizing tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies for the purchase of health insurance in federal 
exchanges violated the text of the PPACA. The decision was notably overruled by King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 
___ (2015). 
42 For the detailed split of the House see the Louisiana State Legislature website: 
http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=850052&n=House%20Vote%20on%20HB%20429%20FI
NAL%20PASSAGE%20(#515).  
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In 2014 the movement languished. Only 17 nullification bills were introduced in 10 state 
legislatures. The decline in the number of proposed statutes is however contrasted by the 
success of 2 nullification bills43 that were enacted in Georgia and Idaho for the first time after 
two years of failures across the 50 states. The Georgia bill (GA S98) was aimed at nullifying 
the abortion coverage requirement and it was enacted in a period of turbulence created by the 
Hobby Lobby controversy44 which was resolved by the Supreme Court with an exemption of 
the contraceptive mandate for some religious family-owned corporations.   The Idaho bill (ID 
S 1355) instead was aimed at nullifying standards of care established by the ACA: “no criteria, 
guideline, standard or other metric established or imposed by the Patient Protection and 
                                                   
43 This figure is significant if we consider that in 2012 and 2013 a bigger number of bills was proposed but none 
of them was enacted.  
44 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 573 U.S. __ (2014). 
Map 3: Neo-nullification bills 2013 
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Affordable Care Act (PPACA), P.L. 111-148, […] shall be used as a basis for establishing an 
applicable community standard of care.” Remarkably, these bills only nullify single aspects of 
the ACA and are not aimed, like previous enacted bills, at attacking core features of the Act. 
The “moderate” content of the bills reflects a compromise achieved after 4 years of legislative 
battles and, perhaps, the shift of state legislature’s attention to other hot federal issues such as 
gun control and Clean Air Act.  
In 2014, the phenomenon of nullification of the ACA is no longer wide spread but mostly 
confined to southern, republican states: namely Mississippi (3), Alabama (2), Georgia (2) and 
Tennessee (2) that together considered 9 bills, more than half of the total. An exception is New 
Jersey (3) where Rep. McHose, the assemblywoman who authored 2 bills in 2012, introduced 
2 more unsuccessful statutes.  The same happened in Louisiana where Rep. Paul Hollis 
introduced a bill aimed at blocking state involvement in the ACA, very similar to the one he 
already introduced in 2013. The decline of the movement in 2014 may also be attributed to the 
expectation of a decision of the Supreme Court in the case King v. Burwell.45 The case was an 
attempt to strike down the entire law and created real prospects for opponents: “My jaw 
dropped when I first saw this.  This has the potential to sink Obamacare.  It could make the 
current website problems seem minor by comparison” commented CATO Institute’s Michael 
Cannon.46 Sandhya Stomachaches and Amy Goldstein of the Washington Post also 
commented: “If the decision going against the government is upheld, it will be more damaging 
to the law than a Supreme Court decision last month that limited coverage of contraceptives.”47 
However, the expectations of a repeal vanished on July 22, 2014 when the Supreme Court 
                                                   
45 576 U.S. _____ (2015). 
46 Quoted in David G. Savage, Could a Wording ‘Glitch’ Doom Obama's Healthcare Law?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
25, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-health-law-flaw-20140825-story.html. 
Law professor Jonathan Adler and Cato Institute health policy expert Michael Cannon have written the most 
definitive explanation of the argument in favor of the plaintiffs.  
47 Sandhya Somashekhar and Amy Goldstein, Federal Appeals Courts Issue Contradictory Rulings on Health-
Law Subsidies, WASH. POST, June 22, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/federal-
appeals-court-panel-deals-major-blow-to-health-law/2014/07/22/c86dd2ce-06a5-11e4-bbf1-
cc51275e7f8f_story.html. 
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confirmed the availability of tax credits and subsidies to federal-run market exchanges and 
effectively preserved the validity of the Act.  
 
 
               
    
The map below shows the aggregated number of proposed bills between 2011-2014. The states 
with more than 10 introduced bills have been assigned the darkest shade.  South Carolina is the 
legislature with the highest number of nullification bills with a total of 13 bills, followed by 
Mississippi (11) and Texas (10). South Carolina is the most prolific state and this is not 
surprising if we consider its major role in the history of nullification (as discussed below).48   
                                                   
48 On November 24, 1832 South Carolina passed an ordinance of nullification, and threatened to secede. 
Map 4: Neo-nullification bills 2014 
  
27 
 
The bills are, overall, distributed evenly between North and South while the West seems to be 
almost unaffected the phenomenon. A remarkable exception is Arizona with its four 
nullification bills. The legislature of Arizona has been particularly prolific with opposition 
measures that will be discussed later with reference to health care freedom acts and Anti-
Commandeering bills.   
Also, Arizona continued a broader nullification battle against federal gun control laws with its 
“Second Amendment Protection Act”, SB1330 passed by the Senate but held back by the 
House on March 2015.49  
 
          
 
 
                                                   
49 Arizona legislature bill tracking service includes videos of the House and Senate sessions: 
http://www.azleg.gov/DocumentsForBill.asp?Bill_Number=SB1330&Session_ID=114.  
Map 5: Neo-nullification bills 2011-2014 
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II. A First Distinction: Pure and Cautious Neo- Nullification Bills 
When considering neo-nullification bills a clarification is imperative: not all bills are the same.  
Even though they share a common objective (to nullify federal law within the territorial 
boundaries) they use a variety of language and provisions; some, for instance, openly use 
nullification language and/or provide penalties for state officers found guilty of enforcing 
federal law; some others do not expressly invalidate federal law i.e. do not use nullification 
language but implicitly nullify federal law by declaring the protection of their citizens from the 
individual mandate.  
From a language point of view, this project suggests a first distinction between “pure neo-
nullification bills” and “cautious neo-nullification bills”. Pure nullification bills are a 
minority (I counted 37 bills); they explicitly use nullification language and therefore make clear 
reference to the controversial doctrine of nullification whose origins and development is 
discussed in the next sections. An example of these bills is 2011 WY H 35 which asserts that 
the federal health reform laws of 2010 “are hereby declared to be invalid in the state, shall not 
be recognized by this state, are specifically rejected by this state and shall be considered null 
and void and of no effect in this state.”  
Cautious nullification bills instead oppose the ACA by prohibiting the implementation of 
certain provisions in their borders without an explicit reference to the nullification doctrine (I 
counted 146 bills). They are declaratory bills against the ACA, asserting that the federal 
government shall not impose an unwanted law and that residents shall be free to choose whether 
or not to buy coverage. Even if they do not explicitly nullify federal law, the ultimate effect of 
these bills is to make federal law ineffective in the state.   An example is Alabama’s amendment 
to its constitution with the Act No. 2011-617; the Act, also known as Amendment 6, was 
approved with 58.96% consensus on November 6, 2012 ballot.  The Act reads: “In order to 
preserve the freedom of all residents of Alabama to provide for their own health care, a law or 
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rule shall not compel, directly or indirectly, any person, employer, or health care provider to 
participate in any health care system.” The rest of the Act does not provide any legal grounds 
to justify such an assertion of sovereignty. Another example is represented by Kansas Act No. 
2011-114: “The government shall not interfere with a resident’s right to purchase health 
insurance or with a resident’s right to refuse to purchase health insurance. […] A person or 
employer may pay directly for lawful health care services and shall not be required to pay 
penalties or fines for paying directly for lawful health care services.”  
Pure and cautious neo-nullification bills use different language for the same practical objective: 
blocking the implementation of the ACA. In order to understand the reasons behind the 
variance in language, I conducted a case study on North Dakota Senate Bill 2309 (2011), one 
of the pure nullification bills that, in order to be approved, was transformed into a cautious bill. 
The case study, reported in section IV, demonstrates that legislators were well aware of the 
implications of using open nullification language and amended the bill several times to make 
it look less “radical”, however the language change did not affect the original nullification 
nature of the bill.  
For this reason, I deemed it appropriate to group pure and cautious bills under the 
comprehensive definition of “neo-nullification bills”. These bills share, indeed, a common 
“DNA” and ultimate practical objective (to block the implementation of the law).    
 
III. The Origins of the Nullification Doctrine 
Founding Fathers  
Proponents of nullification doctrine invoke the authority of founding fathers’ writings to 
defend a certain conception of state sovereignty according to which the Constitution 
authorizes states to nullify laws passed by the Congress. Did the founding fathers themselves 
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ever support such a claim? This section examines founding fathers’ writings and is intended 
to shed light on their conception of nullification.  
The term nullification was first used by founding father Thomas Jefferson in his Kentucky 
Resolution (1798)50 and the concept of states’ rights against the encroachment of the federal 
power was recalled by James Madison in his Virginia Resolution (1798). 51 The Resolutions 
were a protest against the Alien and Sedition Acts, four laws signed by President John Adams 
in 1798, in anticipation of what would be the quasi-war with France.52 These acts, directed 
against Democratic-Republicans, increased the residency requirement for American 
citizenship from five to fourteen years, authorized the president to imprison or deport aliens 
considered “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States” and restricted speech 
critical of the government.53 The Democratic-Republicans believed the acts to be a limit on 
their freedom of speech and press. In an effort to repeal those measures, the legislatures of 
Kentucky and Virginia passed the Resolutions asserting that the Acts were unconstitutional 
and the states as sovereign to “concur in declaring these void and of no force”.54 Both 
Resolutions endorsed a joint opposition by the states, which were said to be creators and 
parties to the compact and therefore “the solely authorized to judge in the last resort of the 
powers exercised under it.”55 However, the two resolutions differ in the use of language and 
in the conception of the role of the individual state in the nullification process. This 
                                                   
50 Jefferson wrote two drafts of the resolutions which are reprinted, together with a fair copy of the 1798 
resolution approved by the Kentucky legislature, in PAUL L. FORD, 8 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 458-
79 (1904-5). For a quick retrieval of my quotes, please use the PDF Ebook available at: http://lf-
oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/805/Jefferson_0054-08_EBk_v6.0.pdf [hereinafter Ford, 8JeffersonWorks]. 
51 Reprinted in JACK N. RAKOVE, JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 589 (1999) [hereinafter Madison, Virginia 
Resolution].  
52 Between 1798 to 1800 the United States of America and the First French Republic engaged in the so-called 
Quasi-War, an undeclared war that mainly involved naval battles.  
53 Alien and Sedition Act, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WEB GUIDES, 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/Alien.html (last visited Jun. 16, 2015).  
54 Ford, supra note 50  at 322. In order to correctly interpret the Resolution, it should be noted that Jefferson was 
Vice-President at the time and did not want to be recognized as author of the Resolution. He only acknowledged 
the paternity of the document in a later stage. 
55 Id. at 321. 
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discrepancy is particularly relevant in distinguishing the nullification doctrine (present in 
Jefferson’s Kentucky Resolution) from its moderate twin interposition (present in Madison´s 
writings).  
In particular, Jefferson formally used the term nullification in his original draft of the 
Kentucky Resolution and defined it as “a natural right” on the part of a sovereign state to self-
defense from the usurpation of the federal government. He argued that “where powers are 
assumed which have not been delegated, a nullification of the act is the rightful remedy”56 and 
that the states “are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general 
government” but “they constituted a general government for special purposes” and “delegated 
to that government certain definite powers, reserving, each State to itself, the residuary mass 
of right to their own self-government”.57 Past studies have yielded some important insights 
into Jefferson’s nullification doctrine and in particular wondered whether Jefferson believed 
that each state had authority to nullify federal law or the states could only do so collectively.58 
It would seem that Jefferson attached importance to collective action but would also have 
favored nullification by a single state:  
 
every State has a natural right in cases not within the compact, (casus non 
fœderis) to nullify of their own authority all assumptions of power by 
others within their limits (…) that nevertheless, this commonwealth, from 
motives of regard and respect for its co-States, has wished to communicate 
with them [the other states]on the subject.59  
                                                   
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 327. 
58 See Ryan Card, Can States ‘Just Say No’ to Federal Health Care Reform? The Constitutional and Political 
Implications of State Attempts to Nullify Federal Law, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1795-1803 (2010). See also 
ALEXANDER JOHNSTON, AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 1763–1876 197-198 (1905) and Wayne D. Moore, 
Reconceiving Interpretive Autonomy: Insights from the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 11 CONST. 
COMMENT. 315, 319 (1994). 
59 Ford, supra note 50 at 321.  
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On the other hand, Madison’s Virginia Resolution never mentioned nullification. In the second 
paragraph of the document, Madison describes Virginia’s warm attachment to the Union of the 
States and justifies the Resolution as a mean to protect the Union’s “existence and the public 
happiness”. Madison did not use the word “nullification” but introduced the term 
“interposition”. Legal historian and a law professor Christian Fritz has explained the 
ambiguous term “interposition” as  
an action that came between the people as the sovereign and the sovereign’s agent, 
the government. This interposition was not a sovereign act, since the people as the 
collective sovereign did not take that step. It did not break the ties between the 
people and their government by, for example, nullifying laws. Rather, the 
interposer, through public opinion, protests, petitions, or even the state legislatures 
acting as an instrument of the people, focused attention on whether the government 
was acting in conformity with the people’s mandates as expressed in their 
constitutions.”60  
 
From the text of the Resolution, it seems to me that Madison conceived “interposition” as a 
joint intervention of the states to stop the violation of the Constitution and invalidate the law:  
 
in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers, 
not granted by the said compact, the states who are parties thereto, have 
the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting the progress of 
                                                   
60 See Christian G. Fritz, Interposition and the Heresy of Nullification: James Madison and the Exercise of 
Sovereign Constitutional Powers, 41 FIRST PRINCIPLES: FOUND. CONCEPTS TO GUIDE POL. & POL’Y. 1 (2012), 
http:// www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/02/interposition-and-heresy-of-nullification-james-madison-
exercise-of-sovereign-constitutional-powers. 
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the evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits, the authorities, 
rights and liberties appertaining to them.61 
 
The Virginia Resolution, rather than nullifying the law straight away, declares its 
unconstitutionality and invokes the concurrence of other states to take “the necessary and 
proper measures […] for co-operating with this state, in maintaining the Authorities, Rights, 
and Liberties, referred to the States respectively, or to the people”.62 Madison confirmed his 
position in 1830 when, witnessing the nullification crisis in South Carolina, he denied that he 
ever suggested that a state could resist the enforcement of alleged unconstitutional law.63 
Madison’s comments are reported in two original letters addressed to Nicholas Philip Trist, 
private secretary to Andrew Jackson. The letters are available in “The James Madison Papers” 
collection of the Library of Congress and have been digitalized for public use.64 In the letter 
dated December 1831 Madison stated:  
 
“For this preposterous & anarchical pretension there is not a shadow of 
countenance in the Constitn. [sic] and well that there is not; for it is certain that 
with such a deadly poison in it, no Constn. could be sure of lasting a year; there 
having scarcely been a year, since ours was formed, without a discontent in some 
one or other of the States which might have availed itself of the nullifying 
prerogative.”65 
 
                                                   
61 Madison, Virginia Resolution. 
62 Id.  
63 See Kevin Gutzman, A Troublesome Legacy: James Madison and the Principles of ’98, 15 J. OF THE EARLY 
REPUBLIC 569 (1995). 
64 Original document available in the collection “The James Madison Papers” at the Manuscript Division of 
Library of Congress. The Library also offers a digitalized version of the letters available at the following link: 
http://www.loc.gov/item/mjm021163/.  
65 Id. 
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Also, in a letter to Mathew Carey, a publisher and economist, Madison harshly commented 
on the events in South Carolina: “the strange doctrines and misconceptions prevailing in that 
quarter are much to be deplored; and the tendency of them the more to be dreaded.”66 In 
addition to the letters, a determinant document to understand Madison’s position in relation 
to nullification is “Notes, On Nullification” of 1834.67 The Notes are intended to be an 
explanation of the true meaning of the Virginia Resolution which Madison insists, is to be 
interpreted as a plea for “concurrent interposition” by the states, not by a single state: “The 
resolution derives the asserted right of interposition for arresting the progress of usurpations 
by the Federal Govt. from the fact, that its powers were limited to the grant made by the States; 
a grant certainly not made by a single party to the grant, but by the parties to the compact 
containing the grant.”68 With reference to nullification by one state, Madison clearly expresses 
his opposition: “a plainer contradiction in terms, or a more fatal inlet to anarchy, cannot be 
imagined”.69 Hence, what mode of interposition was Madison proposing in the Virginia 
Resolution? How many states would need to associate in order to legitimately interpose 
against the federal government? After a careful scrutiny of Madison’s Notes, it would appear 
that the proposal had been intentionally left vague. Madison did not have a clear idea in mind 
of a particular mode of interposition but wanted to leave the states free to decide themselves:  
 
It is sometimes asked in what mode the States could interpose in their collective 
character as parties to the Constitution agst usurped power. It was not necessary for 
the object & reasoning of the resolns & report, that the mode should be pointed out. 
                                                   
66 The digitalized version of the letters is available on the Library of Congress website at the following link: 
http://www.loc.gov/resource/mjm.23_0903_0911/?sp=2&st=text.  
67 James Madison, 9 The Writings of James Madison, comprising his Public Papers and his Private 
Correspondence, including his numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed,  
(Gaillard Hunt ed. 1900). For a quick retrieval of my quotes, please use the PDF Ebook provided by the Online 
Library of Liberty at the following link: http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1940/Madison_1356-
09_EBk_v6.0.pdf.  
68 Id. at 341. 
69 Id.  
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It was sufficient to shew that the authy. to interpose existed, and was a resort 
beyond that of the Supreme Court of the U. S. or any authy. derived from the 
Constitn. The authy. being plenary, the mode was of its own choice, and it is 
obvious, that, if employed by the States as coparties to and creators of the Constn 
it might either so explain the Constn or so amend it as to provide a more satisfactory 
mode within the Constn itself for guarding it agst constructive or other violations. 
 
In his Notes and in a letter to Everett dated Sep. 10th 1830, Madison also defended 
Jefferson’s Kentucky Resolution from the accusation of providing the basis for the 
nullification doctrine. He argued that Jefferson upheld nullification only as the natural 
right “against insupportable oppression”70 but not as a constitutional right: “Still I believe 
that he did not attach to it the idea of a constitutional right in the sense of S. Carolina, but 
that of a natural one in cases justly appealing to it.”71  
Furthermore, Madison corroborated his interpretation of Jefferson’s position in another 
letter to Everett, where he even argued that the word “nullification” was not present at 
the time of approval of the Resolution in 1798 but appeared on a later stage: “The term 
nullification to which such an important meaning is now attached, was never a part of 
the Resolutions and appears not to have been contained in the Kentucky Resolutions as 
originally passed, but to have been introduced at an after date.”72 
From my examination of Jefferson’s writings, it seems to me that the Kentucky 
Resolution was intended to be a political maneuver to counter the Federal party 
ascendancy in Congress, a warning, an intimidation perhaps, rather than a real 
proclamation of the states’ rights to nullify federal law. Indeed, nullification never 
                                                   
70 Id. at 427.  
71 The letter is quoted at 446 (395 of the original copy of the book). 
72 Id. at 442 (389 of the original copy of the book).  
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happened. Jefferson himself did not have a clear idea of the ultimate objective of the 
nullification doctrine or perhaps was conscious that it would have inexorably led to 
secession. For this reason, I argue that he intentionally left the matter open to the 
evolution of the events. In a letter to Madison he wrote: 
“I enclose you a copy of the draft of the Kentucky resolves. I think we should 
distinctly affirm all the important principles they contain, so as to hold to that 
ground in future, and leave the matter in such a train as that we may not be 
committed to push matters to extremities, & yet may be free to push as far as 
events will render prudent.” 73 
 
In another letter to John Taylor:  
 
“For the present I should be for resolving the alien & sedition laws to be 
against the constitution & merely void, and for addressing the other States to 
obtain similar declarations; and I would not do anything at this moment 
which should commit us further, but reserve ourselves to shape our future 
measures or no measures, by the events which may happen.”74 
 
This letter anticipates, in my opinion, the following compromise and explains the reasons 
why the Kentucky Resolutions remained a dead letter.  
 
In conclusion, my analysis of primary sources such as the letters and Notes appears to suggest 
that the main reason for the present misuse of Founding Fathers’ work is the vagueness of 
                                                   
73 The letter is reported in Ford, supra note 5050 at 312. The letter is dated November 17, 1798. 
74 Id. at 324. The letter is dated Nov. 26, 1798.  
  
37 
 
Jefferson and Madison’s positions and the lack of attention to complementary writings (letters 
and other manuscripts). Yet Jefferson’s Kentucky Resolutions offer something less than a fully 
developed theory of nullification […] Jefferson thus introduced the general idea of nullification 
but provided only fragmentary justification and did not translate theory into practice—except 
to win election as president by campaigning against the Acts and then, once in office, letting 
them expire.75  
Hence, the analysis of founding fathers’ writings demonstrates that the seeds of current 
nullification debate can certainly be found in the early days of the federation, but also that 
those issues were vague at the time, have not been solved and are perpetually reappearing in 
different guises.  
 
Calhoun, the South Carolina "Exposition" (1828) and the Ordinance of Nullification 
(1832) 
The concept of nullification was expanded further by Vice-President John Calhoun, who led 
the South Carolina movement against the so called “Tariff of Abominations”, a protectionist 
tariff passed by the Congress and approved by President John Quincy Adams on May 1828 to 
protect the northern industrial economy from competition with foreign imports. In particular, 
southern states were concerned by the fact that the tariff would have increased the price they 
had to pay for imports and therefore the cost of living in the agricultural South while at the 
same time harming exports of southern cotton to Britain. The tariff was denounced as a system 
of robbery and plunder, destructive to the southern states76  and became the focus of southern 
rage against northern encroachments upon their internal affairs.  
                                                   
75 Read & Allen, supra note 34.  
76 CHAUNCEY S. BOUCHER, THE NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA 22 (1916). 
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Historians recognize in the South Carolina nullification crisis “the beginning of the formidable 
antinationalist movement in the state”77 and argue that this event foreshadowed the state's 
announcement of secession nearly 30 years later.78 John Calhoun expressed the discontent in 
a pamphlet entitled “South Carolina Exposition and Protest” in which he vehemently opposed 
the tariff declaring it unconstitutional and therefore asserting the authority of the state of South 
Carolina to nullify its effects within its borders: “May the General Government, on the other 
hand, encroach on the rights reserved to the States respectively? To the States respectively 
each in its sovereign capacity is reserved the power, by its veto, or right of interposition, to 
arrest the encroachment.” 79 Calhoun undoubtedly followed Jefferson’s reasoning and did not 
miss the chance to emphasize the power of the compact to the detriment of Congress, which 
he defines only as “a creature” of the Constitution. According to Calhoun, nullification 
suspended the operation of a federal statute and only a convention of states (deciding with a 
majority of three fourths) could withhold or confirm the right of a state to nullify a federal 
measure. 
 
There is provided a power, even over the Constitution itself, vested in three 
fourths of the States, which Congress has the authority to invoke, and may 
terminate all controversies in reference to the subject, by granting or 
withholding the right in contest. Its authority is acknowledged by all; and 
to deny or resist it, would be, on the part of the State, a violation of the 
constitutional compact, and a dissolution of the political association, as far 
                                                   
77 Id. at 1. 
78 See WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR 93-96 (1968). 
79 John Calhoun, South Carolina Exposition and Protest (1828).  
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as it is concerned. This is the ultimate and highest power, and the basis on 
which the whole system rests.80 
 
Calhoun’s pamphlet animated the protest and the situation became worse after the enactment 
of a new tariff bill with lower rates than the Tariff of Abominations but still too high for the 
southerners;81 on 24th November 1832 a special intrastate convention ratified the “South 
Carolina Ordinance of Nullification”.  The ordinance declared the tariffs “unauthorized by the 
constitution of the United States (…) null, void, and no law, nor binding upon this State” and 
explicitly threatened secession in case Congress passed measures to repress the protest:  
 
we will not submit to the application of force on the part of the federal 
government (…) but we will consider the passage, by Congress, of any act 
authorizing the employment of a military or naval force against the State 
of South Carolina (…) to be null and void, otherwise than through the civil 
tribunals of the country, as inconsistent with the longer continuance of 
South Carolina in the Union; and that the people of this State will 
henceforth hold themselves absolved from all further obligation to 
maintain or preserve their political connection with the people of the other 
States; and will forthwith proceed to organize a separate government, and 
do all other acts and things which sovereign and independent States may 
of right do.82 
 
                                                   
80 Id. 
81 The South Carolina Nullification Controversy, U.S. HISTORY PRE-COLUMBIAN TO THE NEW MILLENNIUM, 
http://www.ushistory.org/us/24c.asp. 
82 Calhoun, supra note 79. 
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The Congress responded first with the so called Force Bill83 but, after intense negotiations 
conducted between Henry Clay and John Calhoun, enacted the Compromise Tariff of 1833 
establishing that import taxes would gradually be cut over the next decade until, by 1842, they 
matched the levels set of 20%.84 South Carolina accepted the deal and withdrew its secession 
threats.  
 
Original documents, broadsides and other printed ephemera available at the “Printed 
Ephemera Collection” of the Library of Congress, Washington, DC85 demonstrate that 
nullification animated not only popular demonstrations but also meaningful discourse over 
the nature of the Union. Examples of popular involvement are the song “Jackson and the 
nullifiers”86 and the ironic epitaph of the Constitution87 whereas the interest of intellectuals is 
attested by the proposal of Thomas White for a tri-weekly newspaper that would have 
discussed ways to conciliate the interest of the Union and states’ rights.88  The relevance of 
the debate surrounding nullification and federalism is also confirmed by the Hayne-Webster 
Debate, a series of speeches in the Senate that took place on January 19–27, 1830 during 
which Robert Hayne of South Carolina and Daniel Webster of Massachusetts put forward 
their conflicting visions of the Union; Hayne interpreted the Union as a “confederacy” of 
sovereign states and Webster advocated instead for an organic entity comprised of a Single 
People.89   
                                                   
83 4 Stat. 632 (1833), the legislation stipulated that the president could, if he deemed it necessary, deploy the 
U.S. Army to force South Carolina to comply with the law. 
84 DAVID AND JEANNE HEIDLER, HENRY CLAY: THE ESSENTIAL AMERICAN 253 (2011). 
85 The digital collection is available on the Library of Congress website at 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/rbpehtml/.  
86 See scanned copy of the original document in the Appendix at p. 263. 
87 See scanned copy of the original document in the Appendix at p. 264. 
88 The original text can be read in PDF format on the Library of Congress website at the link: 
https://www.loc.gov/resource/rbpe.18602500/.  
89 For an insight into the debate see Charles J. Reid, Jr., Highway to Hell: The Great National Highway Debate 
of 1830 and Congress as Constitutional Interpreter, 46 U. Tol. L. Rev. 1, 1 -2 (Fall2014) and also Maurice G. 
Baxter, ONE AND INSEPARABLE: DANIEL WEBSTER AND THE UNION 179-93 (1984). 
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The Ordinance of Nullification was largely condemned by the President Andrew 
Jackson and other state legislatures. The Presidential proclamation of Dec. 10, 1832 reproved 
the doctrine nullification as “carry[ing] with it internal evidence of its impracticable 
absurdity”90 and “incompatible with the existence of the Union, contradicted expressly by the 
letter of the Constitution, unauthorized by its spirit, inconsistent with every principle on which 
it was founded, and destructive of the great object for which it was formed”.91The 
proclamation is a plea to American citizens to value the achievements of the United States as 
a nation and terminates with a speculation on the nature and objectives of the American 
political system, a lucid example of an early treatise on U.S. federalism. Following the 
proclamation, a number of state legislatures joined the President in denouncing the South 
Carolina move and only Alabama supported the call for a Federal Convention; 92 in the first 
group it is possible to identify New Hampshire, Maine,93 Massachusetts,94 Connecticut, New 
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, Ohio, Indiana, 
                                                   
90 ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS, STATE PAPERS ON NULLIFICATION: INCLUDING THE 
PUBLIC ACTS OF THE CONVENTION OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ASSEMBLED AT COLUMBIA, NOVEMBER 
19, 1832 AND MARCH 11, 1833 (1834) [hereinafter State Papers], Google digital copy available at: 
https://books.google.co.uk/books/reader?id=4hUOAAAAIAAJ&hl=it&printsec=frontcover&output=reader&pg
=GBS.PA79.  
91 Id. at 80. 
92Id. at 223 “we consider the present Tariff of duties, unequal, unjust, oppressive and against the spirit, true 
intent and meaning of the Constitution… [but] nullification, which some of our Southern brethren recommend 
as the Constitutional remedy for the evils under which we labor, is unsound in theory and dangerous in 
practice(…) Therefore, as a last resort, we recommend to our co-States the calling of a Federal Convention, to 
meet in the City of Washington on the first of March, 1834, or at such other time and place as may be agreed 
on”. 
93 Id. at 106 describing “those measures as utterly inconsistent with the spirit of forbearance and compromise in 
which our Union had its origin, and by a perseverance in which it can alone be maintained”.  
94 Id. at 122 “Had it been intended that the States should possess the important power of annulling or repealing 
at discretion the acts of the General Government, this power would undoubtedly have been given to them in 
express terms. It is not even pretended that the Constitution contains any such express concession”. 
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Maryland95 and Mississippi.96 Georgia mistakenly sent an application to the Congress for a 
Federal Convention and allegedly rejected such a proposal.97 The North Carolina resolution 
shows the essence of the debate in the southern states: i.e. a blend of strong criticism for the 
Tariff compensated by attachment to the Union:  
Resolved, That whatever diversity of opinion may prevail in this State, as to the 
constitutionality of the acts of Congress imposing duties on imports for protection, 
yet, it is believed, a large majority of the people think those acts unconstitutional; 
and they are united in the sentiment, that the existing Tariff is impolitic, unjust and 
oppressive; and they have urged, and will continue to urge its repeal. Resolved, 
That the doctrine of Nullification as avowed by the State of South Carolina, and 
lately promulgated in an Ordinance, is revolutionary in its character, subversive of 
the Constitution of the United States and leads to a dissolution of the Union.98 
 
Ultimately, Calhoun’s South Carolina “Exposition” and the Ordinance of Nullification 
did not succeed in their intent to nullify federal law and a compromise was reached by the  the 
two dominating personalities of the time, Henry Clay and President Andrew Jackson.  The 
                                                   
95 Id. at 289 “it is not in the power of any one State to annul an act of the General Government, as void or 
unconstitutional. That the power of deciding controversies among the different States, or between the General 
Government and a State, is reposed in the Federal Judiciary” and at 290“the Ordinance of Nullification of South 
Carolina, is calculated to mislead her citizens from the true character of the Federal Government, and the just 
allegiance, which they owe to that Government.” 
96 Id. at 229. The original document, together with letter of transmittal from the Governor, dated Feb. 6, 1833 is 
available at the Library of Congress in the digital collection “An American Time Capsule: Three Centuries of 
Broadsides and Other Printed Ephemera”. Nullification is regarded as “heresy, fatal to the existence of the 
Union”. See scanned copy in the Appendix under n.1.  
97 Id. at 39, “the State of Georgia, in conformity with the Fifth Article of the Federal Constitution, hereby makes 
application to the Congress of the United States, for the call of a Convention of the people, to amend the 
Constitution afore said, in the particulars herein enumerated, and in such others as the people of the other States 
may deem needful of amendment.”. From the state papers, it seems that the first Resolution was an error of the 
press “I beg leave to correct an error, which occurred through the inadvertence of the press, and a want of proper 
scrutiny at this Department, in regard to a resolution, transmitted to you on the 28th of December last, and 
purporting to have been approved on the 22d of said month. The resolution forwarded to you, was rejected by 
the Legislature, and a substitute adopted (which you will find in the printed laws, pages 49 and 50.) The official 
signatures of the officers of both branches of the General Assembly, and that of the Governor, were improperly 
placed by the printer, to the resolutions heretofore forwarded to you, and forwarded from this Department 
without detecting the error.” 
98 Id. at 201. 
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lack of clarity on what the practice of state interposition would look like became apparent 
once South Carolina attempted to nullify federal law.99 Nonetheless, it should be noted that 
those assertions were strong enough to provoke a reaction of the Congress and a subsequent 
compromise bill. This dynamic could be the key to understanding the current nullification 
revival and its objectives.  
 
Post-civil war nullification movement: Brown v. Board of Education and the Massive 
Resistance 
The civil rights era offers another example of a national crisis (debate on desegregation) 
fought by southern states in the name of their independence from the federal government or, 
in this case, from the rulings of the Supreme Court. Between 1956 and 1958, eight southern 
states100 approved Interposition Resolutions against the implementation of the desegregation 
decisions in Brown v. Board of Education.101 The resistance became known as Massive 
Resistance to the federal government’s desegregation policies. 102 The Resolutions clearly 
resembled103 Madison and Jefferson’s language in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions in 
their call for nullification, interposition and for liberty from “a Supreme Court usurping the 
powers reserved to the states”.104  The first state to approve an interposition resolution was 
Virginia on Feb. 1, 1956 with a 36-2 vote in the Senate and 90-5 in the House. The interest 
for the doctrine of interposition was so widespread that the Senate instructed the Committee 
                                                   
99 Lawrence Landerson, Federalism and Massive Resistance: Southern Responses to Brown v. Board of 
Education, Paper presented at the meeting of the International Political Science Association in Montreal, 
Quebec, Canada July 2014. 
100 Alabama (Feb. 2, 1956); Arkansas (Constitutional amendment of Apr 18, 1956); Florida (Apr. 18,1957); 
Georgia (Mar. 9, 1956); Louisiana (May 29, 1956); Mississippi (Feb. 29, 1956); South Carolina (Feb. 14, 1956); 
Virginia (Feb. 1, 1956). The resolutions have been reprinted in 1 RACE RELATIONS LAW REPORTER (1956).  
101 There were 2 decisions. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) in which the Supreme Court held that segregated 
schools violated the Constitution and Brown II, 394 U.S. 294 (1955) which ordered state school authorities to 
dismantle the dual systems and move to a unitary system “with all deliberate speed”. 
102 See DEWEY GRANTHAM, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE SOLID SOUTH: A POLITICAL HISTORY 136–138 (1992) 
and George Lewis, MASSIVE RESISTANCE: THE WHITE RESPONSE TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2006). 
103 See NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING 
THE 1950'S 127 (1969).  
104 H.R.J. Res.174, 1957 Leg., (Fla. 1957). Reprinted in 1 RACE RELATIONS LAW REPORTER 707 (1956). 
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for Courts of Justice to prepare a report on the history and application of the doctrine.  The 
report shows the firm interpretation of the Union as a compact of sovereign states and the 
consequent reservation of the powers not delegated to the States, or to the people: “The 
Committee do, indeed, perceive the Constitution to be a compact to which the States are 
parties.”105 
This belief is also confirmed by the Alabama Resolution, that reads: “there can be no tribunal 
above their [the states] authority to decide, in the last resort, whether the compact made by 
them be violated.”106 The Mississippi legislature forbade public employees from complying 
with desegregation orders.”107 The state of Arkansas even adopted a constitutional amendment 
to resist the Supreme Court’s resistance:  
 
“…the State of Arkansas shall take appropriate action and pass laws opposing in 
every Constitutional manner the Un-Constitutional desegregation decisions…of 
the United States Supreme Court, including interposing the sovereignty of the state 
of Arkansas to the end of nullification of these and all deliberate, palpable, and 
dangerous invasions or encroachment upon rights and powers not delegated to the 
United States nor prohibited to the States by the Constitution of the United 
States…”108 
 
                                                   
105 Committee for Courts of Justice, The Doctrine of Interposition, Its History and Interpretation. A Report on 
Senate Joint Resolution 3 General Assembly of Virginia 1956 and Related Matters 6 (1957). The Report is 
available online at http://www2.vcdh.virginia.edu/civilrightstv/documents/images/DoctrineInterposition.pdf.  
106 H.R.J. Res. 42, 1956 Leg., Spec. Sess. (Ala. 1956).  Reprinted in 1 RACE RELATIONS LAW REPORTER 
437 (1956). 
107 WILLIAM P. HUSTWIT, JAMES J. KILPATRICK: SALESMAN FOR SEGREGATION 63 (2013).  
108 Ark. Const. amend. 44, §1 (repealed 1990).The text of the Amendment is quoted in Lawrence Landerson, 
supra note 99 and reprinted in 1 RACE RELATIONS LAW REPORTER 1117 (1956). 
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The Arkansas move during the Civil Rights era has probably inspired recent ACA nullification 
attempts to amend the constitutions of Florida (2011 Senate Joint Resolution 2)109 New Jersey 
(2014 ACR 14 and SCR 59)110 and Oklahoma (2014 HJR1084)111. 
To what extent can we say that current nullification measures are replicating the 1956 
resolutions? 
It is possible to recognize three elements of “plagiarism” of the nullification doctrine:  
1. implicit disregard of the Supreme Court`s authority (decision in Brown); 
2. critique of the principle of judicial supremacy that establishes the Court as final arbiter 
of constitutional issues; 
3. attribution of the authority to interpret the Constitution to the States. 
It is unclear whether such doctrinal position was also underlying the Declaration of 
Constitutional Principle, also known as the Southern Manifesto, signed on Mar. 13, 1956 by 
99 members of the Congress.112 The Manifesto was intended to be an exposé of the resentment 
towards the alleged Supreme Court’s overstep of powers but it does not explicitly attribute the 
authority to interpret the Constitution to the States: “We regard the decision of the Supreme 
Court in the school cases as a clear abuse of judicial power. It climaxes a trend in the Federal 
judiciary undertaking to legislate, in derogation of the authority of Congress, and to encroach 
                                                   
109 Joint resolution would propose a State Constitutional amendment to prohibit laws or rules from compelling 
any person, employer, or health care provider to participate in any health care system, permit any person or 
employer to purchase lawful health care services directly from health care provider, or permit health care 
provider to accept direct payment from person or employer for lawful health care services.  
110 A proposed state constitutional ""Health Care Freedom Amendment"" would seek ""to preserve the freedom 
of the people of New Jersey to provide for their health care."" The proposed amendment would provide that "no 
State or federal law or regulation shall compel, directly or indirectly, any person to obtain health care coverage, 
any employer to provide health care coverage to its employees, or any health care provider to participate in any 
health care coverage plan or program.”. 
111 Would propose a state Constitutional amendment to prohibit the ''state from aiding in the enforcement of'' 
federal health reforms, permitting residents subject to ACA-related fines to bring a right of civil action, also 
would permit a state tax deduction by residents who pay an ACA-related fine. Also would prohibit the state 
from establishing a health care exchange.  
112 See JOHN KYLE DAY, THE SOUTHERN MANIFESTO: MASSIVE RESISTANCE AND THE FIGHT TO PRESERVE 
SEGREGATION (2014) and MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE 
SUPREME COURT 1936-1941 240 (1994). 
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upon the reserved rights of the States and the people.”113 The declaration limited its scope to 
a condemnation of the Supreme Court’s activism. This is a typical characteristic of a certain 
category of present nullification bills that I have named “cautious neo-nullification bills”; this 
category of bills renounces a more radical approach to allow a broader consensus.  
However, at state and Congressional level interposition remained “a theoretical exercise with 
little practical impact”114 perhaps because of the lack of full and unanimous support by the 
states. Brown was not nullified, the Supreme Court rejected interposition in Cooper v. 
Aaron115 and in Bush v Orleans Parish School Board116 confirmed the ruling of a federal 
District Court finding the principle of the interposition “disavowed in the Preamble to the 
Constitution”.117  
IV. The organizations that promote nullification 
Much of the current debate, both scholarly and political, considers nullification as buried in 
1789,118 a non-starter,119 an antebellum relic,120 a discredited theory risen from the grave,121 or 
an example of contemporary zombie (or dinosaur) constitutionalism.122 Nonetheless, my 
research of legislation in 50 states demonstrates that nullification is very much a live issue that 
has been discussed in several state legislatures. In the political battlefield, even Joni Ernst -a 
junior United States Senator from Iowa- seems to support nullification. In a video obtained by 
The Daily Beast, Ernst said on September 13, 2013 at a forum held by the Iowa Faith & 
                                                   
113  Southern Manifesto on Integration (March 12, 1956). Source: Congressional Record, 84th Congress Second 
Session. Vol. 102, part 4. Washington, D.C.: Governmental Printing Office, 1956. 4459-4460. 
114 Landerson, supra note 99. 
115 358 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958). 
116 188 F. Supp. 916 (E.D. La. 1960), aff'd, 365 U.S. 569 (1961). 
117 Id. at 923. 
118 Mark E. Brandon, Secession and Nullification in the Twenty-first Century 67 ARK. L. REV. 91-97 (2014). 
119 JOHN DINAN, HOW STATES TALK BACK TO WASHINGTON AND STRENGTHEN AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM 1 (Cato Inst., Policy Analysis No. 744, 2013).  
120 Read and Allen, supra note 34. 
121 Ryan S. Hunter, Sound and fury, signifying nothing: nullification and the question of gubernatorial executive 
power in Idaho, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 659-692 (2013). 
122 Levinson, supra note 34 at 17.  
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Freedom Coalition that Congress should not pass any laws “that the states would consider 
nullifying.”123  
The idea that states can nullify federal law has somewhat been revived since the publication of 
a 2010 book titled “Nullification: How to Resist Federal Tyranny in the 21st Century”124 by 
right-wing historian Thomas E. Woods.125 Woods holds a B.A. from Harvard University and a 
Ph.D. from Columbia University, both in History. He is an activist, blogger and also founder 
of Liberty Classroom, a website that offers pay-for-access courses in U.S. Constitutional 
history, Austrian economics and history of political thought. He was one of the founders of the 
League of the South, a neo-secessionist organization based in Alabama that has been identified 
by the Southern Poverty Law Center as a hate group.126 Thomas Wood is an intellectual and 
his work has contributed to systematizing the nullification doctrine but it is hard to believe that 
his work, alone, reached the state legislatures. Also, the homogeneity of language used in the 
nullification bills suggests a common drafting hand.  
What is the source of this multitude of nullification bills?  
I have identified two organizations, of different nature and size, that drafted nullification bills 
and pushed them in the state legislatures: the Tenth Amendment Center and the American 
Legislative Exchange Council.  
The Tenth Amendment Center (TAC) 
According to Ryan Hunter, the center is the leading promoter of nullification: 
                                                   
123 Ben Jacobs, Exclusive: GOP Senate Candidate Caught Saying States Can Nullify Federal Laws, DAILY 
BEAST (July 28, 2014), http:// www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/07/28/exclusive-gop-senate-candidate-
caught-saying-states-can-nullify-laws.html. 
124 THOMAS E. WOODS, JR., NULLIFICATION: HOW TO RESIST FEDERAL TYRANNY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2010). 
125 About Tom Woods, Tom Woods, http://www.tomwoods.com/about (last visited Aug. 8, 2015). 
126 The Southern Poverty Law Center defines the League as a neo-Confederate group that advocates for a second 
Southern secession and a society dominated by “European Americans.” The league believes the “godly” nation 
it wants to form should be run by an “Anglo-Celtic” (read: white) elite. See League of the South, SOUTHERN 
POVERTY LAW CENTER, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/league-south# (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2018).  
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“The disturbing aspect of the anti-PPACA nullification efforts in most other states 
is that a significant portion of the text of most of these bills is not an original product 
of the state legislatures, but is taken largely from an advocacy website run by 
the Tenth Amendment Center (TAC).”127 
The TAC is a small think tank that provides model legislation and keeps track of nullification 
bills across 50 states via its website which publishes weekly updates, video, articles and book 
reviews. The center aims to “teach people about the original meaning of the Constitution”128 
through multi-city event tours and conferences organized under the campaign “Nullify now”. 
Relevant speakers at the “Nullify now” events129 include the historian Thomas E. Woods,130 
Gary Johnson131, Randy Brogdon132 and Joe A. Wolverton II. 133  
The founder of the center is Michael Boldin, a 38 year old activist “recovering Catholic” who 
sees himself as a “Ninety-eight' guy—as in 1798.””134 In a podcast interview at Adam vs The 
Man, 135 he defined himself as a reformed communist whose activism is rooted in objections 
to the Iraq War and declared that he never voted in his life. Apparently, he manages the 
organization from his house in Los Angeles, California and the organization is funded by 
voluntary donations or the purchase of products on sale in the website. Even if Michael Boldin 
                                                   
127 Hunter, supra note 121 at 693-94 (2013). 
128 Definition on the Home Page of the website: http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/.  
129 See dates and venues at http://nullificationmovie.com/the-nullify-now-tour/. 
130 Author of The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History (2004) and Nullification: How to Resist 
Federal Tyranny in the 21st Century (2010). 
131 Former Governor of New Mexico, he served as the 29th Governor of New Mexico from 1995 to 2003. He 
was the Libertarian Party nominee for President of the United States in the 2012 election. 
132 He was a state senator for Oklahoma’s 34th senate district from 2002 until 2011, author of the Oklahoma 
10th Amendment Resolution and Health Care Freedom Act. He is currently chairman of the Oklahoma 
Republican Party.  
133 Correspondent for The New American, a print magazine published twice a month by American Opinion 
Publishing Inc., a company owned by the John Birch Society (JBS).  
134 Stephanie Mencimer, If at First You Don't Secede, MOTHER JONES (Jul. /Aug 2010), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2010/07/michael-boldin-tenth-amendment. 
135 Internet based podcast talk show hosted by Adam Charles Kokesh, an American libertarian. The interview 
can be viewed on You Tube: AdamKokesh, Michael Boldin - Tenth Amendment Center, YOUTUBE (Nov. 30, 
2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uy0RXEOBuhw.  
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officially takes distance from Koch brothers’ funding136 and has declared his communist 
background, it should be noted that the campaign “Nullify now” has been sponsored by the 
John Birch Society,137 an anti-communist organization whose leading founder was, indeed, 
Fred Koch. The Koch family is a politically active business family most noted for funding the 
campaigns of Republican candidates and a number of conservative and libertarian political 
organizations. The ideological position of the Tenth Amendment Center is therefore difficult 
to identify and certainly its mission does not identify with the program of a specific political 
party.  
In order to support activists willing to join the movement, the center provides model 
legislation138 named “Federal Health Care Nullification Act”, contact names and telephone 
numbers of state legislators and encourages activists to “strongly, but respectfully” contact 
the relevant state legislators and chase the introduction of the legislation.   
On May 11th 2015, I interviewed the group’s spokesman, Michael Maharrey to find out the 
strategy the organization has put in place to promote nullification across 50 states. He said 
that with very few resources (4 members of staff) and a budget of less than $100,000 per year 
the center adopts an 8 steps strategy:  
1. contact with a legislator keen on states’ rights issues; 
2. coalition building and support; 
3. blogging/reporting in order to educate the general public; 
4. action alerts published at every important step in the bill process; 
5. email campaigns; 
                                                   
136 See statement on the Tenth Amendment Center website. Mike Maharrey, No Koch money here!, TENTH 
AMENDMENT CENTER (Dec. 22, 2012), http://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2012/12/no-koch-money-here/.  
137 See sponsorship announcement: Bill Hahn, The John Birch Society Announces Sponsorship of Tenth 
Amendment Center’s Nullify Now! Tour, THE JOHN BIRCH SOCIETY (Sept. 1, 2010), https://www.jbs.org/more-
press-room-articles/item/3261-the-john-birch-society-announces-sponsorship-of-tenth-amendment-
center%E2%80%99s-nullify-now-tour.  
138 Model Legislation: Nullify Obamacare in 4 Steps, TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER 
http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/legislation/federal-health-care-nullification-act/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2018).  
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6. regular conference calls and communication with legislators and grassroots 
organizations in support of a nullification bill; 
7. ad campaigns; 
8. public testimony.  
 
Mr. Maharrey also confirmed the different background of Tenth Amendment center members 
who mostly come from political right conservative or radical left. To my question “Would 
you classify the movement as libertarian?” he answered that “there is a lot of support from 
libertarians but it really depends on the issue at stake: for example the political lefties would 
support deregulation in marijuana and privacy issues but conservatives would support 
deregulation in healthcare and gun laws”. The organization does not identify with a specific 
political movement but with the general principle of decentralization and empowerment of the 
states, in line with an originalist interpretation of the Tenth Amendment. In particular, my 
attempts to label Tenth Amendment Center’s ideology were watered down by Mr. Maharrey’s 
answers during the interview which made clear that the movement itself is not conscious of 
the legal implications of nullification and, what is more concerning, of the difference between 
fully-fledged nullification of federal law and non-compliance with federal law. Michael 
Maharrey asserted “there is two ways to look at nullifications: the academic side with 
Jefferson and Madison doctrinal systematization and the practical side with non-cooperation 
and nullification of federal law in practice; an example of the latter being the non-prosecution 
for the use of marijuana in certain states.” From the academic point of view, defining “non-
cooperation” as “nullification in practice” is inaccurate; my taxonomy of sovereignty bills is 
indeed aimed at distinguishing between active and passive resistance, active resistance being 
seen as an open declaration of unconstitutionality of federal law and implying the non-
effectiveness of federal rule in the state, passive resistance being interpreted as mere non-
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compliance and refusal to use state resources to implement federal law. The difference is that 
where the first category of bills leaves no space to the federal government to operate in the 
state and also provide penalties for federal officials found guilty of implementing the law 
within the state, the second category represents only a refusal to cooperate and leaves the 
federal government free to use its own resources. An example of the latter is the establishment 
of federal exchanges in states that refuse to establish state exchanges themselves. Michael 
Maharrey does not seem to be aware of the profound constitutional implications of defining 
non-cooperation as “nullification in practice”, the two terms having different doctrinal origins.  
It is therefore apparent that the Tenth Amendment Center, rather than being concerned with 
doctrinal issues, is an activist organization that works in the field, towards a practical objective 
that is deregulation, without a coherent political or ideological perspective. My findings reveal 
that members of the movement themselves interpret nullification as abolition of every kind of 
regulation, both federal and state; therefore also misusing the Tenth Amendment as their flag.  
In light of my field research on the work and credo of the Tenth Amendment Center I conclude 
that, despite its role as leading promoter of nullification, the organization suffers from internal 
contradictions and lacks a uniform and convincing ideological framework.  This is reflected 
in a populist rhetoric and tendency to manipulate the concept of decentralization in favor of 
the concept of deregulation.  
 
The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) 
 
A highly influential, but more concealed activity in promoting nullification legislation is 
carried out by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), 139 an association of state 
                                                   
139 Defined on its own website as the “nation’s largest nonpartisan individual membership association of state 
legislators”. 
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legislators and private-sector members. ALEC was founded in 1973 as “a nonpartisan 
membership association for state lawmakers who shared a common belief in limited 
government, free markets, federalism, and individual liberty.”140 According to ALEC’s 
declarations, approximately one-third of all state legislators are members, in addition to 78 
ALEC “alumni” in Congress and more than 300 private-sector companies, national trade 
associations, and nonprofit organizations.141 The association is funded for more than 98% by 
corporations, corporate trade groups, and corporate foundations including the Koch family 
Charles G. Koch Foundation, the Koch-managed Claude R. Lambe Foundation, the Scaife 
family Allegheny Foundation and the Coors family Castle Rock Foundation.142 ALEC showed 
fierce opposition to the ACA since the beginning and in 2013 published on its website the 
“State Legislators Guide to Repealing Obamacare”143 encouraging legislators to introduce the 
“Freedom of Choice in Health Care Freedom Act” and providing them with model legislation. 
The ALEC bill sample, according to Christie Herrera, Director of the Health and Human 
Services Task Force at ALEC, was enacted in seven states via the legislature or the ballot box, 
and served as the basis of the lawsuit Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius,144 Virginia’s first-
in-the-nation case about the constitutionality of the federal individual mandate.145 The text of 
the draft bill prohibits any person, employer, or health-care provider from being compelled to 
purchase or provide health insurance; protects the right of a person or employer to pay directly 
for healthcare services; protects the right of health care providers to accept direct payment  of 
healthcare services, and protects the existence of a private health insurance market. The 
                                                   
140 History, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL, http://www.alec.org/about-alec/history/ (last visited Sep. 9, 2015). 
141  Letter from American Legislative Exchange Council to Robert C. Byrd, United States Senate and Nancy 
Pelosi, United States House of Representatives (Jul. 29, 2009). The letter has been published by Sourcewatch 
and is available at http://www.sourcewatch.org/images/6/6b/ALEC_Health_Care_letter_2009.pdf.  
142 See What is ALEC?, CENTER FOR MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY, 
http://www.alecexposed.org/wiki/What_is_ALEC%3F (last updated Oct.13, 2017).  
143 State Legislators Guide to Repealing Obamacare, AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL, 
http://www.alec.org/publications/the-state-legislators-guide-to-repealing-obamacare/ (Nov. 8, 2011).  
144 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Va. 2010), rev'd, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 
2011). 
145 State Legislators Guide to Repealing Obamacare, supra note 143.  
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legislation was intended to provide standing to a state participating in litigation against the 
federal individual mandate; allow a state to launch additional, 10th-Amendment-based 
litigation and empower a state attorney general to litigate on behalf of individuals harmed by 
the mandate.146  
ALEC is undoubtedly a major player in influencing state legislatures. It creates model 
legislation that is then pushed in the state legislatures by ALEC legislator members: “Each 
year, close to 1,000 bills, based at least in part on ALEC Model Legislation, are introduced in 
the states. Of these, an average of 20 percent become law.”147 Considering such a high rate of 
success in introducing bills, this research project intended to assess the influence of ALEC’s 
activity in the nullification movement.  
In order to measure the impact of ALEC’s work I have compared the sponsors of my 183 
nullification bills against the list of ALEC’s members. I assumed that if the same name 
appeared on both lists that would be a sufficient element to presume that the sponsor had 
proposed the bill under the influence of ALEC.  The major obstacle I encountered is that 
ALEC does not officially disclose the names of all members. For this reason, I consulted a 
partial list of ALEC members published by Source Watch, a project of the Center for Media 
and Democracy, on their website.148 The Center for Media and Democracy defines itself as “a 
national media group that conducts in-depth investigations into corruption and the undue 
influence of corporations on media and democracy (hence the name).” 149 The list of ALEC 
politicians that I have used is the result of investigative journalism; it has been compiled 
mostly by taking names from ALEC statements, letters and correspondence addressed to 
                                                   
146 Id. at 18. 
147 History, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL, supra note 140. 
148 Alec politicians, CTR. FOR MEDIA & DEMOCRACY, 
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/ALEC_Politicians (last visited Jan. 24, 2018).  
149 About us, CTR. FOR MEDIA & DEMOCRACY, http://www.prwatch.org/cmd (last visited Jan. 24, 2018). 
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Congress and from other ALEC internal documents published by Common Cause150 and used 
to file a formal whistleblower tax fraud claim against ALEC. The analysis does not claim to 
be definitive but to offer an additional dimension to my research project.  
The comparison of the list of authors of nullification bills and the list of ALEC politicians 
shows that, overall, more than half of the bills (53.3%) have been introduced in state 
legislatures by ALEC members. The table below presents the number of nullification bills 
introduced by ALEC members for each year and compares that figure with the total of 
nullification bills introduced across state legislatures.  The third column provides the result of 
that comparison as percentages.       
 
A remarkable figure is the peak of nullification bills introduced by ALEC members (59%) in 
2011 and the significant decrease in the following years. The peak is to be seen as a reaction 
to the enactment of the reform and the hope of influencing the judicial process that would 
terminate with the 2012 Sebelius decision. This figure not only supports the claim that 
                                                   
150 The organization describes itself as a “nonpartisan, grassroots organization dedicated to restoring the core 
values of American democracy, reinventing an open, honest and accountable government that serves the public 
interest, and empowering ordinary people to make their voices heard in the political process.”. See more at 
About Us, COMMON CAUSE, http://www.commoncause.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2018). 
Year  Total of 
nullification bills 
introduced in state 
legislatures 
Number of 
nullification bills 
introduced by 
ALEC Members in 
state legislatures 
Percentage of  nullification bills 
introduced by ALEC Members 
2011 116 68 59% 
2012 21 9 43% 
2013 29 14 48% 
2014 17 7 41% 
Tot. 183 98 53.5% 
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nullification is used mainly in view of influencing litigation but that ALEC is, to the greatest 
extent, concerned with the Court outcomes.   
To conclude, it is possible to argue that ALEC is a key player in nullification efforts but at the 
same time, ALEC uses nullification only with the intent of influencing the judicial process; 
once the Court had declared the individual mandate provision of the ACA constitutional, 
ALEC backed out on nullification leaving the legislative battle in the hands of the libertarian 
movement. 
 
V. North Dakota Senate Bill 2309 (2011), a Case Study on the Legislative 
History of a Neo-Nullification Bill  
 
My study of the nullification movement has taken into consideration both enacted legislation 
and introduced-only bills. This is because, in my opinion, the analysis of introduced-only bills 
provides the researcher with valuable information about the original intent of nullificationists 
and is therefore necessary to understand the essence and origins of the phenomenon. I found 
that, in average, only 7% of proposed nullification bills passed all the stages of the state 
legislative process and have been finally enacted.  It is even more interesting to compare the 
text of the failed and enacted bills; the analysis reveals that state legislators are reluctant to 
approve bills that contain express nullification language i.e. explicitly declare the ACA 
provisions unconstitutional, and prefer instead bills that invalidate the individual mandate by 
simply stating that citizens of the state will be not be obliged to purchase health insurance.  
The first characteristic that appears to secure the passage of the statute in a state legislature is 
a moderate and vague language. Remarkably, none of the enacted statutes explicitly uses 
nullification language but, in most cases, the Act undergoes a process of “language” tweaking, 
transforming its resemblance but not its nature. In particular, most of the enacted bills avoid 
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the words “null”, “void” and references to the nullification doctrine in favor of plain invitations 
to “consider enacting any measure necessary to prevent the enforcement” of the ACA.  
The following case study describes this “adaptive evolution” process taking as exemplar the 
text of the North Dakota Senate Bill 2309, a neo-nullification bill that became Act No. 389 on 
04/27/2011.151 The case study examines the textual changes undergone by the bill as it went 
through the legislative process; the different versions of the bill are also presented in the 
appendix for the reader’s convenience.  
The author of the bill is Republican Senator Margaret Sitte, well known for having also 
sponsored restrictive abortion measures in 2014.152 The enacted bill is today a new section to 
chapter 54-03 of the North Dakota Century Code, relating to federal health care reform 
legislation. The legislative history of the bill provides an illuminating case study for 
investigating the influence of Tenth Amendment Center and ALEC in promoting the 
introduction of the bill, the original intent of legislators and the dynamics of compromise 
around the language and content of the bill.  The rationale for the selection of this bill over 
others is the availability of the committee reports with the narrative of the discussion around 
                                                   
151 S. 2309, 62 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2011). The legislative history of the bill is available on the North Dakota 
Legislature website at http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/62-2011/bill-actions/ba2309.html.  
The final text of the Act reads: An Act to create and enact a new section to chapter 54-03 of the North Dakota 
Century Code, relating to federal health care reform legislation. BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATIVE 
ASSEMBLY OF NORTH DAKOTA: SECTION 1. A new section to chapter 54-03 of the North Dakota 
Century Code is created and enacted as follows: 
Federal health care reform law. 
1. The legislative assembly declares that the federal laws known as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act [Pub. L. 111 - 148] and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 [Pub. L. 111 - 152] likely 
are not authorized by the United States Constitution and may violate its true meaning and intent as given by the 
founders and ratifiers. 
2. The legislative assembly shall consider enacting any measure necessary to prevent the enforcement of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 
within this state. 
3. No provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act or the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010 may interfere with an individual's choice of a medical or insurance provider except 
as otherwise provided by the laws of this state. 
152 See Henry Lebak Bismarck, Margaret Sitte is Far From a Conservative, THE BISMARCK TRIBUNE, 
bismarcktribune.com/news/opinion/mailbag/margaret-sitte-is-far-from-a-conservative/article_95900fdc-9091-
11e3-b8c3-0019bb2963f4.html (Feb. 9, 2014).  
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the different version of the bill. I have examined the Senate153 and House Committee meetings’ 
minutes,154 including the testimony and reconstructed the debate around the bill. 
The influence of the American Legislative Exchange Council and the Tenth Amendment 
Center  
This study has examined contemporary nullification as a political movement and found that a 
major role in the promotion of nullification bills was played by ALEC and the Tenth 
Amendment Center. This section is concerned with the investigation of the role played by these 
two organizations in the introduction/enactment of North Dakota Senate Bill 2309. In order to 
assess the influence of ALEC I checked whether any member of the North Dakota House or 
Senate had ties with the association. In particular, I examined the legislative journey of the bill 
and checked the profile of the members of the House and senators that were involved in the 
legislative process.  
The journey of the bill started in the North Dakota’s legislature Senate Human Services 
Committee and in the House Industry, Business and Labor Committee.  
The original bill was introduced on Jan. 24th 2011 and referred to the Senate Human Services 
Committee. The Committee was composed of four Republicans (Chairman Sen. Judy Lee, Vice 
Chair Sen. Gerald Uglem, Sen. Spencer Berry and Sen. Dick Dever) and one Democrat (Sen. 
Tim Mathern). The composition of the Committee appears to suggest a certain influence of 
ALEC: out of FIVE members, THREE are reported to have ties with ALEC. Specifically, 
according to the Center for Media and Democracy list, the Chairman of the Committee Sen. 
Judy Lee and the Vice Chairman Sen. Gerald Uglem used to be members of the ALEC Health 
                                                   
153 STAFF OF N.D. S. HUM. SERVICES COMM., 62ND LEG., 2011 SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE MINUTES 
SB2309 (Comm. Print 2011). Access to the minutes has been kindly provided, upon request, by Richard M. 
Mikulski, reference librarians of the North Dakota Legislative Council. A copy of the minutes is on file with the 
author.  
154 STAFF OF N.D. H. INDUS. & LAB. COMM., 62ND LEG., 2011 HOUSE STANDING COMMITTEE MINUTES SB2309 
(Comm. Print 2011). Access to the minutes has been kindly provided, upon request, by Richard M. Mikulski, 
reference librarians of the North Dakota Legislative Council. A copy of the minutes is on file with the author. 
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and Human Services Task Force,155 Sen. Gerald Uglem was also member of ALEC Energy, 
Environment and Agriculture Task Force156 and Sen.Dick Dever was member of the ALEC 
International Relations Task Force.157 The Tenth Amendment’s Center appears to have played 
a role in the introduction of the bill. In her testimony before the Senate Committee on Feb. 2nd, 
the author of the bill, Sen. Sitte openly used talking points from Thomas Woods of the Tenth 
Amendment Center. She argued that the bill had been drafted on the blueprint of Thomas 
Jefferson’s and James Madison’s Kentucky and Virginia resolutions.158 
 
The bill was then considered by the House Industry, Business and Labor Committee. The 
Committee was composed of 14 members, 10 republicans (Chairman Rep. George Keiser, Vice 
Chairman Rep. James Kasper, Rep. Donald Clark, Rep. Robert Frantsvog, Rep. Nancy 
Johnson, Rep. Curt Kreun, Rep. Mike Nathe, Rep. Dan Ruby, Rep. Gary Sukut, and Rep. Don 
Vigesaa) and four democrats (Rep. Bill Amerman, Rep. Tracy Boe, Rep. Ed Gruchalla and 
Rep. Marvin Nelson).  Three members of the Committee are reported to have ties with ALEC: 
Rep. Dan Ruby who is also member of the ALEC Commerce, Insurance and Economic 
Development Task Force,159 Rep. Don Vigesaa who is also member of the Energy, 
                                                   
155 Their names appear in the list of members of the Health and Human Services Taskforce provided by the 
Center for Media and Democracy. ALEC Health and Human Services Task Force, CENTER FOR MEDIA AND 
DEMOCRACY, https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/ALEC_Health_and_Human_Services_Task_Force (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2018).  
156 His name appears in the list of members of the Energy, Environment and Agriculture Task Force provided by 
the Center for Media and Democracy. ALEC Energy, Environment and Agriculture Task Force, CENTER FOR 
MEDIA & DEMOCRACY, 
https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/ALEC_Energy,_Environment_and_Agriculture_Task_Force (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2018). 
157 His name appears in the list of members of Federalism and International Relations Task Force provided by 
the Center for Media and Democracy. ALEC Federalism and International Relations Task Force, CENTER 
FOR MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY, 
https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/ALEC_Federalism_and_International_Relations_Task_Force (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2018). 
158 STAFF OF N.D. S. HUM. SERVICES COMM, supra note 153 (Feb. 2, 2011).  
159 His name appears in the list of members of the Commerce, Insurance and Economic Development Task 
Force provided by the Center for Media and Democracy. ALEC Commerce, Insurance and Economic 
Development Task Force, CENTER FOR MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY, 
https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/ALEC_Commerce,_Insurance_and_Economic_Development_Task_Fo
rce (last visited Jan. 24, 2018). 
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Environment and Agriculture Task Force 160 and finally, Chairman Rep. Kasper whose name 
appear in two ALEC headed letters respectively addressed to Nancy Pelosi (to reiterate concern 
with the federal health reform)161 and to Majority leader Reid (to express concern with the plan 
to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act).162 The involvement of ALEC is also 
confirmed by the testimony material submitted by Sen. Sitte. Specifically she attached an e-
mail from ALEC Legislative Analyst Monica Mastracco to Rep. Kasper; the email was an 
invitation to introduce the ALEC Freedom of Choice in Healthcare Act.  
Sen. Sitte also disclosed ties with the Tenth Amendment Center when asked by Chairman 
Keiser in the House Committee testimony on March 21st to provide legal grounds for the 
proposed bill’s assertion of sovereignty: “This is from the Tenth Amendment Center, Thomas 
Wood and you can google it, so it’s eleven states that have adopted this language. We are using 
the whole idea of state nullification, that states have the authority to nullify an Act of Congress 
if Congress have done something to overlap its boundaries”.163 She also said that she had been 
in contact with the Center and had been reassured that, despite the Senate amendments, the bill 
would still have been considered part of the nullification movement. In the same testimony, 
she submitted a blog page from Tenth Amendment’s website.164 I conclude that it is therefore 
safe to assume that in the North Dakota SB 2903 case study both ALEC and the Tenth 
Amendment Center have played a central role in the promotion of the bill. This finding 
reinforces the initial assumption that nullification is appropriately studied as a political 
phenomenon with roots in those organizations that aim at influencing litigation. 
 
                                                   
160 Supra note 156. 
161 ALEC letter to Nancy Pelosi supra note 141.  
162 Letter from American Legislative Exchange Council to Majority Leader Reid, United States Senate (Mar. 10, 
2010). The letter has been published by Sourcewatch and is available at 
http://www.sourcewatch.org/images/3/3b/EPALetterforSenate.pdf.  
163 Staff of N.D. H. Indus. & Lab. Comm., supra note 154 (Mar. 21, 2011).  
164 Id. 
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The dynamics of compromise around the language and content of the bill 
When discussing the two typologies of neo-nullification bills (pure and cautious) above, I also 
referred to the textual evolution process that most of the enacted statutes had undergone in 
order to be approved by the state legislatures.  What follows is a critical analysis of the 
amendments made to the North Dakota Senate Bill 2309 before its final enactment.  
The original bill, as proposed by Sen. Sitte, was a radical declaration of sovereignty. The text 
read: 165 
“The legislative assembly declares that the federal laws known as the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act [Pub . L. 111 - 148] and the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 [Pub . L. 111 - 152] are not authorized by the 
United States Constitution and violate its true meaning and intent as given by the 
founders and ratifiers and are declared to be invalid in this state, may not be 
recognized by this state, are specifically rejected by this state, and are considered 
to be null in this state. […] Any official, agent, or employee of the United States 
government or any employee of a corporation providing services to the United 
States government who enforces or attempts to enforce an act, order, law, statute, 
rule, or regulation of the government of the United States in violation of this Act is 
guilty of a class C felony.”  
According to Sen. Sitte, such a vigorous declaration of sovereignty was justified as it 
represented the will of the people166 and reflected the ruling of the federal Court that the 
individual mandate is an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional power. 167   
The nullification language was deleted in the very first consideration of the bill by the Senate 
Committee on Human Services. The engrossed Senate bill only left the first part of the phrase: 
                                                   
165 The full text of the bill can be found in the appendix, p. 269.  
166 STAFF OF N.D. S. HUM. SERVICES COMM, supra note 153 (Feb. 2, 2011).  
167 Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Serv's., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011). The Bill 
was enacted before the Supreme Court ruling in Sebelius. 
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“the ACA is not authorized by the United States Constitution and violates its true meaning and 
intent as given by the founders and ratifiers.” The compromise was found by Sen. Uglem after 
Chair Judy Lee declared to “have a little problem with declaring it invalid in the state”.168 
Also, it should be noted that the Senate Committee deleted sections 3, 4 and 5, the provision 
that established penalties for federal or state officials found guilty of enforcing the federal 
health care reform law. A number of committee members indeed declared “discomfort”169 with 
this controversial provision. Chair Judy Lee explained: “anything we do is going to put our 
state employees in legal jeopardy as well”.170 The committee amended the bill and granted a 
do pass as amended with a 3-1-1 vote.171 The Senate reviewed the bill and passed in second 
reading with a 27-19 vote. 
 
When the bill reached the House Industry, Business and Labor Committee the language became 
even more moderate, and words expressing possibility had been added to supplant the original 
assertiveness: “[the ACA is] likely not authorized by the United States Constitution and may 
violate its true meaning and intent as given by the Founders and ratifiers.” [emphasis added] 
Rep. Kasper explained that the House Industry, Business and Labor Committee added “likely” 
because “they had some consternation on their side on making a hard statement that it is 
unconstitutional because the federal courts have not ruled”.172 In a later meeting, on March 30 
he recognized the danger of an assertive language and said “After the amendment was defeated, 
I talked to some people and found three concerns that the committee members had. The first 
one was the reference to federal law and the concern that we should not be talking about federal 
law in an amendment…”.173 On Apr. 18th 2011 Rep. Kasper exposed his personal opinion 
                                                   
168 STAFF OF N.D. S. HUM. SERVICES COMM, supra note 153 (Feb. 16, 2011). 
169 Id.   
170 Id. 
171 Senator Spencer Berry did not vote on Senate Bill 2309 when it was in Committee. 
172 Staff of N.D. H. Indus. & Lab. Comm., supra note 154  (Mar. 21, 2011).  
173 Staff of N.D. H. Indus. & Lab. Comm., supra note 154 (Mar. 30, 2011). 
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saying that he agreed with Sen. Dick Denver that the ACA was not authorized by the US 
Constitution but suggested that “likely” and “may” were necessary for the survival of the bill: 
“[I] would agree but sometimes making those bold statements at a time like this might not be 
the right thing to say for the survival of the bill”.174 Rep. Ruby emphasized that a softer 
language would have left room for some kind of result at higher court level. At the center of 
the dispute was also the willingness to go a little further than HB 1165, a very similar but only 
declaratory bill that was enacted on 04/04/2011. HB 1165 provided that “a resident is not 
required to have a policy of individual health coverage, and would not be liable for any penalty, 
assessment, fee, or fine”. Also, the House added an entire section entitled “Health insurance 
coverage not required - Freedom to choose and provide medical services.” The section would 
have implicitly nullified the individual mandate. However, under the suggestion of Sen. Dever 
that section was removed by the Conference Committee and replaced with a plain declaratory 
statement of citizen protection “No provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 may interfere with an 
individual’s choice of medical provider or their choice of an insurance provider except as 
provided by North Dakota State Law.” The amended bill passed the Conference Committee 
and finally the House of Representatives with a 69-24 vote. The Governor signed Senate Bill 
2309 on April 27, 2011. The final version of the statute, as anticipated, maintained the original 
objective but differed from the model significantly. In particular, the Act lost the original 
assertiveness in favour of a much more moderate language, exemplified by the use of future 
tense “shall”,175 and of words expressing eventuality such as “may” and “likely”. The final Act 
looks more like a vague invitation to consider nullification as an option than a real assertion of 
sovereignty. The controversial legality of nullification appears to have played an essential role 
                                                   
174 Staff of N.D. S. Hum. Services Comm, supra note 153 (Conference Committee Apr.  18, 2011). 
175 S. 2309, 62th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2011) at subsection 2: “The legislative assembly shall consider 
enacting any measure necessary to prevent the enforcement of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 within this state.”  
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in shaping the language of the Act but what should be noted is that, despite language tweaking, 
the original nullification intent has not been affected. Whether legislators really believed that 
a nullification statute could have nullified federal law is the subject of the next section. 
The intent of legislators 
When reading a contemporary nullification bill a constitutional scholar cannot avoid wondering 
why states arrogate to themselves the ability to declare unconstitutionality of federal law and 
whether in drafting the bill the legislators have considered the traditional role of judicial review.  
Were legislators aware of the legal implications of such a class of bills or did they believe that 
the state legislature could stop the enforcement of federal mandates?  Is the declaration of 
unconstitutionality the means or the final objective?  
The minutes of the Senate Human Services Committee suggest that legislators were fully aware 
of the legal problems created by a bill aimed at nullifying federal law but limited their objection 
to language tweaking.  Chair Judy Lee, well aware of the legal implications, proposed to 
convert the bill into a non-binding Resolution; Sen. Uglem reiterated the suggestion and his 
assertion exemplifies the position of legislators: “Not comfortable with putting this into state 
law, is in agreement with the goal but don’t feel comfortable with it in law.” 176 Awareness of 
the federal nature of the issues at stake is also showed by Sen. Mathern (Dem.) who objected 
to the fact that the bill was being considered by the Human Service Committee when it would 
have been more appropriate to refer it to the Judiciary Committee: “[We] are not called upon 
to evaluate healthcare; bill calls upon us to evaluate our relationship with the federal 
government”.177  Legislators were clearly aware of the consequences of nullification and some 
of them, like Sen. Dick Dever, would have passed the bill as proposed. However, this position 
was not shared by more cautious legislators like Rep. Ruby who kept on drawing attention to 
                                                   
176 Staff of N.D. S. Hum. Services Comm, supra note 153 (Apr.  18, 2011). 
177 Id. at Feb..2, 2011. 
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the pending federal litigation. The final version is the result of the compromise between these 
two factions.  
To go back to our initial question, Is the declaration of unconstitutionality the means or the 
final objective? This case study, together with evidence from my interview with Tenth 
Amendment Center’s Communication Director Michael Maharrey,178 makes clear that 
legislators use nullification bills as a means and not as final objective. During her testimony, 
Sen. Sitte declared that the Act was not a solution but a way forward: “This is a third way of 
showing the will of the people: federal court decision, congress acting, and now the states 
acting”.179 Rep. Kasper also explained that the scope of the bill was only to guarantee the rights 
of the citizens for their ability to seek medical care and the rights of the providers to provide 
it: “With the uncertainty of what is happening in Washington with the Health Care Protection 
Act and not knowing how the rules are going to come down they wanted to make a statement 
that our citizens and providers have certain rights that are protected in statute”.180  The comment 
of Rep. Kasper demonstrates that the major hope is to influence the judicial process: “If the 
Supreme Court acts between now and the special session, which is a possibility, this bill could 
be extremely important. If the Supreme Court does not act before the special session but there 
are new rules and regulations that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
promulgates that could be undesirable to our citizens and providers then this bill is also 
important.”181 
The analysis of the minutes of the committee meeting reveals that the intent of legislators was 
to influence the pending federal litigation by drawing attention to the alleged 
unconstitutionality of the individual mandate. Also, nullification is seen as one of three 
                                                   
178 See interview analysis above “I would still be happy with a piece of bread if I can’t get the whole loaf”. 
179 STAFF OF N.D. S. HUM. SERVICES COMM, supra note 153 (Feb.2, 2011).  
180 Id. at Apr. 13,2011.  
181 Id. at Apr. 14, 2011.  
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different strategies to oppose the ACA “With so much of our freedom and prosperity at stake 
it is highly advisable to pursue all three strategies”.182 
It is also pertinent here to recall the conclusions of the section about ALEC’s interest in 
promoting this kind of legislation. Legislators’ action are often piloted by group interests with 
precise objectives and no interest in the practical means used to achieve a certain outcome. If 
we keep that in mind and we assume that the objective of interest groups was to block the 
implementation of the new regulations and influence the judicial process, it is easier to 
understand why legislators did not move from the original objective but only moderated the 
language of state bills: “If, for example, passing immigration reform or repealing healthcare at 
the federal level is politically unfeasible, private groups with a stake in these decisions might 
target state officials to seek alternative policies that would achieve substantially similar results 
in select jurisdictions.”183 
I would therefore conclude that the doctrine of nullification is knowingly utilized by interest 
groups to make their voice louder but it is clear that nullification is only a mechanism to put 
forward certain political objectives that would not otherwise be achieved.  
 
VI. Nullification: the contemporary philosophical and constitutional 
controversy 
 
Up until this point, my work has provided a portrait of the nullification phenomenon and 
demonstrated that the doctrine, in its contemporary and revised version, has lost vigor and is 
used only –in a populist key- to achieve political goals that fall short of nullification as it was 
                                                   
182 Testimony in support of Senate Bill 2309. 
183 Julia Preston, Political Battle on Immigration Shifts to States, N.Y. Times (Dec. 31, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/01/us/01immig.html?_ r=0. 
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intended in 1832. As seen in the North Dakota case study, state legislators are well aware of the 
implications of such a doctrine and only mean to use nullification to raise their voice, gather 
popular consensus and fight back against policies they do not like.  
 
Eminent scholars184 discussed the phenomenon of nullification during a symposium organized 
by the Arkansas School of Law in September 2013;185 the main objective of the symposium 
was to assess the value (if any) of contemporary calls for secession, nullification, and/or 
interposition. The symposium “Cooper's Shadow: Secession, Nullification and State Rights, 
Circa 2013” was opened by University of Texas law Professor Sanford V. Levinson who 
defined contemporary nullification measures as products of “zombie (or dinosaur) 
constitutionalism”186 because of the similarities with Thomas Jefferson’s Kentucky Resolutions 
of 1798. In the same symposium, Dr. James Read, Professor of Political Science at the College 
of Saint Benedict/Saint John's University also agreed that nullification was a revival of buried 
constitutional rhetoric that he had previously called “undead”.187  The same idea of a revival of 
the theory of nullification has also been discussed in more recent literature on nullification that 
interpreted nullification bills as an attempt to “stealing some pages from early American 
history's playbook”.188  
I find myself in disagreement with the definition of current state measures against 
implementation of certain provisions of the ACA a revival of nullification era claims.189 I would 
                                                   
184 University of Arkansas law professor Mark Killenbeck, Stanford University historian Jack Rakove, 
Washington University in St. Louis philosopher Kit Wellman, Vanderbilt University law professor Mark 
Brandon and College of St. Benedict political scientist James Read.  
185 Symposium, Cooper's Shadow: Secession, Nullification, and States’ Rights, 67 ARK. L. REV. 1 (2014). 
186 Levinson supra note 122. 
187 Read & Allen, supra note 34. “Contemporary nullification may or may not ultimately catch on as a living 
doctrine, powerful enough to bring a state and its citizens to a direct test of force with the federal government—
as occurred in South Carolina in the 1830s and in several Southern states in the 1950s. But in the last few years 
nullification has at least rejoined the ranks of the ‘undead.’” 
188 Keely N. Kight, Back to the Future: The Revival of the Theory of Nullification, 65 MERCER L. REV. 521, 522 
(2014).  
189 See id.at 523 and James H. Read, Changing the Rules; Leaving the Game; Nullification, Secession, and the 
American Future, 67 ARK. L. REV. 103 (2014).  
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certainly concede that contemporary nullification efforts find roots in that historical moment 
and constitutional controversy but the contemporary nullification bills do not share the same 
objectives of the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions or the Calhoun’s Exposition.  
Using a metaphor, I would instead say that the doctrine of nullification was born with 
Jefferson’s Kentucky Resolution, grew taller in 1832 with Calhoun, married secession, lived its 
golden age during the civil war but died in that conflict. Contemporary nullification is not a 
“zombie” but only a “descendant”: it maintains philosophical grounds but developed a much 
more complex doctrine with very different objectives, modern constitutional concerns and 
consequent modern approaches. I instead find myself more comfortable with Professor John 
Dinan’s remarks against labelling current state measures against implementation of federal law 
as “nullification efforts”. I quote here his findings:  
Upon closer examination, and contrary to the statements of supporters and critics 
alike, these recent state measures regarding health care, guns, driver‘s licenses, and 
medicinal marijuana fall short of invoking the clearly discredited doctrine of 
nullification embodied in the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, the resolutions of 
several New England states in response to the Embargo of 1807,13 the South 
Carolina Nullification Ordinance of 1832, Wisconsin‘s nullification of the Fugitive 
Slave Law in 1859,15 and interposition acts adopted by eight southern states in 
1956 and 1957 in response to the Supreme Court‘s school desegregation rulings. 
Rather as I will argue, these recent state measures illustrate several ways that states 
are capable of safeguarding federalism principles without engaging in 
nullification.190 
States legislatures do engage in nullification but in a different, evolved and more complex way.   
                                                   
190 Dinan, supra note 2 at 1638.  
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The main difference between the original and contemporary conception of nullification is in its 
linkage to the doctrine of secession. The Arkansas symposium appropriately discussed 
nullification together with secession191 because during the crisis of 1832 nullification and 
secession were two faces of the same coin and southern states demonstrated their willingness 
to secede 40 years later. However, the symposium failed to acknowledge that secession is no 
longer part of the contemporary nullification movement. With the exception of the Texas 
National Movement192 I find it difficult to argue that there is any secession motive in the states 
or even secession intent in the mind of the authors of nullification bills. Such a discrepancy 
between the original and contemporary conception of nullification truly is, in my opinion, the 
key to understand the current movement. To recall the metaphor used by Prof. Read,193 
contemporary nullificationists do not even think for a moment of leaving the game but have 
much higher ambitions: changing the rules of the game. Fueled by the success of populist 
arguments on citizenship rights and state sovereignty, contemporary nullification sets up 
intentional legal paradoxes that originate in constitutional controversies regarding different 
doctrines of separation of powers. My argument here is that the real target of nullificationists is 
no longer the Congress but the separation of powers and Supreme Court’s authority: 
nullificationists specifically challenge judicial review and judicial supremacy. 
What follows is an analysis of the constitutional issues that lead me to this conclusion.  
The main legal issue created by nullification is the clash with the Supremacy Clause which 
establishes federal law as the “supreme law of the land, and invalidates state laws that interfere 
with or are contrary to federal law”.194 As UCLA professor Adam Winkler comments - “Any 
                                                   
191 See Symposium supra note 185. In particular, Mark E. Brandon, Secession and Nullification in the Twenty-
First Century, 67 ARK. L. REV. 91 (2014).  
192 The movement is an organization that works to promote the idea of an independent Texas. See their webpage 
Texas Nationalist Movement, http://texnat.org/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2018). 
193 James H. Read, supra note 189.  
194 ABC Charters, Inc. v. Bronson, 591 F.Supp.2d 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (quoting Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 
496 F.Supp.2d 477, 518 (M.D. Pa. 2007). 
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law that interferes with a valid federal law is unconstitutional. […] The federal government can 
pass legislation in an area, and people who are citizens of the states have to obey that 
legislation.”195 Supremacy of federal law is a straightforward concept that would lead to a tout-
court rejection of nullification. 
The key point, however, is that the position of nullificationists is more subtle and controversial: 
they argue that the Supremacy Clause does not apply to the ACA because they believe that 
certain provisions of the law are unconstitutional, not “made in pursuance thereof” as the 
Supremacy Clause would require.196 The evident assumption behind this argument is that 
sovereign states possess judicial review capacity, the power to interpret the Constitution and 
review the constitutionality of federal laws, even if this implies disregarding Supreme Court’s 
rulings, i.e. the Sebelius decision. A paradox?  Yes, if we take into account that in the American 
constitutional tradition judicial review is a prerogative of the Supreme Court (Marbury v. 
Madison) 197 and that states are bound by U.S. Supreme Court rulings (Cooper v. Aaron). 198 
However, the idea that the Supreme Court possesses judicial review power and finality over the 
meaning of the Constitution has been objected to by many constitutional theorists. What follows 
is an analysis of the literature that supports the philosophical underpinnings behind the two 
legal issues created by nullification: the rejection of the principle of judicial review (the fact 
                                                   
195 Quoted in K. Mahnken, Red States' Legally Dubious Strategy to Destroy Obamacare, NEW REPUBLIC (28 
Jan. 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116373/red-states-wage-legally-dubious-war-nullify-
obamacare. 
196 Article VI, Paragraph 2. “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall 
be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution 
or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.”.  
197 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). The decision formally established the principle of judicial review. 
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”. 
198 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). Cooper announced that “the federal judiciary is supreme in the 
exposition of the law of the Constitution” and further that an “interpretation of [the Constitution] enunciated by 
th[e] Court . . . is the supreme law of the land.” More importantly, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the 
doctrines of nullification and interposition: “the Brown case can neither be nullified openly and directly by state 
legislators or state executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for 
segregation…” 
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that the Court has the power to strike down laws) and judicial supremacy199(the fact that the 
Court is the final arbiter in the interpretation of the Constitution).  
With regard to judicial review, relevant conservative literature200 seems to be skeptical of 
Marbury and has developed arguments against the attribution of this power to the Supreme 
Court itself. One of the main arguments is that the Constitution never mentions judicial review 
as a power expressly granted to the Supreme Court:201  
Indeed, no specific language in the Constitution gives the Supreme Court the power 
to declare certain governmental conduct unconstitutional, let alone the exclusive 
authority to do so. Judicial review can be derived from some sections of the 
Constitution, but in almost every instance it is the power of federal courts to strike 
down state actions or to void congressional statutes that threatens judicial 
independence.202 
Furthermore, originalists argue that the founders did not contemplate judicial nullification of 
legislation enacted by the states and by Congress. The distinguished historian Leonard Levy 
asserted: “The evidence seems to indicate that the Framers did not mean for the Supreme Court 
to have authority to void acts of Congress.”203 William Crosskey, one of the most provocative 
legal historians of recent times, 204 reaches the same conclusion: “The rationally indicated 
conclusion is that judicial review of congressional acts was not intended, or provided, in the 
                                                   
199 Robert Justin Lipkin, Which Constitution? Who Decides? The Problem of Judicial Supremacy and the 
Interbranch Solution, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1055, 1056-57 (2006). 
200 See CHARLES S. HYNEMAN, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL 125 (1963); Louis Boudin, Government by 
Judiciary 26 POLIT. SC. QTLY. 238-248 (1911); James B. McDonough, Usurpation of Power by Federal Courts 
(1912) AM. L. REV. 45; JESSE. H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 62-63 
(1980). 
201 It is here worth reporting the text of Art. III of the U.S. Constitution: “The judicial Power of the United 
States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such Courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish”. 
202 Neal Devins and Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83, 86 (1998).  
203 LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 100 (1988). 
204 So defined by Abe Krash in The Legacy of William Crosskey, 93 YALE L.J. 959 (1984). 
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Constitution.”205 A more recent publication by Prof. William Nelson reads: “What makes 
[Marbury] even more important is the absence of any clear plan on the part of the Constitution’s 
framers to provide the Court with this power”.206 Mark Graber insists: “No constitutional 
provision plainly states that elected officials are also bound by Supreme Court decisions on 
constitutional questions.”207  
 
On the other hand, modern scholarship208 alleges that Marbury is a victim of 
contemporary revisionism and supports the legitimacy of judicial review in light of the 
assumption that there was a historical practice of judicial review in American courts before 
the decision in Marbury. Unexpectedly, even the originalist Randy Barnett supports this view: 
“Judicial nullification of unconstitutional laws is not only consistent with the frame provided 
by original meaning, it is expressly authorized by the text and is entirely justified on originalist 
grounds.”209 The debate concerning the appropriate role of judicial review is wide and it not 
within the aims of this work to review the extensive literature in the field. However, it is 
relevant to note that recent defenses of a vigorous judicial review finds their roots in the 
pluralist theory. Examples are Terri Jennings Peretti, In Defense of a Political Court (1999) 
arguing that politically motivated constitutional decision making is beneficial to the American 
democracy and Louis Michael Seidman, Our Unsettled Constitution (2001) which develops a 
theory of “unsettlement”, according to which the evolving interpretation of the Constitution 
allows political bargaining. Who is right and who is wrong? Maybe the Supreme Court’s 
                                                   
205 WILLIAM CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1000 
(1953).  
206 WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (2000). 
207 MARK A. GRABER, A NEW INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 115 (2013). 
208 See SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 89 (1990); James E. Pfander, 
Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court's Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515 
(2001); William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review before Marbury, 58 STAN L. REV. 455 (2005); CLIFF SLOAN 
& DAVID MCKEAN, THE GREAT DECISION: JEFFERSON, ADAMS, MARSHALL, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE SUPREME 
COURT (2009).  
209 Randy Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Judicial Power, 12 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 115, 120 (2004). 
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judicial review power is a distortion; maybe it is the natural creature of the ideologies and 
legal philosophies that surrounded the formation of the US constitutional system;210 what is 
certain is that it is a 200 years old legal tradition and factual reality in the United States. 
Nullification is clearly hitting right at the top of the constitutional pantheon.  
 
With regard to judicial supremacy, academic criticism211 has strongly opposed the idea 
that the Supreme Court should serve as the final, highest arbiter of the Constitution, as 
established by Marbury and Cooper v. Aaron.  
A provocative argument is put forward by Prof. Paulsen212 who contends that Marbury 
has created a myth and that a proper reading of Marshall’s decision would actually suggest 
that judicial review is not an “exclusive” power of the judiciary but should be shared between 
the three institutional branches and the states’ government. In his view, judicial jurisdiction 
does not imply judicial supremacy over the other branches of government: 
 
none of the hypotheticals posed by Marshall remotely suggests judicial 
exclusivity or even judicial priority in constitutional interpretation. They 
all involve constitutional questions of a type that could (and should) be 
considered in the ordinary course of business of the legislative and 
executive branches. There is nothing uniquely judicial about them, so as 
to suggest in any way that constitutional interpretation is a uniquely 
judicial activity.213 
                                                   
210 I am also referring to the influence in the United States of Coke’ decision in Dr. Bonham's Case (8 Co. Rep. 
107/ 77 Eng. Rep. 638) which, despite disputes and subsequent development of UK law, is widely recognized as 
establishing judicial review. 
211 See Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 986 (1987). In support of judicial 
supremacy arguments see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1361 (1997). 
212 Michael S. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 
217, 345 (1994) and, from the same author, The irrepressible myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706 (2003).  
213 Id. at 2721. 
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The broader idea that constitutional interpretation should be the result of a dialogue among all 
of three branches of government as well as the states and the general public is recalled by 
political scientist Dr. Louis Fisher and Prof. Neal E. Devins who named this conception a “three 
branch interpretation” theory in the introduction to their book The Democratic Constitution.214 
The book is the continuation of their previous joint work on the field215 and although it does 
not explicitly challenge the supremacy of the Court, it emphasizes the role that non judicial 
actors play in shaping constitutional values. The interrelation with the work of other, more 
radical scholars is declared by the authors themselves: “by arguing that courts can and should 
play a pivotal role in triggering both social movements and elected government actions, we part 
company with other scholars who have challenged the Court’s status as ultimate interpreter of 
the Constitution”. 216  
Prof. Robert Nagel is similarly critical of excessive judicial power denouncing the gap 
between “legal culture” (intended as judicial opinions) and “political culture” (the law as 
implemented by institutions, behaviors, and understandings) caused by judicial activism. The 
Supreme Court of the United States, he argued, should intervene in “those special occasions 
when some aberrant governmental action is emphatically inconsistent with constitutional 
theory, text, and public understanding as expressed in prolonged practice”.217 In all the other 
cases, Prof. Nagel asserts, public policy decision-making should be left to the other branches 
of the federal government or to the states.  
                                                   
214 NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2004). 
215 See LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS (2006); NEAL 
DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2000). 
216 NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 5 (2004). 
217 Robert Nagel, Constitutional Cultures: The Mentality and Consequences of Judicial Review, 39 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 187 (1989). 
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Scholars based a more specific argument in defense of judicial deference to the Congress in  
particular provisions of the Constitution, notably Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.218 
As Prof. Kermit Roosevelt219 suggests, this constitutional provision advances the argument that 
Congress is the primary body to enforce legislation and that the courts should defer to the 
congressional interpretations upon which enforcement legislation is based.   
However, in my ACA nullification case study there is no inter-branch conflict within the federal 
government but a conflict between the federal judiciary and state legislatures representing the 
people. Hence, more pertinent to this paper, which depicts nullification as a movement aimed 
at protecting individual liberty and therefore empowering “The People”, is another challenge 
to interpretive judicial supremacy which finds its ideological roots in the so called 
“constitutional interpretations by non-judicial actors” or “popular constitutionalism”, the idea 
that ordinary citizens, rather than the courts, are the most authoritative interpreters of the 
Constitution. A recent elaboration of this argument can be found in an acclaimed 2004 book by 
Larry Kramer220 and in the work of Edward Hartnett: “With a Constitution made in the name 
of ‘We the People,’ all of us are legitimately interested in the meaning of the Constitution--all 
of us must be welcome participants in the conversation.”221  Professors Balkin222 and Robert 
Post and Reva B. Siegel223 find constitutional authority in social movements and in the voice 
of the People arguing that  originalism’s appeal grows out of the conservative constitutional 
ideals it expresses. 
                                                   
218 “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” 
219Kermit Roosevelt, Judicial Supremacy, Judicial Activism: Cooper v. Aaron and Parents involved, 52 ST 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1191, 1197 (Summer 2008). 
220 LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 221 
(2004). 
221 Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 123 (1999). 
222 Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism 354-56 (2011). 
223 Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 25 (Jack M. 
Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009). 
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A comprehensive theory of the so defined “populist constitutional law” is developed by Prof. 
Mark Tushnet224 who, starting from a full rejection of judicial supremacy, argues that the 
development of constitutional meaning should be left primarily in the hands of political rather 
than judicial actors. In his view, populist constitutional law would distribute constitutional 
responsibility throughout the population and increase the power of self-government.225 He 
defines populist constitutional law as “a law oriented to realizing the principles of the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution Preamble. More specifically, it is a law 
committed to the principle of universal human rights justifiable by reason in the service of self-
government.”226 He points out that only the Declaration and the Preamble should be considered 
the body of populist constitutional law. The main characteristic of this system is the “thinness” 
of its provisions that provide guidelines but leave space for its application “it leaves a wide 
range open for resolution through principled political discussion- principled because they are 
oriented toward the Declaration’s principles.”227  
Judicial supremacy has also recently been at the center of the political dispute about same-sex 
marriage. On Jun. 26th 2015 the Supreme Court ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges228 that state-level 
bans on same-sex marriage are unconstitutional. In spite of the decision, Kim Davis, a Kentucky 
county clerk, kept on refusing to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples on grounds that 
issuing the licenses would violate her Christian beliefs. She was subsequently jailed for five 
days following a charge of contempt of court hearing.229 Was Ms. Davis nullifying de facto the 
Supreme Court ruling? Can we interpret her behavior as a challenge to judicial supremacy?  
                                                   
224 MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) 8-9, 14-15, 22-23. 
225 Id. at 174. 
226 Id. at 181.  
227 Id. at 185. 
228  576 U.S. ___ (2015).  
229 U.S. District Court Judge David L. Bunning issued the decision. On August 26, 2015, a three-judge panel of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld Judge Bunning's decision. 
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Former Arkansas Governor Mr. Huckabee did not miss the chance to point the finger to the 
Supreme Court on the day Ms. Davis was released: “The founders never gave one branch of 
government the power to make the law,” referring to the Supreme Court’s decision allowing 
same-sex marriage across the country. “Every one of us will have to decide whether we want 
to keep this great country or whether we want to surrender and sacrifice it to tyranny.”230 It is 
clear that the language of nullification still pervades conservative political discourse in the 
speeches of governors, state legislators, and even U.S. presidents.231 
My finding is that, when seeking popular consensus, contemporary nullificationists borrow 
from the populist tradition much more than from Calhoun’s teachings and their claims certainly 
fall short of invoking secession. The ultimate goal of contemporary nullificationists is to 
influence litigation and if possible to create a decentralized system of judicial review where 
states can reject a federal law because of constitutional concerns. The obvious objection to this 
hypothetical framework is that shared judicial responsibility would create chaos and anarchy. I 
would like to conclude, in this regards, with Prof. Paulsen’s reply to this corncern:  
“Decentralization is not chaos; it is simply the antithesis of centralized interpretive 
authority. It is an example of ‘checks and balances.’ If there is one thing we know 
about the Framers, it is that they feared the concentration of power and sought to 
prevent it in the design of the Constitution. […] Division and shared responsibility 
admits of the possibility of disagreement, competing interpretations, ongoing 
tension, struggle, compromise (or deadlock), and lack of a definitive resolution. In 
other words, it admits of — indeed, virtually assures — exactly what separation of 
powers is designed to produce as a general proposition. Over time, and across a 
                                                   
230 Reported in Alan Rappeport, Mike Huckabee (Not Ted Cruz) Captures Spotlight at Kim Davis Event, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sep. 8, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/09/08/mike-huckabee-captures-spotlight-
not-ted-cruz-at-kim-davis-event/.  
231 DANIEL BELAND, PHIL ROCCO AND ALEX WADDAN, OBAMACARE WARS 28 (2016), QUOTING SAMUEL 
HUTCHINSON BEER, TO MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1993).   
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broad range of issues, such an arrangement tends to produce a kind of general 
equilibrium — not perfect stability or repose, but general equilibrium. (Does a 
regime of judicial supremacy really do any better than that?). ”232 
 
Conclusion: the Role of Nullification in Today’s Society 
My research of legislation in 50 states and analysis of the nullification doctrine reveals that 
today’s nullification has evolved into a different phenomenon that only shares philosophical 
origins with Jefferson and Calhoun’s conception. This is why I term current efforts neo-
nullification. Beyond the nature of the phenomenon itself, this work is concerned with the 
theory of nullification and, ultimately, with the consequences of such a radical assertion of 
states’ rights for American federalism. In particular, the current phenomenon of nullification 
raises deep vertical separation of powers questions, namely the adequacy of a growing 
regulatory role for the federal government and the desirability of federal intervention in 
matters of social policy in such a way as to materially interfere with the traditional powers of 
the states. On the other hand, it is also possible to recognize a veiled horizontal separation of 
powers issue;233 state legislatures are claiming for themselves the ability to pronounce upon 
the constitutionality of federal laws, effectively trying to usurp the judicial function. What 
then can we say is the role of nullification? 
Prof. Tushnet suggested that nullification is aimed at creating a constitutional crisis: “Now 
consider what Governor Faubus might reasonably have thought he could accomplish by his 
actions […] Not much. His actions were highly likely to generate and exacerbate social 
tensions, as they did.”234 I agree with Prof. Tushnet, especially considering the high number 
                                                   
232 Michael Paulsen, The irrepressible myth of Marbury, supra note 212 at 633.  
233 Id. Prof. Paulsen pleads for a shared judicial review power between the three branches of government and the 
state governments. 
234 Tushnet, supra note 224 at 22.  
  
78 
 
of nullification bills that have been proposed in the state legislatures in the last five years. It 
would be inappropriate to conclude that all the bills have been proposed with a real hope of 
nullifying federal law, 1832 style. More realistically, they have been proposed to express deep 
disagreement and to feed a political struggle aimed at a constitutional revolution as described 
above. In this regard, I would like to recall the comments of Dr. James H. Read & Dr. Neal 
Allen: “whether nullification theory is upheld in federal court is not the only question. States 
in the past have sometimes successfully obstructed federal laws and rulings for years despite 
consistently losing in court.”235 On the other hand, Prof. John Dinan sees recent state measures 
as “contribut[ing] to restraining federal power and preserving state autonomy in several 
ways”.236 In this sense, today’s nullification is just like Jefferson imagined it, “a train as that 
we may not be committed to push matters to extremities, and yet be free to push as far as 
events will render prudent”.237  
What is more concerning is, indeed, the reason for this political struggle. The discussion on 
the influence of ALEC would lead to the conclusion that the broader target is the federal 
government’s ability to regulate business. Traditionally, the aspiration to limited government 
and strong states was a characteristic of the radical right wing that found its resurgence in the 
Tea-Party movement.  It would be interesting, but it is beyond the scope of this work, to 
investigate the influence of this party on the GOP.  
In conclusion, I put forward a consideration, a conjecture and an admonition.  
A consideration: as things stand, the debate on radical states’ rights movement (i.e. 
nullification) has captured the attention of enthusiastic constitutional theorists and of states’ 
legislators but has not yet reached Washington. A conjecture: in the current highly polarized 
                                                   
235 James H. Read & Neal Allen, supra note 75 at 267. 
236 Dinan, supra note 2 at 1638 (2011). 
237 Jefferson, supra note 50.   
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political climate,238 with a Republican Party agenda dominated by the increasingly influential 
libertarian Tea Party, this is arguably what Jason Frank239 would call “a constituent moment” 
and therefore, a period of turbulence in federalism, American-style. Given the rise of popular 
constitutionalism and originalism,240 promoted mainly by the Tea- Party, there are reasons to 
speculate on the possibility that the dispute over the role of the federal government and its 
relationship to individual rights (culminated in the nullification discourse) could effectively 
evolve from mere constitutional argument to constitutional change. An admonition: the 
constitutional change would be successful and enduring as long the movement is able to solve 
the libertarian paradox that Prof. Rebecca E. Zietlow has delineated in her article “Popular 
Originalism? The Tea Party Movement and Constitutional Theory.”241 The paradox consists 
in the simultaneous embracing of two different doctrines: originalism (the doctrine according 
to which the interpretation of a written constitution should seek the original public meaning 
of the words of the text or be consistent with what was meant by those who drafted and ratified 
the original meaning of the provisions at the time that they were adopted) and popular 
constitutionalism (i.e. the idea that it is desirable for people other than judges to engage in 
constitutional interpretation). 242 The advocates of nullification will have to make a choice: 
originalism or popular constitutionalism. This is to avoid a clash of the two holdings which 
would result in judicial activism. As Prof. Zietlow has commented, those two doctrines are 
indeed incompatible: 
 
                                                   
238 See, e.g., William A. Galston, Political Polarization and the U.S. Judiciary, 77 UMKC L. Rev. 307, 312-15 
(2008) and Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in 
America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 332 (2011) (“[O]ur radically polarized politics . . . reflect long-term structural 
and historical changes in American democracy that are likely to endure for some time to come.”). 
239 JASON FRANK, CONSTITUENT MOMENTS: ENACTING THE PEOPLE IN POST REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (2010). 
240 The term popular originalism is used by J. A. Goldstein, Can Popular Constitutionalism Survive the Tea 
Party Movement? 105 NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 288, 298 (2011).  
241 Rebecca E. Zietlow, Popular Originalism? The Tea Party Movement and Constitutional Theory, 64 FLA. L. 
REV. 483 (2012). 
242 See Larry D. Kramer, Popular constitutionalism supra note 220. 
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Originalists believe that a single fixed meaning exists and is discernible by 
examining the text and the intent of the Framers or the original public 
meaning of the text. By contrast, popular constitutionalists accept the 
possibility that the text has multiple meanings and that the meaning of the 
text may change through the process of construction by the political 
branches. To that extent, popular constitutionalism is premised on the 
existence of a living Constitution, a concept that is antithetical to most 
originalists.243 
 
The nullification controversy demonstrates a fundamental concern over the role of the federal 
government and the limits of congressional power. The ACA is not the only battlefield and 
constitutional conservatives have numerous issues of concern; controlled substances,244 
Second Amendment rights,245 Right to Try,246 immigration,247 Agenda 21,248 Common 
Core249. This debate deserves academic attention as it is likely to affect lawmakers and the 
broad U.S. political landscape in coming years with the potential to radically reshape our 
understanding of American federalism.250  Perhaps more important than whether a state 
claimed to nullify the ACA is that some state legislators appeal to an interpretation of the 
                                                   
243 Rebecca E. Zietlow, supra note 241 at 501 (2012). 
244 See, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5 (West 2007). 
245 Nine states have passed laws “Firearms Freedom Acts (FFAs)” which render federal laws regarding firearms 
inapplicable to firearms and ammunition produced, sold, and used exclusively within state borders. See, e.g., 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-404(a) (2013). 
246 “Right to Try” bills allow extremely sick people to use treatments that are not currently allowed to them 
under federal regulations, effectively nullifying in practice some FDA restrictions. See Right to Try, TENTH 
AMENDMENT CENTER, http://tracking.tenthamendmentcenter.com/issues/right-to-try/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2018).  
247 See, e.g., Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. tits. 11, 13, 23, 28, and 41 (2010)). 
248 These bills would prohibit the state, as well as cities and counties, from adopting and developing 
environmental and developmental policies known as Agenda 21 (action plan of the United Nations with regard 
to sustainable development agreed in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 199). 
249 Bills are aimed at delaying or banning implementation of the Common Core State Standards Initiative (set of 
learning goals for students K12 in mathematics and English language arts/literacy).  
250 See also Austin Raynor supra note 33 at 614. “Notwithstanding the threat of preemption, they are capable of 
generating significant effects in a variety of spheres, from federal enforcement policy to constitutional doctrine.” 
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constitution according to which nullification is permitted.251As Dr. Alex Waddan argued, 
although such appeals are unlikely to result in the repeal of federal laws, they do place issues 
on the agenda that would not be there otherwise, often with the hope of scoring political points 
for negotiating with the federal government.   
  
                                                   
251 See Landerson, supra note 99. 
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Chapter two: The Health Care Freedom Acts and Their Link 
with the Health Care Lawsuits in Arizona, Virginia and 
Missouri252 
 
This case is not about whether the Act is wise or unwise legislation, or whether it will solve 
or exacerbate the myriad problems in our health care system. In fact, it is not really about 
our health care system at all. It is principally about our federalist system, and it raises very 
important issues regarding the Constitutional role of the federal government. 
 
Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1263 
(N.D. Fla.)(2012) 
Introduction 
 
My search of ACA oppositional bills in the NCSL database revealed that some state legislatures 
did not limit themselves to the discussion of nullification bills but passed acts and constitutional 
amendments that explicitly prohibited the implementation of the individual mandate provision 
within their borders. This type of legislation takes the name of Health Care Freedom acts, i.e. 
state legislation in direct conflict with the individual mandate provision that explicitly aims at 
triggering a federal lawsuit.  
This category of bills declares the right of residents to be free to choose whether to purchase 
health insurance. At first glance, these bills could fall in the category of “neo-nullification bills” 
because they try to nullify the federal individual mandate provision according to which 
residents are required to carry health insurance. However, the main difference is that 
nullification bills are remonstrances; they declare state sovereignty and use states’ rights 
language whereas the Health Care Freedom acts are straight-forward prohibitions to implement 
the individual mandate in the state and, more importantly, they are fully-fledged legislation i.e. 
                                                   
252 Extracts from this chapter were included in a paper “The Battle for a Constitutional Moment: State 
Legislative Opposition to the ACA” presented at the Political Science Association 67th Annual International 
Conference in April 2017.  
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acts. The legislatures passed these bills with the explicit intention of creating a justiciable 
conflict between federal and state law and they were meant to be part of a multi-state strategy. 
This is also the reason why they all take the same title: Health Care Freedom act. Furthermore, 
the analysis of the texts of the Health Care Freedom acts reveal the absence of typical 
nullification language, namely the express declaration of unconstitutionality of federal law. 
Timothy Sandefur observed, for example, that the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act did not 
constitute a nullification act because it “made no mention of “states’ rights” or any sovereign 
authority to declare federal laws unconstitutional; it simply recognized and defined an 
individual right, one which is not conferred exclusively to federal protection.”253 
Did those statutes ever prevent the implementation of the individual mandate in the states? No, 
indeed they had no legal credibility.  The main reason for their passage in certain state 
legislatures was, according to Prof. Dinan, to “increase the likelihood that the Court will deem 
such a challenge justiciable prior to 2014 when the individual mandate actually takes effect.”254 
In other words, the Health Care Freedom acts were meant to trigger a conflict between state 
and federal law that would have provided support in lawsuits against the government. The 
strategist and promoter of this tactic was the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) 
that provided state legislators with model legislation.  
This chapter describes the phenomenon of the enactment of Health Care Freedom acts between 
2010-2012 across the 50 states and their close relation to the subsequent lawsuits. The case 
studies of Arizona, Virginia and Missouri Health Care Freedom acts investigate the factors that 
influenced the enactment of the statutes, points the attention to the legal challenge that they 
had triggered and conclude on the role that they have played in the battle against the 
implementation of the health reform. 
                                                   
253 Timothy Sandefur, State Standing to Challenge Ultra Vires Federal Action: The Health Care Cases and 
Beyond, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 326 (2012). 
 
254 Dinan, supra note 11 at 1661. 
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I. The Health Care Freedom Phenomenon 
The label “Health Care Freedom of Choice Acts” identifies a certain category of bills enacted 
by 16 state legislatures between 2010-2012 aimed at blocking the operation of the individual 
mandate within their borders. The measures sought to guarantee that residents would not be 
compelled to participate in any health care system and would be free from the threat of penalty 
if they chose not to participate. However, since their declared objectives would have created 
an inevitable conflict with the federal requirement to carry health care insurance and such a 
conflict would have been resolved in favor of the federal law, it is somehow misleading to 
consider these measures as meaningless declaration of state sovereignty.  Instead, the main 
argument put forward by this study is that the healthcare freedom acts were enacted in certain 
state legislatures with the main objective of sustaining a health care federal lawsuit and should 
therefore be considered in connection with the legal actions that they were meant to trigger.255 
This was particularly true in Virginia, Missouri and Arizona, as this work demonstrates.  
The map below, created by the author with a map creator software, visualizes the Health Care 
Freedom acts phenomenon between 2010-2012. It distinguishes between yellow and red states: 
the 11 legislatures in yellow enacted statutory measures while the 5 legislatures in red passed 
constitutional amendments and submitted them to popular ballot. In certain legislatures, such 
as Florida and Colorado (Initiative 63 was on the November 2, 2010), the legislature passed a 
Health Care Freedom act but the constitutional amendment was not approved on the ballot.  
 
 
                                                   
255 See Raynor, supra note 33 at 638 arguing that “Sovereignty laws can also have a significant effect on 
constitutional adjudication”.  
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1. Map of Health Care Freedom acts 2010-2012 
  
Map created with SmartDraw software, © IDG 
Table 2 reports the text of the enacted Health Care Freedom acts in chronological order. The 
order is dictated by the date of the passage of the bill in the state legislature and not by the 
actual enactment. This is because some bills, such as the Arizona bill (n.1), had been already 
passed by the legislature in June 2009 but only enacted in November 2010 after a ballot vote. 
Since this study aims at understanding the intentions of state legislators, I considered it 
necessary to prioritize an overview of the legislatures’ activity which then pointed to 
investigating the reciprocal influence of the legislatures on each other. My analysis below will 
consider whether the passage of a Health Care Freedom bill in one legislature influenced the 
introduction of a similar bill in another legislature.  Furthermore, as seen above, some bills 
were enacted as statutes and some others as constitutional amendments. Yet I did not consider 
it appropriate to examine them separately and have included statutes and constitutional 
amendments in the same table. This provides the reader with a comprehensive portrait of the 
phenomenon and aids a holistic analysis of the bills.  
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2. Table of Health Care Freedom Acts wording 
Typology State Health Care Freedom Act 
wording 
1 
Constitutional amendment 
Arizona  
November 2, 2010 on the ballot,  
Ariz. Const. art. XXVII, § 2 
 
Resulting from 2009 HCR 2014, 
passed on Jun. 22, 2009.  
Section 2. A. To preserve the freedom 
of Arizonans to provide for their 
health care: 
1. A law or rule shall not compel, 
directly or indirectly, any person, 
employer or health care provider to 
participate in any health care system. 
2. A person or employer may pay 
directly for lawful health care 
services and shall not be required to 
pay penalties or fines for paying 
directly for lawful health care 
services. A health care provider may 
accept direct payment for lawful 
health care services and shall not be 
required to pay penalties or fines for 
accepting direct payment from a 
person or employer for lawful health 
care services. 
B. Subject to reasonable and 
necessary rules that do not 
substantially limit a person's options, 
the purchase or sale of health 
insurance in private health care 
systems shall not be prohibited by law 
or rule. 
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2 
Statute 
Virginia  
Mar. 10, 2010 (2010 SB 283) 
Mar. 10, 2010 (2010 SB 311)   
Mar. 10, 2010 (2010 SB 417)  
Apr. 21, 2010 (2010 HB 10) 
 
No resident of this Commonwealth, 
regardless of whether he has or is 
eligible for health insurance coverage 
under any policy or program provided 
by or through his employer, or a plan 
sponsored by the Commonwealth or 
the federal government, shall be 
required to obtain or maintain a 
policy of individual insurance 
coverage except as required by a 
court or the Department of Social 
Services where an individual is 
named a party in a judicial or 
administrative proceeding. No 
provision of this title shall render a 
resident of this Commonwealth liable 
for any penalty, assessment, fee, or 
fine as a result of his failure to procure 
or obtain health insurance coverage. 
3 
 
Statute 
Idaho  
Mar. 17, 2010 (2010 HB 391) 
It is hereby declared that the public 
policy of the state of Idaho, consistent 
with our constitutionally recognized 
and inalienable rights of liberty, is 
that every person within the state of 
Idaho is and shall be free to choose or 
decline to choose any mode of 
securing health care services without 
penalty or threat of penalty by the 
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federal government of the United 
States of America. 
4 
Statute 
Utah  
Apr. 7, 2010 (2010 HB 67) 
4) (a) An individual in this state may 
not be required to obtain or maintain 
health insurance as defined in 
Section 31A-1-301, regardless of 
whether the individual has or is 
eligible for health insurance 
coverage under any policy or 
program provided by or through the 
individual's employer or a plan 
sponsored by the state or federal 
government. 
(b) The provisions of this title may 
not be used to hold an individual in 
this state liable for any penalty, 
assessment, fee, or fine as a result of 
the individual's failure to procure or 
obtain health insurance coverage. 
 
5 
Statute 
 
Missouri  
August 3, 2010 passed referendum.  
Resulting from May 11, 2010 (2010 
HB 1764) 
 
1.330. 1. No law or rule shall 
compel, directly or indirectly, any 
person, employer, or health care 
provider to participate in any health 
care system. 
2. A person or employer may pay 
directly for lawful health care 
services and shall not be required by 
law or rule to pay penalties or fines 
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for paying directly for lawful health 
care services. 
 
6 
Constitutional Amendment 
Oklahoma  
Constitutional Amendment 
approved on November 2, 2010 on 
the ballot. 
Okla. Const. art. II, § 37 
 
Resulting from 2010 SJR 59 passed 
on May 26, 2010 bill approved.  
 
B. To preserve the freedom of 
Oklahomans to provide for their 
health care: 
1. A law or rule shall not compel, 
directly or indirectly, any person, 
employer or health care provider to 
participate in any health care system; 
and 
2. A person or employer may pay 
directly for lawful health care 
services and shall not be required to 
pay penalties or fines for paying 
directly for lawful health care 
services. A health care provider may 
accept direct payment for lawful 
health care services and shall not be 
required to pay penalties or fines for 
accepting direct payment from a 
person or employer for lawful health 
care services. 
C. Subject to reasonable and 
necessary rules that do not 
substantially limit a person's options, 
the purchase or sale of health 
insurance in private health care 
systems shall not be prohibited by 
law or rule. 
  
90 
 
 
 
7 
Statute 
Louisiana  
Jul. 2, 2010 (2010 HB 1474) 
It is hereby declared that the public 
policy of this state, consistent with 
our constitutionally recognized and 
inalienable right of liberty, is that 
every person within this state is and 
shall be free from governmental 
intrusion in choosing or declining to 
choose any mode of securing health 
insurance coverage without penalty 
or threat of penalty 
 
8 
Statute 
Wyoming  
Constitutional Amendment 
approved on November 6, 2012  
Wyo. Const. art. I, § 38  
 
Resulting from 2011 SJR 2 passed 
on February 19, 2011.  
 
 
§ 38. Right of health care access 
Currentness 
(a) Each competent adult shall have 
the right to make his or her own health 
care decisions. The parent, guardian 
or legal representative of any other 
natural person shall have the right to 
make health care decisions for that 
person. 
(b) Any person may pay, and a health 
care provider may accept, direct 
payment for health care without 
imposition of penalties or fines for 
doing so. 
(c) The legislature may determine 
reasonable and necessary restrictions 
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on the rights granted under this 
section to protect the health and 
general welfare of the people or to 
accomplish the other purposes set 
forth in the Wyoming Constitution. 
(d) The state of Wyoming shall act to 
preserve these rights from undue 
governmental infringement. 
 
   
9 
Statute 
Tennessee  
Mar. 23, 2011 (2011 SB 79)  
It is declared that the public policy of 
this state, consistent with our 
constitutionally-recognized and 
inalienable right of liberty, is that 
every person within this state is and 
shall be free to choose or to decline to 
choose any mode of securing 
healthcare services without penalty or 
threat of penalty; provided, however, 
the provisions of Titles 36 and 56 
concerning requirements for 
healthcare coverage of children in 
child support cases shall not be 
altered in any manner by the 
provisions of this section. 
10 
Statute 
Montana  
Apr. 5, 2011 (2011 SB 418)  
The state or federal government may 
not: 
(a) mandate or require a person or 
entity to purchase health insurance 
coverage as defined in 33-22-140; or 
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(b) impose a penalty, tax, fee, or fine 
of any type if a person or entity 
declines to purchase health 
insurance coverage. 
 
11 
Statute 
Indiana  
May 12, 2011 (2011 SB 461) 
Notwithstanding any other law, a 
resident of Indiana may not be 
required to purchase coverage under a 
health plan 
12 
Constitutional Amendment 
Alabama  
Constitutional Amendment 
approved on Nov. 6, 2012 on the 
ballot. 
Ala.Const. Art. I, § 36.04 
Alternatively cited as AL CONST 
Amend. No. 86 
 
Resulting from 2011 HB 60 passed 
on Jun. 09, 2011. 
 
Sec. 36.04. Mandatory participation 
in health care system prohibited. 
a) In order to preserve the freedom of 
all residents of Alabama to provide 
for their own health care, a law or rule 
shall not compel, directly or 
indirectly, any person, employer, or 
health care provider to participate in 
any health care system. 
(b) A person or employer may pay 
directly for health care services and 
shall not be required to pay penalties 
or fines for paying directly for lawful 
health care services. A health care 
provider may accept direct payment 
for lawful health care services and 
shall not be required to pay penalties 
or fines for accepting direct payment 
from a person or employer for lawful 
health care services. 
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(c) The purchase or sale of health 
insurance in private health care 
systems shall not be prohibited by 
law or rule. 
13 
Statute 
North Dakota  
Jul. 07, 2011 (2011 H 1165) 
The resident is not required to obtain 
or maintain a policy of individual 
health coverage except as may be 
required by a court or by the 
department of human services 
through a court or administrative 
proceeding. 
2. This section does not render a 
resident of this state liable for any 
penalty, assessment, fee, or fine as a 
result of the resident's failure to 
procure or obtain health insurance 
coverage 
 
14 
Statute 
New Hampshire  
Jul. 14, 2011 (2011 SB 148) 
No resident of this state, regardless 
of whether he or she has or is eligible 
for health insurance coverage under 
any policy or program provided by 
or through his or her employer, or a 
plan sponsored by the state or the 
federal government, shall be 
required to obtain or maintain a 
policy of individual insurance 
coverage except as required by a 
court or the department of health and 
human services where an individual 
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is named a party in a judicial or 
administrative proceeding. No 
provision of this title shall render a 
resident of this state liable for any 
penalty, assessment, fee, or fine as a 
result of his or her failure to procure 
or obtain health insurance coverage. 
 
15 
Statute 
Kansas  
Aug. 10, 2011 (2011 HB 2182) 
A resident of this state has the right 
to purchase health insurance or 
refuse to purchase health insurance. 
The government shall not interfere 
with a resident's right to purchase 
health insurance or with a resident's 
right to refuse to purchase health 
insurance. 
16 
Constitutional Amendment 
Ohio  
Constitutional Amendment 
approved on Nov. 8, 2011 (2011 
Issue 3- citizen initiated 
constitutional amendment) 
 
Ohio Const. Article I, Section 21 
 
OH Const. Art. I, § 21 
O Const I Sec. 21  
Preservation of the freedom to 
choose health care and health care 
coverage 
 
Section 21*(A) No federal, state, or 
local law or rule shall compel, 
directly or indirectly, any person, 
employer, or health care provider to 
participate in a health care system. 
Section 21*(B) No federal, state, or 
local law or rule shall prohibit the 
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purchase or sale of health care or 
health insurance.  
Section 21*(C) No federal, state, or 
local law or rule shall impose a 
penalty or fine for the sale or 
purchase of health care or health 
insurance. 
 
The first state to pass a Health Care Freedom act was Arizona (2009 HCR 2014 passed on Jun. 
22, 2009 and constitutional amendment approved on November 2, 2010 on the ballot). Arizona 
was followed by the legislatures of Virginia (2010 SB 283- 2010 SB 311- 2010 SB 41, 7 Mar. 
10, 2010) and Idaho (2010 HB 391, Mar. 17, 2010). It should be noted that the first three Health 
Care Freedom acts were enacted before the actual passage of the ACA (signed into law by 
President Barack Obama on March 23, 2010).256 Arguably, instead of fighting an enacted piece 
of legislation, states were sending a message to Washington and equipping themselves to 
promptly resist the passage of the ACA with a lawsuit. Circuit Judge Diana Gribbon Motz 
noted that the Virginia legislature had considered its Health Care Freedom Act well before the 
enactment of the ACA and that the Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell signed the bill hours 
after Obama signed the ACA: “Virginia filed this action on March 23, 2010, the same day that 
the President signed the Affordable Care Act into law. The Governor of Virginia did not sign 
the VHFCA into law until the next day.”257 This preventive push back strategy is key to 
understand the dynamic of state resistance especially in its relation to subsequent legal actions.  
                                                   
256 The preventive passage of bills that conflict with anticipated federal polices is a technique that the states have 
used also in relation to the possibility that the Obama administration could enact gun laws.   
257 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 267 (4th Cir. 2011). The bill history reported by the 
Virginia Legislature (http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?ses=101&typ=bil&val=sb417) shows the bill as 
enacted on Mar. 3, 2010 but the actual signature might have been delayed.   
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The link with the lawsuits is particularly emphasized by the Idaho Healthcare Freedom Act 
which explicitly called for the Attorney General’s action: “The attorney general shall take such 
action as is provided in section 67-1401(15), Idaho Code, in the defense or prosecution of rights 
protected under this act.”258 
On Apr. 7, 2010 the Utah legislature passed its Health Care Freedom act and it was followed 
in May by the Missouri statute (2010 HB 1764). Oklahoma’s legislature passed a constitutional 
amendment on May 26, 2010 and the same was approved on the ballot on Nov. 2, 2010. In  
Colorado a citizen initiative proposed constitutional amendment was rejected on the November 
ballot. The last state legislature to pass a Health Care Freedom Act in 2010 was Louisiana 
(2010 HB 1474, Jul. 2, 2010). 
The situation in Florida was unique: the Health Care Freedom Act (2010 HJR 37), a proposed 
amendment to the State Constitution, was approved by the legislature for inclusion on the 
November 2, 2010 general election ballot but it was challenged in court for its controversial 
language that was deemed by plaintiffs to be “political rhetoric that invites an emotional 
response from the voter materially misstating the substance of the amendment.”259 The wording 
of the amendment resembled the measures enacted in other states260 but the actual ballot 
question was construed in a way that the Leon County Circuit Court261 deemed violated the 
requirements of Florida Statute 161.101(1), 262 according to which ballot questions should 
contain clear and unambiguous language. The Florida Supreme Court struck down the 
                                                   
258 Idaho Code Ann. § 39-9004 (West). 
259 Mangat v. Dept. of State, 2010 WL 6331989 (Fla.Cir.Ct.) (Trial Order).  
260 The amendment read: “HEALTH CARE SERVICES.--Proposing an amendment to the State Constitution to 
prohibit laws or rules from compelling any person, employer, or health care provider to participate in any health 
care system; permit a person or employer to purchase lawful health care services directly from a health care 
provider; permit a health care provider to accept direct payment from a person or employer for lawful health 
care services; exempt persons, employers, and health care providers from penalties and fines for paying or 
accepting direct payment for lawful health care services; and permit the purchase or sale of health insurance in 
private health care systems.” 
261 Id.  
262 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 101.161 (West) requires “clear and unambiguous language”. 
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amendment on Aug. 31, 2010, holding that the ballot summary was misleading in providing 
that the amendment would ensure “access to health care without waiting lists”, would “protect 
the doctor-patient relationship” and that it constituted ambiguous political rhetoric when it 
referred to the amendment as a “guard against mandates that don't work”.263 Two similar bills 
(FL S2 and FL H 1193) were enacted in May 2011 and June 2011 proposing another 
constitutional amendment. They were presented in the November 6, 2012 state ballot as the 
Florida Healthcare Amendment but were defeated by 51.5% of votes. Health care freedom 
legislation was never approved in Florida but the same state led the biggest multi-state lawsuit 
across the nation and was joined by 25 other states in a case that reached the Supreme Court: 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.264 
Wyoming opened 2011 with a Senate Joint Resolution passed on Feb. 19, 2011 and was 
followed by Tennessee (2011 SB 79) and Montana (2011 SB 418).  The Montana statute was 
enacted on Apr. 5, 2011 —before the Sebelius decision—  and passed the ballot on November 
6, 2012 —after the Sebelius decision— with 318,612 votes in favor and 155,536 against.265  
The statute provided “The state or federal government may not:(a) mandate or require a person 
or entity to purchase health insurance coverage as defined in 33-22-140; or (b) impose a 
penalty, tax, fee, or fine of any type if a person or entity declines to purchase health insurance 
coverage.”266 The bill was authored by republican Sen. Art Wittich who presented it to the 
Senate Committee on Business, Labor and Economic Affairs on 03/23/2011 as a measure 
aimed at creating a justiciable case that would reach the Supreme Court  and that it was worth 
                                                   
263 Florida Dep’t of State v. Mangat, 43 So. 3d 642 (Fla. 2010).  
264 567 U.S. 519 (2012). The lawsuit started in the District Court for the Northern District of Florida, No. 3:10-
CV-00091-RV-EMT, with Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, brought by the Attorneys 
General and/or Governors of twenty-six states, two private citizens and the National Federation of Independent 
Business (“NFIB”). 
265 Source: Montana Secretary of State General Election Canvass 
sos.mt.gov/elections/2012/2012_General_Canvass.pdf.  
266 S. 418, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2011).  
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to fight.267 This is an explicit declaration of intent and a fundamental evidence of the 
assumption that the main objective was to provide support in a health care federal lawsuit .  
On May, 10 2011 the Indiana Governor signed a bill titled “Health Care Reform Matters” which 
was effectively another way to call a Health Care Freedom act. The statute had been worded to 
explicitly invalidate the individual mandate provision of the ACA as it read “notwithstanding 
any other law, a resident of Indiana may not be required to purchase coverage under a health 
plan”. It is clear that the Indiana legislature referred to the ACA when it mentioned “any other 
law” and the act was therefore targeting a specific piece of legislation. The Indiana Legislature 
also considered a constitutional amendment (2010 Senate Joint Resolution 14) but the bill 
remained in the Senate Committee on Judiciary as the legislature adjourned and no action was 
ever taken.  
The Alabama Legislature passed its health care constitutional amendment (2011 HB 60) on 
Jun. 09, 2011 followed by the statutes of North Dakota on Jul. 07, 2011 (2011 H 1165), New 
Hampshire on Jul. 14, 2011 (2011 SB 148) and Kansas on Aug. 10, 2011 (2011 HB 2182).  
The last state to pass a health care freedom act was Ohio with a citizen initiated constitutional 
amendment (2011 Issue 3) that was approved on the Nov. 8, 2011 ballot. The measure was not 
followed by a lawsuit and initially the state did not join the multi-state lawsuit mainly because 
of the opposition of Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray who believed the lawsuits were 
“without merit and would be a waste of taxpayer dollars”. However, Ohio eventually joined 
the Florida multi-state lawsuit together with Kansas and Wisconsin.268 
                                                   
267 Id. , House Committee on Business and Labor, MONTANA LEGISLATURE (Apr. 5, 2011) 
http://montanalegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=5185&meta_id=55419 between 00:49:50 – 
00:50:50.   
268 Second Amended Complaint, Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Hum. Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 
1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 3:10-cv-91). 
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Finally, a note on the Georgia battle against the ACA.  In Georgia there had been a series of 
failed Health Care Freedom bills.  
(2010) GA SR 794-- 01/11/2010 
(2011) GA SR 55-- 01/26/2011 
(2013) GA SR 99-- 01/29/2013 
(2014) GA H 707-- 02/18/2014 
2014 GA H 707 --- 01/13/2014269 
In Apr. 15th 2014 the legislature passed a much moderate Health Care Freedom Act270 (HB 707 
then incorporated into HB 943)271 but this study has not included the measure in the list of 
Health Care Freedom acts because its wording was limited to a declaration that the state would 
not have use its resources to implement the ACA and there was no explicit rejection of the 
individual mandate requirement. It seemed therefore more appropriate to consider this act as 
Anti-Commandeering legislation: 
Neither the state nor any department, agency, bureau, authority, office, or other unit 
of the state nor any political subdivision of the state shall expend or use moneys, 
human resources, or assets to advocate or intended to influence the citizens of this 
state in support of the voluntary expansion by the State of Georgia of eligibility for 
                                                   
269 Prohibits powers, assets, employees, agents, or contractors of the state or any political subdivision, 
municipality, or other local government authority from engaging in an activity that aids any agency in the 
enforcement of provisions of the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010; prohibits 
establishment of a health care exchange for the purchase of health insurance, participation in or purchase of 
insurance from a health care exchange established by a nonprofit organization. 
270 2014 Ga. Laws 243; O.C.G.A. §§ 31-1-40, -23 (Supp. 2014). 
271 For an analysis of the legislative history see Walter S. Freitag and Jason D. Freiman, Health, 31 Ga. St. U. L. 
Rev. 113 (2014). 
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medical assistance in furtherance of the federal “Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act”…272 
Anti-Commandeering legislation will be further examined in Chapter III. 
II. The Link Between Legislation and Constitutional Adjudication 
It has been argued that sovereignty laws “can also have a significant effect on constitutional 
adjudication, at all stages of the judicial process; they may catalyze private lawsuits, trigger 
standing for purposes of federal jurisdiction, and even influence the content of substantive 
doctrine.”273 In the case of Arizona, Virginia and Missouri Health Care Freedom legislation 
and litigation were closely interrelated. Arizona’s plaintiffs claimed that the Arizona Health 
Care Freedom Act would have offered protection from the individual mandate and federal law 
did not pre-empt this particular state legislation;274 the Commonwealth of Virginia used the 
Virginia Health Care Freedom Act’s conflict with the provisions of the ACA to claim standing 
“to defend its legislative enactments”275  and Missouri plaintiffs alleged the violation of the 
Due Process Clause because the ACA “PPACA violates these Missouri citizens’ right to 
determine their own appropriate health care, a right they have under Missouri's Health Care 
Freedom Act.”276 With regard to the other states that passed health care freedom act legislation 
but did not file any lawsuit, Prof. John Dinan noted that their legislation was aimed at increasing 
                                                   
272 Ga. Code Ann. § 31-1-40 (West). 
273 Raynor, supra note 33 at 638. 
274Coons v. Geithner, No. CV-10-1714-PHX-GMS, 2012 WL 6674394, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 20, 2012), aff'd sub 
nom. Coons v. Lew, 762 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2014), as amended (Sept. 2, 2014). 
275 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 603 (E.D. Va. 2010), rev'd, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 
2011). 
276  Peter D. KINDER, Missouri Lieutenant Governor, Dale Morris, Robert O. Osborn, Geraldine F. Osborn, 
Samantha Hill, Julie Keathley, individually and as parent and guardian for M.K, her minor son, Plaintiffs, v. 
Timothy F. GEITHNER, Secretary of Treasury, Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of HHS, Eric H. Holder, Jr., 
Attorney General, Hilda L. Solis, Secretary of Labor, Defendants., 2010 WL 4063085 (E.D.Mo.). 
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the chances for a successful Supreme Court’s case and to present the Court with an opportunity 
to rule on the Commerce Clause doctrine: 
Although a lawsuit presenting a challenge to the constitutionality of the ACA 
could be filed in the absence of these state acts--and in fact, the multi-state suit 
includes a number of plaintiff states that have not yet passed such acts-- the 
purpose of these state acts, which by themselves are seemingly preempted by the 
ACA and therefore have no independent meaningful effect, is to increase the 
likelihood that the Court will deem such a challenge justiciable prior to 2014 
when the individual mandate actually takes effect.277 
Another possibility, as Austin Raynor pointed out, is that state legislatures expected to 
catalyze a flood of private lawsuits278 that never took place. Instead, the big battle was fought 
by twenty-six states, several individuals, and the National Federation of Independent Business 
in the federal courts279 and eventually in the Supreme Court.280  
The following sections analyze the circumstances in which Arizona, Virginia and Missouri 
passed their Health Care Freedom acts and their relation with the lawsuits.   
Arizona Health Insurance Reform Amendment 
Arizona had been at the forefront of the opposition to the requirement to carry health insurance 
since 2008 when a citizen initiated constitutional amendment “Freedom to Choose Act” sought 
                                                   
277 Dinan, supra note 2 at 1663 (2011). Prof. Dinan also referred to the declaration of Alabama state senator Scott 
Beason in a news account by David White, Alabama Senate Passes Health Care Opt-Out Bill, BIRMINGHAM 
NEWS (April 1, 2010), available at http:// blog.al.com/spotnews/2010/04/senate_passes_health_care_opt-.html: 
“Beason said his bill or a similar bill from another state could serve as a vehicle for a court challenge claiming the 
health care law violated the U.S. constitution's 10th amendment.”  
278 Supra note 33 at 613.  
279 The lawsuit started in the District Court for the Northern District of Florida: Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. 
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla.) and was appealed in the Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit: Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th 
Cir. 2011). 
280 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).  
  
102 
 
to prevent the legislature from introducing a state health insurance mandate. The amendment 
was narrowly rejected at the 2008 November ballot281 but in 2009, when the enactment of the 
ACA was imminent, the legislature considered a similar Health Care Freedom constitutional 
amendment (Proposition 106-2009 HCR 2014). The measure, sponsored by Rep. Barto, was 
first passed by the Arizona State Senate and the Arizona House of Representatives and then 
submitted for approval at the 2010 ballot where it was approved.  
The text of the amendment, that today constitutes Art. XXVII, section 2 of the Arizona 
Constitution, reads: 
Section 2. A. To preserve the freedom of Arizonans to provide for their health care: 
1. A law or rule shall not compel, directly or indirectly, any person, employer 
or health care provider to participate in any health care system. 
2. A person or employer may pay directly for lawful health care services and shall 
not be required to pay penalties or fines for paying directly for lawful health care 
services. A health care provider may accept direct payment for lawful health care 
services and shall not be required to pay penalties or fines for accepting direct 
payment from a person or employer for lawful health care services.282 
 
In this state, the anti-ACA constitutional amendment was followed by a lawsuit, Coons et al v. 
Geithner et al283 in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. The lawsuit has 
been called the “Goldwater suit”284 as it was mainly orchestrated by the Goldwater Institute, a 
                                                   
281 See Dinan, supra note 2 at 1660 (2011) citing data from 2008 General Election, Ariz. Sec. of State, http:// 
www.azsos.gov/results/2008/general/BM101.htm (last updated Nov. 25, 2008). 
282 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 36–1301; ARIZ. CONST. XXVII, § 2(A).  
283 Coons v. Geithner, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d- No. CV-10-1714-PHX-GMS, 2012 WL 6674394, at *1 (D. 
Ariz. Dec. 20, 2012), aff'd sub nom. Coons v. Lew, 762 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2014), as amended (Sept. 2, 2014).  
284 Matthew R. Farley, Challenging Supremacy: Virginia's Response to the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 37, 62 (2010) 
  
103 
 
Phoenix based think-tank. The plaintiffs were Nick Coons (a citizen of Arizona with no private 
medical insurance) and two members of the United States House of Representatives, Jeff Flake 
and Trent Franks. The close relationship between state legislation and lawsuits is exemplified 
by the fact that the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Arizona Act was not pre-empted by 
the Affordable Care Act.285 The other grounds of the claims included the alleged violation of 
Article I legislative power under the Commerce Clause, Necessary and Proper Clause, 
Spending Clause, and taxation power. District court judge G. Murray Snow dismissed 
plaintiffs' claims on Aug. 31, 2012, holding his decision until the Supreme Court issued the 
Sebelius decision.  On appeal, Circuit Judge Susan P. Graber affirmed the district court decision 
in part and ruled that the Arizona Health Care Freedom Act was preempted: 
The Arizona Act provides that its citizens may forego minimum health insurance 
coverage and abstain from paying any penalties, Ariz. Const. art. XXVII, § 2, which 
is exactly what the individual mandate requires. The Arizona Act thereby stands as 
an obstacle to Congress' objective to expand minimum essential health coverage 
nationwide through the individual mandate, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, and is, therefore, 
preempted under the Supremacy Clause.286 
 
The lawsuit was a failure for the proponents of the legal challenge and the supporters of the 
Health Care Freedom Act who saw their whole strategy struck down by the courts. Josh 
Blackman noted that Governor Brewer changed her attitude towards the ACA immediately 
                                                   
285 Coons v. Geithner, No. CV-10-1714-PHX-GMS, 2012 WL 3778219, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 31, 2012), aff'd in 
part, vacated in part sub nom. Coons v. Lew, 762 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2014), as amended (Sept. 2, 2014). 
286 Coons v. Lew, 762 F.3d 891, 902 (9th Cir. 2014), as amended (Sept. 2, 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1699, 
191 L. Ed. 2d 675 (2015). 
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after the Sebelius decision; she chose to participate in a federally facilitated exchange and 
expanded Medicaid in 2013.  
One of the first governors to push back against the Medicaid expansion was 
Arizona Governor Jan Brewer. Brewer vigorously opposed Obamacare for nearly 
three years. However, after the Court upheld the law, and gave states the option to 
opt into the Medicaid expansion, Brewer pulled a 180, and supported joining 
Obamacare.287 
Other scholars have suggested that her decision to participate in a federally facilitated exchange 
was a political strategy dictated “by the desire to see the exchange experiment fail, label that 
failure as a matter of poor federal management, and thereby damage the ACA, particularly the 
exchange component.”288 
 
The Virginia Health Care Freedom Act (VHCFA) 
 
In 2010, the Virginia General Assembly considered a total of six statutes and amendments to 
the state constitution that would have created direct conflict with the individual mandate 
provision.289   Three identical bills were filed by different sponsors in the Senate: SB 283,290 
311,291 417. 292   
                                                   
287 Josh Blackman, Obamacare Comes Full Circle in Arizona, Josh Blackman’s blog (Sep. 12, 2013), 
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2013/09/12/obamacare-comes-full-circle-in-arizona/.  
288 John Stuart Hall & Catherine R. Eden, Arizona: Round 1, State-Level Field Network Study of the 
Implementation of the Affordable Care Act, ROCKEFELLER INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT (Mar, 2014).  
289 SB 283, 311, 417 (identical but sponsored by three different senators), HB 10, HB 722 (these bills contain a 
slightly stronger language and invoked “a person‘s natural right and power of contract to secure the blessings of 
liberty”. After their passage in the House, were revised by the Senate to be identical to SB 283, 311, 417), HJR 
7 (amendment to art. 1 of the Virginia Constitution, failed in the House Privileges and Elections committee. For 
a report of the texts and circumstances of the passages of these bills see Shirley p 53-55.  
290 S. 283, 2010 Leg., (Va.2010). 
291 S. 311, 2010 Leg., (Va.2010). 
292 S. 417, 2010 Leg., (Va.2010). 
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The bills filed in the Senate read: 
No resident of this Commonwealth, regardless of whether he has or is eligible for 
health insurance coverage under any policy or program provided by or through his 
employer, or a plan sponsored by the Commonwealth or the federal government, 
shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual insurance coverage. 
No provision of this title shall render a resident of this Commonwealth liable for 
any penalty, assessment, fee, or fine as a result of his failure to procure or obtain 
health insurance coverage.293 
 
Two constitutional amendments were considered by the House, HB722294 and HB10.295 The 
text of HB10 contained a reference to liberty that was then deleted to reflect the language of 
the senate bills:  
No law shall restrict a person's natural right and power of contract to secure the 
blessings of liberty to choose private health care systems or private plans. No law 
shall interfere with the right of a person or entity to pay for lawful medical services 
to preserve life or health, nor shall any law impose a penalty, tax, fee, or fine, of 
any type, to decline or to contract for health care coverage or to participate in any 
particular health care system or plan, except as required by a court where an 
individual or entity is a named party in a judicial dispute. Nothing herein shall be 
construed to expand, limit or otherwise modify any determination of law regarding 
what constitutes lawful medical services within the Commonwealth.296 
The final version of the House bill, passed in February 2010, was identical to the above-
mentioned Senate Bills.  
                                                   
293 Id.  
294 H.D. 7, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va.2010). 
295 H. 10, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va.2010) (enacted as Act of Apr. 21, 2010, ch. 818, 2010 Va. Acts ___). 
296 Id.  
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Perhaps a confirmation of the fact that the bills were intended to trigger a court challenge is 
that another measure, House Joint Resolution 7 (a proposed amendment to Article I of the 
Virginia Constitution that would have prohibited penalties for individuals that do not 
purchase health insurance) was due for reconsideration in 2012 but failed in the House 
Privileges and Elections committee in mid-February, and it was never taken up again because 
the lawsuit was already in advanced stage.297   
The first bill to pass in the Senate was SB 417 (the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act). 
The bill was introduced on 13th Jan. 2010 by Senator Jill Holtzman Vogel, 298 an affirmed 
attorney with national  reputation and native Virginian who also served as Deputy General 
Counsel at the Department of Energy.299 The fact that the sponsor was an attorney would 
corroborate the argument that the legislators were aware of the insubstantial legal value of the 
provisions of such a bill for Virginia residents and the intent of the bill was purely to support 
the state standing in a potential lawsuit. SB 417 was approved by the Committee on Commerce 
and Labor and also passed the Senate of Virginia on February 1, 2010 with a vote of 23-Y and 
17-N.300 The discussion around the bill in the Senate was minimal because it followed a broad 
discussion of the other identical bill —SB 283— sponsored by Senator Frederick M. Quayle 
from Suffolk. During the discussion about SB 283 the sponsor commented: “this is not a bill 
that deals with healthcare but it is a bill that attempts to reinforce the U.S. Constitution:  never, 
the Congress has mandated that all citizens should purchase anything…”.301 The bill was 
criticized by democratic senators such as Senator Petersen from Fairfax who expressed 
concerns that the measure “would create problems in situations when —as part of a divorce 
                                                   
297 See Matthew R. Farley, Challenging Supremacy: Virginia's Response to the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, 45 U. Rich. L. Rev. 37, 56–57 (2010). 
298 See S. JOURNAL, Senate of Va., Reg. Sess. ___ (2010), available at http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-
bin/legp604.exe?ses=101&typ=bil&val=sb417.  
299 See Sen. Jill Holtzman Vogel website, http://www.senatorjillvogel.com/about/.  
300 See S. JOURNAL, Senate of Va., Reg. Sess. ___ (2010), available at http://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-
bin/legp604.exe?ses=101&typ=bil&val=sb417.  
301 Video of 02/01/2010 Senate Proceedings, RICHMOND SUNLIGHT (Feb. 1, 2010) at 24 min., 
https://www.richmondsunlight.com/minutes/senate/2010/02/01/.  
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settlement—a Court requires to provide health insurance for a minor children or when an 
organization such an athletic club that requires its members to carry health insurance”302 and 
Senator Saslaw from Fairfax who, pointing to the U.S. Constitution Supremacy clause, belittled 
the bill as “not worth the paper it is written on” and “absolutely meaningless”.303  
Once passed by the Senate, SB 283, 311 and 417 were then sent to the House of Delegates for 
review, and passed the House on February 12, 2010.304  The three bills received harsh 
comments from some democratic representatives such as Joseph D. Morrissey from Henrico:  
What we do here has merit, has meaning and it is purposeful but these bills devalue what we 
do; as legislation it is an embarrassment simply because it is not legislation. It is mere poetry 
with no legislative value”.305  
Governor Bob McDonnell subsequently made recommendations to this bill, including the 
exemptions that the democratic senators pointed to during the senate discussion. 306  The 
recommendation was agreed to by the Senate of Virginia on March 4, 2010 with a vote of 25-
Y and 15-N.  The House of Delegates also agreed to the Governor Bob McDonnell 's 
recommendation on March 10, 2010 with a vote of 90-Y and 3-N. This event is fundamental 
to determining the date of enactment of the bill; Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli and others 
would later argue before the court that because Senate Bill 417 had been previously amended 
                                                   
302 Id at 28. 
303 Id at 33.  
304 SB 283 passed with a vote of 67-Y and 29-N, SB 311 passed with 67-Y and 28-N and SB 417 passed with 
66-Y and 29-N.   
305 Video of 02/12/2010 House Proceedings, RICHMOND SUNLIGHT (Feb. 12.2010) at 28 min. 
https://www.richmondsunlight.com/minutes/house/2010/02/12/.  
306 The Governor recommended adding that the provision did not exempt from the requirement to carry health 
insurance in two circumstances:  
1. when required by a court or the Department of Social Services.  Line 12, enrolled, after coverage 
insert: except as required by a court or the Department of Social Services where an individual is named a party 
in a judicial or administrative proceeding 
2. students, when required by universities as a condition of enrollment. Line 15, enrolled, after Act insert: 
This section shall not apply to students being required by an institution of higher education to obtain 
and maintain health insurance as a condition of enrollment.  Nothing herein shall impair the rights of 
persons to privately contract for health insurance for family members or former family members. 
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by the Governor, it became law without his signature when the House of Delegates adopted the 
Governor's amendment on March 10, 2010.307  
In the event, Bills SB283 (Chapter 106, 2010 Acts of Assembly), SB311 (Chapter 107, 2010 
Acts of Assembly), SB417 (Chapter 108 of the 2010 Acts of Assembly) and HB10 (Chapter 
818, 2010 Acts of Assembly) were signed in a signing ceremony held in the Governor's Cabinet 
conference room in the Patrick Henry Building on Capitol Square. Of particular significance 
was the presence of Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli who commented “Virginians spoke 
loudly and clearly in rallies, in town halls, and at the ballot box about their opposition to the 
new federal health care law. The governor and both Democrats and Republicans in the General 
Assembly heard them, and as a result, the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act is being signed 
today”.308 The fact that Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli was present during the ceremony is a 
clear demonstration that the objective of the legislation was mainly to support a legal action. 
On the face, however, the legislation was praised by Lieutenant Governor Bill Bolling309 for 
sending a message to Washington and for asserting Virginia’s right to refuse the 
implementation of the individual mandate provision: 
 
Needless to say, I was very disappointed to see the United States Congress turn the 
cheek of indifference to the will of the American people and approve a massive 
federal takeover of our healthcare delivery system. However, here in Virginia we 
have sent a strong message that we want no part of this national fiasco. By signing 
these bills today, we affirm that in Virginia we will not stand idly by and allow any 
level of government to force our citizens to obtain health insurance against their 
will. We believe that this is a clear overreaching of the federal government's 
                                                   
307 Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II et. al., State Sovereign Standing: Often Overlooked, but Not Forgotten, 64 Stan. L. 
Rev. 89, 92 (2012) 
308 2010 VA S 283: Governor's Message - 05/24/2010 available through StateNet on VA S 283 page. 
309 He was unable to attend the ceremony due to an unavoidable scheduling conflict. 
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authority, and we again assert that decisions of this nature should be made on the 
state level, not in Washington. DC.310 
 
The legislation was codified under Virginia Code Section 38.2–3430.1:1 (2010) and was 
effective on July 1, 2010. 311 The final text of the provision is reported below, with the final 
amendments (exceptions to the exemption) requested by the Governor in italics.   
 
§ 38.2-3430.1:1. Health insurance coverage not required. 
No resident of this Commonwealth, regardless of whether he has or is eligible for 
health insurance coverage under any policy or program provided by or through his 
employer, or a plan sponsored by the Commonwealth or the federal government, 
shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual insurance coverage 
except as required by a court or the Department of Social Services where an 
individual is named a party in a judicial or administrative proceeding. No provision 
of this title shall render a resident of this Commonwealth liable for any penalty, 
assessment, fee, or fine as a result of his failure to procure or obtain health insurance 
coverage. This section shall not apply to individuals voluntarily applying for 
coverage under a state-administered program pursuant to Title XIX or Title XXI of 
the Social Security Act. This section shall not apply to students being required by 
an institution of higher education to obtain and maintain health insurance as a 
condition of enrollment. Nothing herein shall impair the rights of persons to 
privately contract for health insurance for family members or former family 
members.”312- 
                                                   
310 Id. 
311 The history of passage of SB 437 is also commented by Farley, supra note 297.  
312 Va.Code Ann. § 38.2–3430.1:1. 
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This provision is directly (and purposely) in conflict with the individual mandate, Section 1501 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.  The evident conflict between state and 
federal law was used by Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli to support a legal action against the 
implementation of the individual mandate requirement in Virginia. His argument was that the 
Commonwealth of Virginia had a right to challenge the individual mandate because the state 
had suffered a “sovereign injury” and that the individual mandate conflicted with its “exercise 
of sovereign power over individuals and entities within the relevant jurisdiction,” which 
“involves the power to create and enforce a legal code.”313 He emphasized that Virginia had 
standing “solely because of the asserted conflict between that federal statute and the 
VHCFA”.314  
The lawsuit started in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on March 23, 2010, 
the same day that President Obama signed the Affordable Care Act into law against the 
Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Sebelius. A similar multi-state lawsuit 
was filed on the same day in Florida but Cuccinelli’s rationale for filing apart from McCollum 
and the other attorneys general was to take advantage of the Eastern District of Virginia’s 
renowned speedy resolution of civil litigation sometimes mocked as ‘Rocket Docket’.315 The 
complaint requested declaratory and injunctive relief from the individual mandate and asked 
the Court “to declare that § 1501 of PPACA is unconstitutional because the individual mandate 
                                                   
313 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 268 (4th Cir. 2011) citing Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. 
v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982), Wyoming v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir.2008), 
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986).  
314 Id. 
315 The Eastern District of Virginia is known as the “Rocket Docket” for its speedy disposition of cases and 
controversies.  
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exceeds the enumerated powers conferred upon Congress.”316 The main issue to resolve was 
whether Virginia could claim standing on its own and not on behalf of any individual.317 
Cuccinelli’s case was heard by District Judge Henry E. Hudson who held that the VHCFA 
provided Virginia with standing:318 “The mere existence of the lawfully-enacted statute is 
sufficient to trigger the duty of the Attorney General of Virginia to defend the law and the 
associated sovereign power to enact it”319 and that the individual mandate was unconstitutional. 
The decision of Judge Hudson was a victory for Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli’s strategy 
and it provided hopes across the 50 states for a repeal of the ACA. However, the defendant 
appealed and on September 8, 2011 and Circuit Judge Diana Gribbon Motz held that Virginia 
could not challenge the “individual mandate” provision for lack of Article III standing320 and 
dismissed this case: “Because the individual mandate applies only to individual persons, not 
states, the Secretary moved to dismiss the suit for that Virginia had not and could not allege 
any cognizable injury and so was without standing to bring this action.”321 The Judge expressly 
avoided ruling on the constitutionality of the individual mandate “Because we hold that 
Virginia lacks standing, we cannot reach the question of whether the Constitution authorizes 
Congress to enact the individual mandate.”322 and defined the VHCFA “a smokescreen for 
Virginia's attempted vindication of its citizens' interests.”323 
                                                   
316 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA ex rel. Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, in his official capacity as Attorney 
General of Virginia, Plaintiff, v. Kathleen SEBELIUS, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human 
Services, in her official capacity, Defendant., 2010 WL 3875236 (E.D.Va.) 20. 
317 See also Timothy Sandefur, State Standing to Challenge Ultra Vires Federal Action: The Health Care Cases 
and Beyond, 23 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 311, 312 (2012). 
318 For an account of the standing issues at stake see Raynor, supra note 33 at 640. 
319 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 605-06 (E.D. Va. 2010), rev'd, 656 F.3d 253 
(4th Cir. 2011). 
320 656 F.3d 253, 4th Cir.(Va.), Sep. 08, 2011. 
321 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 267 (4th Cir. 2011). 
322 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 267 (4th Cir. 2011). 
323 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 269 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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Virginia failed in its attempt to struck down the individual mandate324 provision but other states 
attempted the same strategy.  
The Missouri Health Care Freedom Act 
Representative John Diehl (R-87) introduced the Missouri Health Care Freedom Act (House 
Bill 1764), also known as Proposition C, on Jan. 21, 2010.325 The introduced bill concerned the 
liquidation of domestic insurance companies326 but —with the proposal of State Senator Jane 
Cunningham, an ALEC board member— it was amended (substituted)327 to include the 
prohibition of the individual mandate on May 4, 2010. The resulting bill was therefore 
composed of two parts: the prohibition of the individual mandate and the provision on 
insurance companies’ liquidation. The bill was passed by both Senate and House on May 11, 
2010328 and, because of its controversial nature, was referred for submission to the state-wide 
ballot taking place on August 3, 2010.329 The language of the ballot was: “Shall the Missouri 
Statutes be amended to: Deny the government authority to penalize citizens for refusing to 
purchase private health insurance or infringe upon the right to offer or accept direct payment 
for lawful healthcare services?”330 
                                                   
324 Another case challenging the individual mandate as unconstitutional was unsuccessfully brought before the 
attention of the Virginia courts: Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d (4th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment 
vacated sub nom. Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 133 S. Ct. 679, 184 L. Ed. 2d 452 (2012) abrogated by Nat'l Fed'n 
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 183 L. Ed. 2d 450 (2012) 
325 H.R. Journal, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. 128 (Mo. 2010). 
326 H.1764, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 375.1175 (2010). 
327 State Senator Jane Cunningham proposed a bill that substituted the original. For a brief history of the process 
leading up to Prop C's enactment see Raquel Frisardi, Missouri's Health Care Battle and Differential Judicial 
Review of Popular Lawmaking, 89 WASH. U.L. REV. 207, 211 (2011) “Senator Cunningham's substitute 
language maintained the repeal of section 375.1175, but would also “enact in lieu thereof two new sections 
relating to insurance, with a referendum clause.” While the revised bill did not aim to amend the state 
constitution, it clearly adopted the language of Resolution 48.29 This revised bill would become known as the 
Health Care Freedom Act.” 
328 See Missouri House Journal, 95th Mo. Leg., 2d Sess., p. 1458 (May 11, 2010). 
329 H. 1764, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010): “This act is hereby submitted to the qualified voters 
of this state for approval or rejection at an election which is hereby ordered and which shall be held and 
conducted on Tuesday next following the first Monday in August, 2010, pursuant to the laws and constitutional 
provisions of this state for the submission of referendum measures by the general assembly, and this act shall 
become effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon at such election and not otherwise.” 
330 H. 1764, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010). 
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Despite an initial litigation over the legitimacy of a referendum on a bill that included multiple 
subjects, violating the single subject rule, Proposition C was on the statewide ballot in Missouri, 
where it was approved with 669,073 yes (71.1%).331  The primary advocacy group for the 
enactment of Proposition C is reported to be Missourians for Health Care Freedom (“MHCF”) 
and it would seem that the group used the Tenth Amendment rhetoric to promote the legislation 
as protecting “freedom” from “government control.”332 
The legislation, as codified in Missouri Revised Statutes, Section 1.330 (2010) (“Freedom 
Act”) read:  
No law or rule shall compel, directly or indirectly, any person, employer, or health 
care provider to participate in any health care system. A person or employer may 
pay directly for lawful health care services and shall not be required by law or rule 
to pay penalties or fines for paying directly for lawful health care services.333 
It is again evident that the Missouri’s provision triggers conflict with the individual mandate 
provision of the ACA “since it seems clear that no citizen could simultaneously “deny” the 
federal government's authority to impose tax penalties on individuals without health care and 
comply with a law imposing those same tax penalties.”334 Raquel Frisardi has discussed 
whether the fact that the legislation was approved by popular vote would have conferred a 
special status to the legislation and therefore requested a special process of inquiry for the court  
before invalidating it as unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.335  
                                                   
331 See Missouri Secretary of State, Aug. 3, 2010 Primary Election Results, Proposition C, available at http:// 
www.sos.mo.gov/enrmaps/20100803/ballot_Issue_map.asp? eid=283&oTypeID=20&Tuesday, Äugust 0 ̈3,2 ̈010. 
332 Raquel Frisardi, Missouri's Health Care Battle and Differential Judicial Review of Popular Lawmaking, 89 
Wash. U.L. Rev. 207, 239 (2011). 
333 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 1.330 (West). 
334 Frisardi, supra note 332 at 217 (2011). 
335 Id. 
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The argument put forward by the present study, however, is that the Missouri Health Care 
Freedom Act —just like the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act— was enacted with the purpose 
of supporting a lawsuit rather than with a real intention to pre-empt federal law. In the 
circumstances, a lawsuit to challenge various portions of the ACA was brought by Missouri 
Lieutenant Governor Peter Kinder, joined by seven Missouri citizens on July 7, 2010 before 
the ballot vote that approved the Health Care Freedom Act. The complaint, originally built on 
numerous grounds such as the Anti-Commandeering doctrine,336 the Commerce Clause,337 the 
violation of the Equal Protection, the Privileges and Immunities Clause338 was purposely 
amended on Aug. 18, 2010 to include the violation of the Due Process Clause because of the 
conflict with the Missouri Health Care Freedom Act. 339 This is perhaps even more intriguing 
and confirms the value attributed to the enactment of the Missouri Health Care Freedom Act.    
However, the strategy did not work. The United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Missouri, Rodney W. Sippel, J., 2011 WL 1576721, dismissed the suit for lack of standing 
and the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.340 On appeal, Circuit Judge Steven M. Colloton 
affirmed the judgment of the district court (lack of standing to sue, no Article III case or 
controversy)341  and pointed out that the merits of the individual mandate dispute had been 
settled by the Supreme Court’s Sebelius decision: “Because neither Hill nor Kinder pleaded 
                                                   
336 Complaint at Count 1, Kinder v. Geithner, 2010 WL 2827627 (E.D. Mo. 2011) (No. 1:10 CV 101 RWS).  
“the PPACA is unconstitutional because it commandeers Missouri state employees and compels them to enforce 
a federal health care scheme in contravention of Missouri's sovereignty.” 
337 Id. Count 5.  
338 Id. Count 7.  
339 Amended complaint at Count 9, Kinder v. Geithner 2010 WL 4063085 (E.D. Mo. 2011) (No. 1:10 CV 101 
RWS). “Because it violates constitutionally-protected liberty interests belonging to Samantha Hill and the other 
Missouri citizens, without due process of law, PPACA violates these Missouri citizens' right to determine their 
own appropriate health care, a right they have under Missouri's Health Care Freedom Act.” 
340  Kinder v. Geithner, No. 1:10 CV 101 RWS, 2011 WL 1576721, at *10 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 26, 2011). Only the 
Westlaw citation is currently available. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege a personal injury.  
341 Kinder v. Geithner, 695 F.3d 772, 778 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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sufficient facts to establish an injury-in-fact, both plaintiffs lack standing to sue, and there is 
no Article III case or controversy. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.”342 
Kinder v. Geithner suggests that also in Missouri the bill was enacted with the intent to create 
a justiciable case. This is confirmed in the Brief of the Appellants: “I wish to exercise my 
legally protected right pursuant to the Missouri Health Care Freedom Act to not purchase the 
health insurance policy mandated by PPACA or otherwise participate in the “health care 
system” established by PPACA.”343 
 
  
                                                   
342 Id.  
343 Brief of the Appellants at 29, Kinder v. Geithner, 695 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1973), 2011 WL 
2529647.  
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III. The Health Care Freedom Acts as the Result of States’ Joint Action  
 
The text of the constitutional amendments enacted in Arizona, Oklahoma and Alabama reveal 
the use of an identical language:  
A law or rule shall not compel, directly or indirectly, any person, employer or health 
care provider to participate in any health care system” and “A person or employer 
may pay directly for health care services and shall not be required to pay penalties 
or fines for paying directly for lawful health care services. A health care provider 
may accept direct payment for lawful health care services and shall not be required 
to pay penalties or fines for accepting direct payment from a person or employer 
for lawful health care services. 
To a certain extent, all the Healthcare Freedom acts seem to be inspired by the same model 
and can be analysed as a phenomenon rather than individual state measures. This study 
suggests that a key role in the promotion of the Health Care Freedom acts phenomenon was 
played by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC).344 This organization 
conducted a wide campaign to promote opposition to the ACA ( the ALEC’s Health Care 
Freedom Initiative)345 and provided state legislators with model legislation, the so called 
“Freedom of Choice in Health Care Act”.346 ALEC is undoubtedly a major player in 
                                                   
344 Defined on its website as the “nation’s largest nonpartisan individual membership association of state 
legislators”. ALEC is an association of state legislators and private-sector members. It was founded in 1973 as 
“a nonpartisan membership association for state lawmakers who shared a common belief in limited government, 
free markets, federalism, and individual liberty”. Souce: History, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL, 
https://www.alec.org/membership (last visited Jan. 28, 2018). 
345 ALEC’s Health Care Freedom Initiative, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL, 
http://alec.devhm.net/initiatives/health-care-freedom-initiative/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2018). 
346 Freedom of Choice in Health Care Act, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL, https://www.alec.org/model-
policy/freedom-of-choice-in-health-care-act/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2018).  
The text of the model legislation reads: “The people have the right to enter into private contracts with health 
care providers for health care services and to purchase private health care coverage.  The legislature may not 
require any person to participate in any health care system or plan, nor may it impose a penalty or fine, of any 
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influencing state legislatures. Its website states that  it is responsible for the introduction of 
about 1,000 bills each year and an average of 20 percent become law.347  
The campaign was supported by the publication of the “State Legislators Guide to Repealing 
ObamaCare”348 a guide for state legislators willing to introduce the  measures in their state. 
The model legislation, according to Christie Herrera, Director of the Health and Human 
Services TaskForce at ALEC, was enacted in seven states via the legislature or the ballot box, 
and served as the basis of Commonwealth v. Sebelius, Virginia’s first-in-the-nation lawsuit 
against the federal individual mandate.349  
Herrera’s declarations confirm my assumption that the health care freedom acts were intended 
to be the basis of the following lawsuits. In the ALEC published ‘Guide to Repeal 
Obamacare’, she expressly declares the link between oppositional legislation and lawsuits:   
ALEC’s Freedom of Choice in Health Care Act, if passed by statute, can provide a 
state-level defense against ObamaCare’s excessive federal power. Particularly, the 
measure can provide standing to a state participating in current litigation against the 
federal individual mandate; allow a state to launch additional, 10th-Amendment-
based litigation if the current lawsuits fail; and empower a state attorney general to 
litigate on behalf of individuals harmed by the mandate once it goes into effect in 
2014. If enacted as a constitutional amendment, ALEC’s Freedom of Choice in 
Health Care Act will not only help defend against the federal individual mandate as 
                                                   
type, for choosing to obtain or decline health care coverage or for participation in any particular health care 
system or plan. “ 
347 History, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL, http://alec.devhm.net/about-alec/history/ (last visited Jan. 28, 
2018). 
348 Herrera, supra note 143.  
349 Herrera, supra note 143. 
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indicated above, but it will also prohibit a Canadian-style, single-payer system, 
which legislators in some states have been advocating even before Obamacare. 350  
Further confirmation of this is found in statements reported on ALEC website. On the Health 
Care Freedom Initiative webpage351 ALEC promoted Freedom of Choice in Health Care 
statutes as means to support a legal action and Freedom of Choice in Health Care 
constitutional amendments as legal protection against a state-level requirement to purchase 
health insurance. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the Health Care Freedom bills enacted in Arizona, Virginia and 
Missouri and their relation to the health care lawsuits. It has been argued that in those three 
states the link between health care freedom legislation and health care lawsuits was evident 
because plaintiffs used the legislation to support their legal case.  
This strategy, orchestrated by ALEC and implemented by the individual states, is key to 
understanding the current dynamics of state constitutional contestation. It is clear that states’ 
legislatures did not aim at nullifying the ACA and did not hope that the acts would have ever 
prevented the implementation of the individual mandate but they still passed the legislation.  
This is because they had hope in the effectiveness of the judicial process and believed that their 
legislation could increase the chances of success of the multi-state lawsuit on its way to the US 
Supreme Court. This argument would be supported by the reasons provided by Montana Sen. 
                                                   
350 Herrera, supra note 143 at 18.  
351 Health Care Freedom Initiative, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL, http://alec.devhm.net/initiatives/health-
care-freedom-initiative/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2018). 
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Wittich when questioned by Sen. Reinhart, a Committee Member, on the significance of 
passing a bill that tries to overturn federal law:  
If you haven’t read the district court decision from Florida by judge Vinson I 
commend you to do that, there is an excellent description of the Commerce Clause 
and I also recommend you to read the Supremacy Clause because in the Supremacy 
Clause there is a qualifier, that it has to be in pursuance of the Constitution itself… 
it is qualified… this is not a stretch…  I think that it will withstand the challenge, I 
think it is worth adding Montana’s voice to those other states around the country 
that are trying to do this… I think the Supreme Court will uphold Vinson’s 
decision… 352 
In this case, it is clear that Sen. Wittich intended to convince the Montana legislature of the 
importance of raising the voice and sustain the lawsuit with the legislation. The link between 
legislation and lawsuit is evident again.  
  
                                                   
352 House Committee on Business and Labor, MONTANA LEGISLATURE (Apr. 5, 2011) 
http://montanalegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=5185&meta_id=55419 between 00:46:37 and 
00:49:55.  
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Chapter Three: Tenth Amendment and Anti-Commandeering 
Resolutions 
 
To date, however, the literature on popular constitutionalism has been entirely historical and 
theoretical: no one has studied a constitutional moment in real time. The battle over whether 
health care reform will be entrenched or repealed provides a rare opportunity to do so. 
David A. Super, The Modernization of American Public Law: Health Care Reform and 
Popular Constitutionalism, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 873 (2014). 
 
While Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, including in areas of 
intimate concern to the States, the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon 
Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress' instructions. 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 
Introduction 
 
Nullifications bills have been considered as part of a phenomenon that Prof. Levinson 
termed “Zombie constitutionalism”,353 the resurrection of ideas that no longer form part of the 
American constitutional framework. The previous chapter has instead argued that 
contemporary nullification is a different phenomenon that does not share some of the premises 
of previous nullification attempts such as the link with secession. Furthermore, this work has 
pointed to the relationship between nullification bills and lawsuits and has discussed to what 
extent nullification legislation constituted an attempt by state legislatures to influence 
                                                   
353 Levinson, supra note 122.  
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constitutional adjudication. The present chapter continues this line of enquiry with the 
examination of Anti-Commandeering resolutions and bills considered by some state 
legislatures in anticipation of a response to the passage of the Affordable Care Act. After a 
preliminary exploration of the Anti-Commandeering jurisprudence, I will analyse the use of 
the doctrine in state resolutions and bills considered between 2010-2011 and will question 
whether the passage of Anti-Commandeering resolutions and bills had any influence on the 
presentation of the legal issue to the courts and —ultimately— on the Sebelius holding that the 
authority to penalize states that chose not to participate in Act’s expansion of Medicaid 
program exceeded Congress’s power under the Spending Clause. 
I. Anti-Commandeering Jurisprudence 
The Anti-Commandeering doctrine has been developed by a trio of Supreme Court’s milestone 
decisions: New York, Printz and Sebelius. The doctrine, with different nuances in each decision, 
established that the Federal Government cannot compel the States to enact, legislate for or 
administer a federal regulatory program. The literature has contextualized the elaboration of 
the doctrine in the renewed ‘commitment to Tenth Amendment jurisprudence’354 and the so 
called ‘revival of constitutional federalism’355 that characterized the 90s.  
This work considers the recent resurrection of the doctrine in state legislation and in the 
Supreme Court jurisprudence as evidence of the ongoing polarization of constitutional 
interpretation and examines to what extent state legislatures have contributed to this 
development.  
 
                                                   
354 David T. Woods, A Step Toward Stability in Modern Tenth Amendment Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court 
Adopts A Workable Standard in Printz v. United States, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1417, 1428 (1998).  
355 Lang Jin, Printz v. United States: The Revival of Constitutional Federalism, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 631 (1999). 
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New York v. United States (1992): Congress does not have the power to compel the States 
to enact or administer a federal regulatory program 
 
The Anti-Commandeering doctrine debuted in Supreme Court jurisprudence in New 
York v. United States. The case involved the constitutionality of three provisions of a federal 
statute involving the disposal of radioactive waste: the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Amendments Act of 1985 (LLRWPA). The statute established the responsibility of states to 
provide “either by itself or in cooperation with other States, for the disposal of ... low-level 
radioactive waste generated within the State.”356 In order to encourage the states to comply 
with this obligation, the statute provided three types of incentives that were objects of the legal 
challenge: 
1. Monetary incentives for states with disposal sites (part of the surcharges collected 
by the sited states will be transferred to an escrow account and then be redistributed 
by the Secretary of Energy to virtuous states); 
2. Access incentives for states with disposal sites (states that do not arrange for disposal 
sites and do not meet federal deadlines would face first an increase of the cost of 
access to other states’ sites and then the denial of access altogether); 
3. Take title provision: states that fail to comply with the federal scheme and timetable 
of regulations must “take title” i.e. assume ownership and possession of, as well as 
legal liability for the waste.   
The issue before the court was whether Congress may compel the states to legislate and 
implement federal regulations “in a particular field or a particular way”.357 Petitioners argued 
that the Act was inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause because it 
                                                   
356 42 U.S.C. § 2021c(a)(1)(A).  
357 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992). 
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imposed “intrusive affirmative obligations upon sovereign state governments”.358 The core of 
the argument was that Congress had imposed legislative obligations “without the State’s 
consent, and with no option for the State’s withdrawal from the role of regulator or actor in the 
field”359 undermining the opportunity for state citizens “to decide, through their state 
governmental process, whether state fiscal and legislative resources should be devoted to the 
problem of low-level waste disposal.”360 
Justice O’ Connor (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter and 
Thomas) delivered the majority opinion which affirmed that the monetary and the access 
incentives provided by the LLRWPA were constitutional under the Commerce and Spending 
Clauses. However, she argued, the “take title provision is of a different character”361 and “does 
not represent the conditional exercise of any congressional power enumerated in the 
Constitution.”362  
Whatever the outer limits of that sovereignty may be, one thing is clear: The Federal 
Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory 
program. The Constitution permits both the Federal Government and the States to 
enact legislation regarding the disposal of low level radioactive waste. The 
Constitution enables the Federal Government to pre-empt state regulation contrary 
to federal interests, and it permits the Federal Government to hold out incentives to 
the States as a means of encouraging them to adopt suggested regulatory schemes. 
It does not, however, authorize Congress simply to direct the States to provide for 
the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their borders. While there 
                                                   
358 Brief for Petitioner State of New York at 2, New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992), (No. 91–543, 91–558 
and 90–563), 1992 WL 526118.  
359 Id. at 21. 
360 Id. at 23.  
361 New York, 505 U.S. at 174.  
362 Id. at 176.  
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may be many constitutional methods of achieving regional self-sufficiency in 
radioactive waste disposal, the method Congress has chosen is not one of them.363 
The decision elaborated for the first time the so called Anti-Commandeering doctrine. 
Remarkably, Justice O’Connor did not use the term “commandeer” to illustrate the reasons of 
her decision. The term is present in the court’s opinion only when Justice O’ Connor cited to a 
dictum in the Hodel364 case: “Congress may not simply “commandee[r] the legislative 
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory 
program”365 In Hodel —Justice O’ Connor explained— the Court upheld the Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 precisely because it did not ‘commandeer’ the States into 
regulating mining; states were not compelled participate in the federal regulatory program in 
any manner whatsoever. 366 By contrast, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act’s “take 
title” provision exceeded the powers of Congress because it compelled states to choose between 
accepting ownership of waste generated within their borders or regulating according to 
instructions of Congress (i.e. commandeering the legislative processes of the States).  The 
problem was not whether the Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws 
requiring or prohibiting certain acts, but whether it has the power to compel the States to require 
or prohibit those acts.367 Professor Evan H. Caminker has argued that the Court’s use of the 
term “commandeer,” with its connotation of a militaristic conscription, is perhaps quite 
revealing of the Court’s negative attitude toward this congressional strategy. More neutral 
terms would be “direct,” “order,” “mandate,” and “enjoin.” 368 
 
                                                   
363 Id. at 188.  
364 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981). 
365 Id. at 288.  
366 Id. at 161.  
367 Id. at 166.  
368 Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to 
Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1089 (1995).  
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Printz v. United States (1997): Congress does not have the power to direct the actions of 
State executive officials 
 
The Anti-Commandeering doctrine was further expanded in Printz v. United States369 (1997) 
to include commandeering of state executive officials.  
The case involved the constitutionality of interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act370 requiring local chief law enforcement officers (CLEOs) to conduct 
background checks of prospective handgun purchasers until a national system for instantly 
checking backgrounds was in place. County sheriff Jay Printz challenged the constitutionality 
of the Brady Act’s interim provisions arguing that the requirement to conduct a background 
check was actually compelling state officers to execute federal law. The question before the 
court was whether congressional action compelling state officers to execute federal laws is 
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari following a split in the circuit courts 
where the Second371 and Ninth Circuit372 agreed that the provision was constitutional and the 
Fifth Circuit concluded that it was unconstitutional because violated the Tenth Amendment.  
In a 5 to 4 decision the Supreme Court struck down the interim provision of the Brady Act as 
an unconstitutional command to state officers.  
Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the majority opinion joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, 
Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ. Because there is no constitutional text speaking to this precise 
question—he explained— the opinion considered the historical understanding and practice, 
the structure of the Constitution, and the jurisprudence of this Court.”373 
                                                   
369 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
370 Pub. L. No. 103-159, §§ 101--106, 107 Stat. 1536--44 (1993) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921--
925A (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 3759 (1994)). 
371 Frank v. United States, 78 F.3d 815, 830 (2d Cir. 1996). 
372 Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025, 1033 (9th Cir. 1995). 
373 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905(1997). 
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With regard to historical understanding, Justice Scalia reviewed early legislation including 
statutes that required state courts to record applications for citizenship374 but argued that they 
did not impose obligations on the States’ executive and were therefore not relevant.375  
As to the structure of the Constitution, Scalia emphasized the importance of separation of 
powers to protect liberty376  and argued that federal control of state officers would jeopardize 
the equilibrium of powers between the three branches of the Federal Government:  
 
The Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to administer the laws 
enacted by Congress; the President, it says, “shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed,” Art. II, § 3, personally and through officers whom he appoints 
(…) The Brady Act effectively transfers this responsibility to thousands of CLEOs 
in the 50 States, who are left to implement the program without meaningful 
Presidential control.377  
 
Lastly, referring to the jurisprudence of the court, Scalia contended that the Government’s 
attempt to distinguish New York on the basis that the Brady Act leaves no “policymaking” 
discretion with the State was not convincing because CLEOs were still expected to make 
policy: “utterly no policymaking component is rare, particularly at an executive level as high 
as a jurisdiction’s chief law enforcement officer.”378 
 
The opinion concluded that Congress does not have the power to direct the actions of State 
executive officials and therefore cannot require “local chief law enforcement officers” 
                                                   
374 Id. 
375 Id. at 908.  
376 Id. at.921. ‘This separation of the two spheres is one of the Constitution's structural protections of liberty’.  
377 Id. at 922.  
378 Id. at 927. 
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(CLEOs) to perform background-checks on prospective handgun purchasers. The decision 
invalidated portions of the Brady’s Act:  
 
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a 
federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that 
prohibition by conscripting the State's officers directly. The Federal Government 
may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor 
command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer 
or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether policymaking is 
involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; 
such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of 
dual sovereignty.379 
Justice Scalia used the word ‘commandeering’ and expanded O’Connor’s Anti-
Commandeering doctrine to include the prohibition for the federal government to 
commandeer state officials to assist in the implementation of federal law:  
 
the “federal government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address 
particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political 
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”380 
 
David Woods argued that Printz had strengthened the Anti-Commandeering doctrine and 
represented “a step toward stability in modern Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.”381  
                                                   
379 Id. at 935. 
380 Id. at 935.  
381 David T. Woods, A Step Toward Stability in Modern Tenth Amendment Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court 
Adopts A Workable Standard in Printz v. United States, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1417 (1998). 
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National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012) 
 
Sebelius has been mentioned in the previous chapters as the decision that upheld the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate. However, the decision really involved two separate 
issues. The first issue before the court concerned the extent to which the single mandate 
provision of the ACA is authorized by the Commerce Clause power of the federal government. 
Roberts, C.J., who thought that the single mandate was outside the scope of the Commerce 
Clause power, sided with the liberal wing by upholding it as a valid exercise of the taxing 
power. The other issue was whether the ACA coerced the states into participating in the Act’s 
expansion of the Medicaid program, thus exceeding the scope of Congress’s spending power. 
A majority of the justices (7-2)382 agreed that the expansion of Medicaid was not a valid 
exercise of Congress’s spending power as it would coerce states to either accept the expansion 
or risk losing existing Medicaid funding. After 15 years, the Anti-Commandeering doctrine 
returned in the Supreme Court.   In the majority opinion, the Chief Justice made reference to 
New York and Printz to argue that threatening the states with the loss of federal funding was 
equal to commandeering the states and that Medicaid expansion represented an indirect 
coercion on the states to adopt a federal regulatory system.383 In the words of Justice Roberts 
the conditional spending grant was a ‘gun to the head’.384 The court not only used the Anti-
Commandeering doctrine as elaborated in Printz; it extended the definition of what constitutes 
a federal command to indirect coercion. Some scholars have speculated on the implications of 
the decision for a number of federal statutes underwritten by the spending power that could 
                                                   
382 Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan joined the five most conservative justices. 
383 NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
384 Id. at 2604. 
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suffer legal challenges as a consequence of the Sebelius decision. 385 It has been argued: “The 
Court has reconceptualized what constitutes a federal command to the states, and consequently 
re-defined the scope of the Anti-Commandeering principle. Previously, the Court had 
invalidated federal statutes as commandeerings only when those statutes formally compelled 
the states to govern in a particular fashion.”386 With the decision on Medicaid, the Supreme 
Court sanctioned a new course for the Tenth Amendment’s jurisprudence, whose development 
remains to be seen. This study now questions how the Anti-Commandeering doctrine returned 
to the Supreme Court and if there had been any external influence.  
Dr. Amanda Hollis-Brusky has recently conducted a study on the influence of the Federalist 
Society on Supreme Court decisions. She argued that the Anti-Commandeering doctrine 
elaborated in New York and Printz reads like a scripted response to the complaints articulated 
for over a decade at Federalist Society meetings and in network scholarship and that once that 
script was written, the Supreme Court could expand the doctrine “with relative jurisprudential 
ease” in Sebelius.387 She points to the fact that 3 Supreme Court Justices were members of the 
society (Thomas, Scalia and Alito) and that the final statement where Justice Roberts388 
emphasized that the United States is a system of limited government and dual sovereignty 
recalls language often recited within Federalist Society network. Her research sheds light on 
the influence of an epistemic association on the Sebelius decision and further shows that three 
                                                   
385 See Christopher Roma, To Yoder or Not to Yoder? How the Spending Clause Holding in National Federation 
of Independent Business v. Sebelius Can Be Used to Challenge the No Child Left Behind Act, 34 PACE L. REV. 
1320, 1335 (2014); Erin Ryan, The Spending Power and Environmental Law After Sebelius, 85 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1003, 1066 (2014); David S. Schwartz, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of 
Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 567, 625 (2013). For a different perspective on the 
future of the anticommandeering doctrine see also Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Conditional 
Spending Paradox, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 339, 341 (discussing the distinguish between commandeering and 
coercive exercises of the conditional spending and concluding that the judicial capacity model predicts that the 
Court is likely to retreat and retrench from NFIB's anti-coercion principle). 
386 Bradley W. Joondeph, The Health Care Cases and the New Meaning of Commandeering, 91 N.C. L. REV. 
811, 833 (2013).  
387 Amanda Hollis-Brusky, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY AND THE CONSERVATIVE 
COUNTERREVOLUTION 142 (2015). 
388 Sebelius, 567 U.S.  at 91.  
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amicus curiae briefs contain Federalist Society’s signatories, respectively Richard Epstein, 
Steven G. Bradbury and James F. Blumstein providing evidence of their involvement. This 
chapter extends Hollis-Brusky’s findings by suggesting that the very first signals of the 
influence of interest groups (academic societies, stakeholders and lobbies alike) can be found 
in the legislatures which represent the laboratories for the preparation and discussion of certain 
constitutional challenges.  
The analysis of the history and related filing pertaining to the Sebelius case reveals that the 
Anti-Commandeering challenge was launched by the Attorneys General and/or Governors of 
twenty-six states party to Florida v. HHS,389a case that started in the United States District 
Court, N.D. Florida, Pensacola Division and that was finally heard by the Supreme Court as 
NFIB v. Sebelius. The challenge was set up first on Mar. 23, 2010 (the same day of the 
enactment of the ACA) in the Pleading where the states complained that the ACA violated the 
Spending Clause and principles of federalism protected under the Tenth Amendment:  
 
56. The Act exceeds Congress's powers under Article I of the Constitution of the 
United States, and cannot be upheld under the Commerce Clause, Const. art. I, §8; 
the Taxing and Spending Clause, id.; or any other provision of the Constitution.  
 […] 
58.The Act violates the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, 
and runs afoul of the Constitution's principle of federalism, by commandeering the 
Plaintiffs and their employees as agents of the federal government's regulatory 
scheme at the states' own cost.390 
                                                   
389 Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla.), order 
clarified, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla. 2011), and aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Atty. 
Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub 
nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
390 Complaint at 58, Florida v. HHS, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla 2011) ( No. 3:10-cv-91), 2010 WL 
1038209. 
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The claim was reiterated on Aug. 06, 2010 in a Motion filed by the states plaintiffs, assisted 
by Baker & Hostetler LLP’s lawyers David B. Rivkin and Lee A. Casey. The motion relied 
on a “coercion and commandeering” theory and asserted that the ACA compelled states to 
administer and enforce federal insurance-related programs: 
The ACA shifts billions of dollars in costs, mandates, and responsibilities to the 
States, coerces and commandeers their resources, and renders them arms of the 
federal government, in violation of Congress's Article I powers, the Ninth and 
Tenth Amendments, and the Constitution's federalist structure.391 
However, the refined claim that the threat to lose the federal matching funds amounted to 
commandeering was further developed in a Motion filed on Nov. 04, 2010 where state 
plaintiffs used the South Dakota v. Dole392 test to argue that Medicaid passed the “point at 
which pressure turns into coercion” and therefore was unconstitutional: 
The “choice” offered by the ACA is just as illusory. As shown, States cannot opt 
out of Medicaid, because they are subject to unconstitutionally coercive 
consequences. This clearly was Congress's purpose and intent. However, remaining 
in the ACA Medicaid program will encumber the Plaintiff States with such massive 
new expenses and responsibilities that their viability as sovereigns will be severely 
threatened.393 
The challenge was further refined by Paul Clement, a former United States Solicitor General 
under G.W. Bush, who authored the state plaintiffs’ argument in the Eleventh Circuit Court 
                                                   
391 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at IV, Florida v. HHS, 780 F. Supp. 
2d 1256 (N.D. Fla 2011) (No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT), 2010 WL 3163990 (N.D.Fla.). 
392 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987). 
393Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary, Florida v. HHS, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla 
2011) (No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT), 2010 WL 4564355 (N.D.Fla.).  
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of Appeal.  The Anti-Commandeering doctrine ultimately reached the Supreme Court in the 
Reply Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid394  in which 24 states presented the Supreme 
Court with the argument that the ACA was unconstitutionally coercive because it forced States 
to implement federal policy. The state petitioners, in reply to the federal government’s 
argument that the spending power has no anti-coercion limit and encompasses the power to 
commandeer the States through coercion, argued that if the federal government can coerce 
States to administer federal programs, by threatening to withhold billions of dollars extracted 
from in-State taxpayers, then very little is left of the Anti-Commandeering doctrine.395 
 
The analysis of the filings pertaining to the Sebelius case suggests that the Anti-
Commandeering doctrine came to the attention of the courts because the states, in first 
instance, challenged the Medicaid expansion on Tenth Amendment’s grounds. This alone 
would demonstrate the effectiveness of state challenges to federal policies and, above all, 
would confirm the initial assumption that states play an important role in shaping the 
constitutional discourse. However, there is more. State legislatures expressed their 
constitutional concerns before the actual legal challenge to the ACA adopting Tenth 
Amendment resolutions in three states: Alabama,396 Wyoming397 and Utah.398 It might well 
be the case that such resolutions inspired the legal challenges. This consideration would 
reinforce the argument that state legislatures play a crucial role in shaping the constitutional 
discourse and that the analysis of state legislative activity is key to understand legal 
challenges.   
                                                   
394 Reply Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid, Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human 
Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-400), 2012 WL 864598.  
395 Id. at 7.  
396 S.J.Res. 27 (Al. 2010). 
397 H.J. Res. 2 (Wy. 2010) and H.J. Res. 9 (Wy. 2010). 
398 H.C.Res. 2 (Ut. 2010) and S.J. Res. 3(Ut. 2010). 
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This work now explores Tenth Amendment resolutions that preceded the legal challenges and 
seeks to demonstrate that state legislators prepared the ground for the lawsuits.  
II. The Anti-Commandeering Resolutions 
 
Between 2010-2011, at least five legislatures (Alabama, Utah, Arizona, Virginia and 
Wyoming) passed resolutions containing Anti-Commandeering language to push back federal 
legislation seen as intrusive and unconstitutional. The resolutions claimed Tenth Amendment 
sovereignty and declared the rejection of any federal legislation that would impose mandates 
to the states. The Anti-Commandeering doctrine was later used in court to challenge the 
constitutionality of the ACA and ultimately by Chief Justice Roberts who declared the 
expansion of Medicaid unconstitutional. In 2014, the Anti-Commandeering doctrine was 
resurrected by the Arizona state legislature which passed a constitutional amendment later 
approved at the poll.399  
To what extent were the state resolutions aimed at influencing the argument used by the 
subsequent lawsuits and shaping the constitutional discourse around the legitimacy of the 
ACA? This section explores the legislative history of the five Anti-Commandeering resolutions 
(case studies) and—through the analysis of the respective legislative debates— will seek to 
expound the intent of legislators and the dynamics behind the push back strategies devised by 
state opponents. The rationale for the choice of the five resolutions is that they are the only 
resolutions passed before the Sebelius decision and that have arguably influenced the decision. 
The first two sub-sections explore Alabama and Wyoming’s resolutions which did not 
explicitly target the ACA but used state rights rhetoric to push back on various federal 
                                                   
399 H.C.Res. 2001 (Az. 2010). 
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mandates. Subsections three, four and five explore resolutions that targeted the implementation 
of the ACA more explicitly.  
 
Alabama Senate Joint Resolution 27 (2010) 
The first legislature to pass an Anti-Commandeering resolution was Alabama on Jan. 22nd 2010 
(signed by Governor Riley) before the enactment of the Affordable Care Act (March 23rd, 
2010).  The resolution is a declaration of sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment and, after 
recalling founding fathers’ statements on the vertical separation of powers as a double security 
to the people, it relies on the Anti-Commandeering doctrine as elaborated in Printz: 
“WHEREAS, the United States Supreme Court has ruled in New York v. United States, 112 S. 
Ct. 2408 (1992), that Congress may not simply commandeer the legislative and regulatory 
processes of the states.”400 The resolution continues with a call for the prohibition or repeal of 
“compulsory federal legislation that directs states to comply under threat of civil or criminal 
penalties or sanctions or requires states to pass legislation or lose federal funding”.  It also 
demanded  “to the federal government, as our agent, to cease and desist, effective immediately, 
mandates that are beyond the scope of these constitutionally delegated powers”.401 
The Alabama legislature does not publish the records from the legislative debate and, in order 
to enquire on the nature and objectives of the resolution, on April 28th and May 8th  2017 I 
interviewed by e-mail Senator Scott Beason, the author of the resolution. Senator Beason had 
been a member of the Alabama Senate from 2006 to 2014, representing the 17th District402 and 
is mainly known to be the author of the controversial “ Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer 
and Citizen Protection Act”, a controversial immigration bill signed by Governor Robert 
Bentley on June 9, 2011 that  required immigration checks by law enforcement, educational 
                                                   
400 S.J.Res. 27 (Ala. 2010). 
401 Id.  
402 The 17th Senate District comprises northern and western Jefferson County and a large portion of St. Clair 
County. 
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institutions, and employers, as well as restrictions on public benefits based on an individual’s 
immigration status.403 More interestingly for this research project, in January 2010 Sen. Beason 
sponsored the above mentioned Anti-Commandeering resolution together with other nine 
republican senators.404 I asked Sen. Beason what was his intent in introducing the resolution in 
the Alabama Senate and he replied that it was meant to be “a reminder to the federal 
government of what our rights as a state are in general”.405 To my question on whether the 
resolution intended to prepare the ground for the following legal challenges that led to the 
Sebelius case, he answered that the intent was to raise the voice of the states and that the courts 
might have been sensitized to the issue of state sovereignty: 
 
I cannot say whether the Tenth Amendment resolutions from any of the states had 
a direct impact on the actions of the states' Attorneys General or on the federal 
courts.  The federal courts have been ignoring the states for many years, but the 
resolutions did reflect a rising sentiment among the people of the different states 
that we do not all have to govern ourselves in the same fashion.  Alabama and 
California should be able to be radically different in their worldview and 
subsequent policies.  It could easily have been that the overall feeling which was 
reflected in the resolutions caused the courts to pause, not because the court 
"remembered" that the states have rights, but in order to tamp down the growth of 
the anti-federal government sentiment across the country.  It is possible that they 
                                                   
403 Beason-Hammon, Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, H. 56, 2011 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 
2011). 
404 The resolution had been authored by Senators Beason and sponsored by Senators Sanford, Glover, Brooks, 
Smith, Erwin, Marsh, Holley, Pittman and Orr.  
405 Email from Sen. Scott Beason, Member of the Alabama Senate to the author (Apr. 28, 2017) (on file with 
author). 
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would allow for a cooling down period before returning to policies that centralize 
more and more power in the federal government.406 
 
The other characteristic of the resolutions is that the language is very similar to model 
resolutions circulated by the Tenth Amendment Center 407 and by ALEC.408This would suggest 
that both the grassroots organization and the association of legislators played a major role in 
promoting the resolutions but the actual influence of each of them is hard to track without the 
collaboration of the sponsor.  I asked Senator Beason how he would explain the similarity of 
language used in the resolutions and, although he recognized the use of a template, he was quite 
vague as to the source of the latter:  
 
it may have been that another state's resolution was used as template or it may have 
been based on the wording that was circulating among legislators from different 
states to be used as a template.  It may have been that we stated to our Legislative 
Reference Service what we wanted to say and do, and this was the draft that we 
liked the best from the choices that were generated.  Like I said earlier, 2010 was a 
long time ago.409 
 
The similarity of the language of the Alabama resolution to the sample resolution published by 
the Tenth Amendment Center and to the one published by ALEC suggests that the resolution 
was part of a broader project aimed at challenging national policies via the use of legal 
                                                   
406 Email from Sen. Scott Beason, Member of the Alabama Senate to the author (May 8, 2017) (on file with the 
author).  
407 10th Amendment Resolution, TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER, http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/10th-
amendment-resolution/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2018).  
408 Resolution Reaffirming Tenth Amendment Rights, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL, https://www.alec.org/model-
policy/resolution-reaffirming-tenth-amendment-rights/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2018). 
409 Email from Sen. Scott Beason, Member of the Alabama Senate to the author (Apr. 28 2017) (on file with 
author).  
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expedients. This is confirmed on the Tenth Amendment website by Michael Boldin (the 
founder of the organization) who suggests that the resolutions are a “first step in the overall 
process of the Tenth Amendment movement” and that they are meant to “help create fertile 
ground for future actions”. 410 We know that the Anti-Commandeering doctrine had been at the 
core of the Sebelius decision on Medicaid and have now reason to speculate that the Alabama 
resolution was the first sign, a “notice” —as Boldin says—  of an underlying battle that would 
take place two years later in court.  
 
Wyoming House Joint Resolution 2 and House Joint Resolution 9 (2010) 
The Legislature of Wyoming also adopted two Tenth Amendment resolutions in 2010: HJR 2 
and HJR 9. The first is a pure Tenth Amendment resolution with a demand to Congress to 
prohibit or repeal “all compulsory federal legislation that directs states to comply under threat 
of civil or criminal penalties or sanctions or that requires states to pass legislation or lose federal 
funding”411 and a reiteration of the states right under Section 4, Article IV of the Constitution 
(the guarantee clause), the Ninth Amendment (non-enumerated rights retained by people) and 
the Anti-Commandeering doctrine.  HJR 9, instead, is a request to the Wyoming Congressional 
delegation and Congress to take action to initiate the amendment process provided by article V 
of the Constitution to amend the Tenth Amendment and article I, section VIII (the Interstate 
Commerce Clause), of the Constitution of the United States. The requested amendments are 
aimed at reducing the extent to which the courts can extend Congressional power and start a 
new course for Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that would limit Congress’ powers. In 
particular, the Wyoming legislature proposed to include the word “expressly” in the Tenth 
Amendment to read: “The powers not expressly delegated to the United States by the 
                                                   
410 Alabama Affirms Sovereignty, TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER, 
http://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2010/01/alabama-affirms-sovereignty/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2018). 
411 H.J.Res. 2, 60th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2010).    
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Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people” and to further add that the “amendment shall be considered by all courts as a rule of 
interpretation and construction in any case involving an interpretation of any constitutional 
power claimed by the Congress.”412 With this request the House manifested its commitment to 
promote a narrow interpretation of the Tenth Amendment and to influence the constitutional 
debate around states’ rights. The amendment to the Commerce Clause was instead aimed at 
circumventing Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce to “matters that are primarily 
intrastate with only an insignificant or collateral effect upon interstate commerce”. The 
amendment is an open criticism to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that expanded the scope 
of the Congressional Commerce Clause power and attempts to tackle the federal legislation 
and regulations enacted on the basis on the Commerce Clause.  
The timing of the resolutions and the similarity of content to the other resolutions would 
suggest that the legislature of Wyoming intended to join the other states in the sovereignty 
movement. Even if these resolutions are political non-starters, it can be argued that they 
contributed to raise the profile of the constitutional debate around the legitimacy of federal 
mandates and shed light on a legal issue that will be later discussed in the Supreme Court.  
 
 
Utah 2010 House Concurrent Resolution 2 and Senate Joint Resolution 3: Tenth 
Amendment Rights 
 
The Governor of Utah signed a House Joint Resolution very similar to that of Alabama on Mar. 
23, 2010, the same day of the passage of Obamacare. The language of the preamble is in fact 
                                                   
412 The full amendment to Tenth Amendment reads as follow: The powers not expressly delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people. This amendment shall be considered by all courts as a rule of interpretation and construction in any case 
involving an interpretation of any constitutional power claimed by the Congress. [emphasis added] 
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identical.413 This would suggest a joint action of the states or—again— the influence of the 
Tenth Amendment Center and ALEC. The title of the resolution was ‘Tenth Amendment 
Rights’ and the sponsor was Rep. Julie Fisher. 
The resolution urged the federal government and the United States Congress to ‘immediately 
cease and desist the issuance of mandates and laws that are beyond the scope of these 
constitutionally delegated powers’ and ‘to repeal existing regulations and laws that direct states 
to comply under threat of civil or criminal penalties or sanctions or that require states to pass 
legislation or lose federal funding’. The audio recording of the Committee hearings414 shows 
that the resolution was presented by Rep. Julie Fisher as a ‘Tenth Amendment Resolution’, she 
expressed concern for the federal debt415 and explained that this resolution was meant to join 
the national movement to pass sovereignty bills.416 This statement confirms that state 
resolutions were the expression of a sovereignty movement led by political organizations and 
lobbies committed to defy Obamacare. State legislators do not explicitly identify the 
organizations but the similarity of the language used in the state resolutions and in the sample 
resolutions promoted on the ALEC and Tenth Amendment website is an indication that these 
two organizations played a role in pushing the resolutions through the legislatures. Further on 
in her presentation of the resolution, Rep. Fisher linked the resolution to HB 67417 passed by 
the same legislature on March 22, 2010.418 HB 67 was an act that formally prohibited a state 
agency or department from implementing any provision of the federal health care reform unless 
                                                   
413 S. J. Res.27, (Ala.2010). The preamble reads: “WHEREAS, the Tenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution reads as follows: ‘The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people’.  
WHEREAS, the Tenth Amendment defines the total scope of federal power as being that specifically granted by 
the United States Constitution and no more.” 
414 House Government Operations Committee Feb. 16, 2010, UTAH LEGISLATURE, 
http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=14493&meta_id=507997 (last visited Jan. 29, 
2018).  
415 Id. at 1.28.00.  
416 Id. at 1.28.40. 
417 H.R. 67, Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010).  
418 Id. at 1.29.41.  
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the agency reported to the Legislature on the impact of such implementations. In other words, 
the state legislature was claiming sovereignty over healthcare and trying to avoid the direct 
implementation of federal provisions in the state. The reason why she linked the two measures 
is that the resolutions do not have any direct legal effect and are often referred to as “postcards” 
to Congress. One of the questions asked was whether a similar resolution could trigger a legal 
challenge.419 Rep. Fisher responded that the resolution was a ‘message bill rather than an actual 
challenge’420and that HB 67 could instead trigger the challenge. The statements by Rep. Fisher 
demonstrate that the intention of legislators passing Anti-Commandeering resolutions was, 
unlike the enactment of Health Care Freedom acts, purely to raise the importance of the issue 
and call the attention of Congress: “We are sending the message to Congress that we have 
reached our boiling point.”421 Three days later, on 03/26/2010, the Utah Governor signed 
Senate Concurrent Resolution 3, a sovereignty resolution introduced three months before by 
Senator Stuart Adams. The resolution uses the same Tenth Amendment rhetoric of HCR 2.  
However, where HCR mentioned New York, SCR 3 also mentioned Printz and did not request 
Congress to cease and desist from the issuance of mandates but more specifically to “to prohibit 
or repeal all compulsory federal legislation that directs states to comply under threat of civil or 
criminal penalty or sanction or that requires states to enact legislation or lose federal 
funding”.422 I cannot find a reason for this but I assume that SCR 3 was a more thoughtful and 
polished version of HCR 2.  
Sen. Adams also confirmed that the resolution was being solicited by “a couple of 
constituents”423 and its purpose was to join other 38 states that introduced sovereignty bills in 
                                                   
419 Id. at 1.30.50.  
420 Id. at 1.31.  
421 Id. at 1.30.  
422 S.Conc.Res. 2, Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010).  
423 Senate Committee on Workforce Services and Community and Economic Development, UTAH LEGISLATURE 
(Feb. 8, 2010) 4.05- 4.18, 
http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=14581&meta_id=507785. 
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2009. This resolution, he added, was mainly targeted to claim sovereignty on health care, 
retirement, security and social policies.424 The discussion in the committee highlighted the 
desire of the legislators to claim sovereignty on health care and that their belief that health care 
would be better managed at state level.   
The resolutions did not stop the passage of the ACA but it can be argued that state legislatures 
have been successful in influencing the constitutional discourse and  the subsequent legal battle 
that weakened the ACA’s reach;  Anti-Commandeering became the central issue at stake in the 
Sebelius decision. State legislatures were preparing the ground for legal challenges either by 
enacting legislation that would trigger the legal challenge or —in this case—by passing 
resolutions that raise the relevance of a particular legal issue.  
 
Arizona House Concurrent Resolution 2001 and Senate Concurrent Memorial 1001 
(2010) 
 
In April 2010, the Arizona legislature adopted House Concurrent Resolution 2001 and Senate 
Concurrent Memorial 1001 pledging Congress to introduce and enact legislation that repealed 
the Affordable Care Act because it contravened the Anti-Commandeering doctrine. 
House Concurrent Resolution 2001,425 whose signatory was Representative Judy M. Burges 
(R-4), was intended to be a declaration of sovereignty,426 a call for the prohibition or repeal of 
‘all compulsory federal legislation that directs states to comply under threat of civil or criminal 
penalties or sanctions or requires states to pass legislation or lose federal funding’. The 
                                                   
424 Id. at 5.40- 5.52.  
425 H.Conc.Res. 2001, 49th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).  
426 The title of the Resolution recites: ‘Resolving Intent to Claim Sovereignty Under the Tenth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States over Certain Powers Serving Notice to the Federal Government to Cease 
and Desist Certain Mandates and Providing That Certain Federal Legislation Be Prohibited Or Repealed.’.  
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resolution called for Tenth Amendment’s rights and made express reference to the Anti-
Commandeering doctrine mentioning New York v. United States427 case as principal authority:  
 
“Whereas, the United States Supreme Court has ruled in New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144 (1992), that Congress may not simply commandeer the legislative 
and regulatory processes of the states; and Whereas, a number of proposals from 
previous administrations and some now pending from the present administration 
and from Congress may further violate the Constitution of the United States.” 
 
On 01.19.2010, when Representative Burges presented the resolution in the House Government 
Committee,428 she pointed to policies such as the Real ID Act and the No Child Left Behind 
programs as invasive mandates that had impact on state budget. When challenged on the 
validity of the resolution by Democratic Rep. Tom Chabin, who argued that the Supreme Court 
should be the ultimate arbiter of such controversies, she provided a vague answer which 
confirms my initial assumption that these resolution are meant to send a message to 
Washington and remind Congress of a certain interpretation of the constitutional provisions 
relating to separation of powers and the role of the judiciary: 
 
Rep. Tom Chabin: The Constitution defines our role with the federal government 
(the state of Arizona), and that is interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. 
What benefit, would passing this act, given that since the very beginning of the 
nation, that relation has been defined?429  
                                                   
427 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
428 House Government Committee, ARIZONA LEGISLATURE (Jan. 19, 2010), 
http://azleg.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=13&clip_id=6410&meta_id=105406.  
429 Id. at 58:30. 
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Rep. Judy M. Burges: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chaban. You know of course that when 
the Constitution was created the Supreme Court, the executive and the judicial 
branch [sic] were all created separately and that was to create a balance of power 
(within the constitution). So, basically, what happens is that we the states created 
the federal government, the federal government did not create the states and because 
each one of the different departments […] are to be separate and equal powers.430  
 
The wording of this resolution and the discussion held in Committee represents a good example 
of the use of constitutional rhetoric in state legislatures to push against the implementation of 
federal policies, a trend that this work has been seeking to explore and explain. The arguments 
put forward by the sponsor of the resolution reiterate a conception of the Constitution as a 
contract between sovereign states as opposed to union of people. This idea finds its roots in the 
compact theory as advanced by Thomas Jefferson431 and later developed by Calhoun during 
the nullification crisis in South Carolina in the 1830s. The compact theory also found some 
traction in the Supreme Court and can be clearly recognized in the dissenting opinion of 
originalist Justice Thomas in Term Limits.432 In this decision, Thomas argued that the source 
of the Constitution’s authority resides in the consent of the people of each individual State, not 
the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole.433  
The strategy was further reinforced by a Tenth Amendment memorial passed by the same 
legislature during the 2010 eight special session: Senate Memorial, AZ SCM 1001434 sponsored 
by Senator Chuck Gray, was passed. It is again a declaration of sovereignty calling for Tenth 
                                                   
430 Id. at 59:00. 
431 Jefferson, supra note 50 .  
432 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
433 Id.  
434 S. Conc.Mem.1001, 49th Leg., 8th Spec.Sess (Ari. 2010).  
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Amendment rights and a prayer to the Congress to repeal of the ACA.435 On 3/30/2010 it was 
assigned to the Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by the same Chuck Gray who recognized 
that the memorial had no legal value but constituted a strong political message. He even 
compared the Arizona memorial to the petition of the American colonies to the British King:  
I recognize that this is just a postcard to Congress but one of the opportunities we 
have is the right to petition our government… and if you recall a history lesson (if 
it has been taught properly in the schools, which many times it is not) our founding 
fathers petitioned the King over and over again and in the Declaration of 
Independence it lists all the grievances that were unanswered and they petitioned, 
and they petitioned and they petitioned [...] and so this is the start of that process 
where we petition our government. 436   
During the debate, there was also a proposal for the replacement of the memorial with a call for 
an Art. V convention that was rejected by Sen. Russel Pearce for the possible danger of a 
runaway convention, a convention where delegates do not limit themselves to the amendments 
originally agreed.   
The memorial made express reference to New York v. United States and serves as notice to 
Congress to repeal the ACA, as an unconstitutional encroachment of states’ rights.  
During the Third Reading of the memorial in the House, Rep. McComish confirmed the 
intention of legislators to send a message to Washington, stating that it was a duty of the states 
to push back:  
Today, as I hope, we will send this memorial to Congress and particularly to our 
congressional delegation in the hopes that they will hear our voices and our 
                                                   
435 The title of the Resolution recites: ‘Declaring This State's Sovereignty Under the United States Constitution 
and Urging the Congress of the United States to Repeal the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010.’ 
436 Senate Judiciary Committee, ARIZONA LEGISLATURE, (Mar. 30, 2010) at 62.00, 
http://azleg.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=13&clip_id=7267&meta_id=125195. 
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disappointment to the decisions that they have made. I believe, as a state, we must 
stand up for states’ rights and ensure that the federal government does not go 
unchecked in its powers, and the authority that it holds over the states. Mr. Speaker 
I vote Aye. 437 
My suggestion is that the Arizona legislature passed the Tenth Amendment resolution and 
memorial in an attempt to influence the debate around the constitutionality of the ACA and 
eventually shape the legal challenges that had already been started by attorney generals across 
the states. This is particularly evident when we consider the use of the Anti-Commandeering 
doctrine as a backbone to the underlying compact theory. In other words, the legislators of 
Arizona tried to “legitimize” sovereignty claims (as in the committee hearing) with a legal 
doctrine that they assumed could defeat concerns around the constitutionality of their claims.  
In the event, the same doctrine (Anti-Commandeering) was then used to challenge the ACA in 
court and on arrival to the Supreme Court invalidated the expansion of Medicaid on Anti-
Commandeering grounds. This is not a coincidence. As my research indicates, state legislatures 
have been working subtly to create a sovereignty movement that would shed light on Tenth 
Amendment jurisprudence and would therefore enhance the likelihood of a victory in court.438  
However, the resistance to the implementation of the ACA in Arizona continued with the 
approval of Proposition 122, an amendment to Article 2, Section 3 of the state constitution 
approved on November, 4th 2014439  and the 2015 HB2643. These further measures provided a 
                                                   
437 Arizona House Third Reading - Special Session, ARIZONA LEGISLATURE (Mar. 31, 2010) at 01:14:47, 
http://azleg.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=13&clip_id=7309&meta_id=126040.  
438 It should also be noted that the legislature of Arizona continued its Anti-Commandeering battle in 2015 with 
House Bill 2643, an Act that prohibits the state in various ways from “from using any personnel or financial 
resources to enforce, administer or cooperate with the Affordable Care Act.”. 
439 The amendment related to the rejection of unconstitutional federal actions, it read: “to protect the people's 
freedom and to preserve the checks and balances of the United States Constitution, this state may exercise its 
sovereign authority to restrict the actions of its personnel and the use of its financial resources to purposes that 
are consistent with the constitution by doing any of the following…”. For full text see Arizona Constitution  
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mechanism for refusing the use of state resources to purposes inconsistent with the constitution 
and recalled the Anti-Commandeering doctrine.  
 
 
Virginia House Resolution 46 (2011): State sovereignty; Congress urged to honor Tenth 
Amendment to U.S. Constitution 
 
Alabama, Utah and Arizona were joined by the Virginia’s House on 01/31/2011 with the 
adoption of Virginia House Resolution 46 (2011). The resolution, introduced on 01/12/2011, 
quickly moved from the  House Committee on Rules to the floor of the General Assembly and 
passed with 65 Yes and 33 No votes.  
The content of House Resolution 46 is similar to the resolutions examined above. It refers to 
the text of the Tenth Amendment, the compact theory and the Anti-Commandeering doctrine 
as elaborated in New York: “the scope of power defined by the Tenth Amendment means that 
the federal government was created by the states specifically to be an agent of the states”. 440  
The purpose, as specified in the resolution, is specifically to serve notice to the federal 
government to “cease and desist, effective immediately, mandates that are beyond the scope of 
these constitutionally delegated powers”. Further, just like in the other resolutions, there is a 
request to prohibit or repeal “all compulsory federal legislation that directs states to comply 
under threat of civil or criminal penalties or sanctions or requires states to pass legislation or 
lose federal funding”.441 The latter provision had been strongly opposed during the House 
debate by Democratic Delegate Joe Morrissey who pointed to several federal compulsory 
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legislations (Civil Rights Act 1964, Voting Rights Act 1965, Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act 1948, Consumer Product Safety Act 1972) that would be put at risk by this resolution. 442   
If those acts were passed under constitutional authority —responded sponsor Peace—then this 
act does not address them.443 The reference to the alleged unconstitutionality of the ACA is 
clear. The Virginia resolution, however, is different to the other resolutions because of its 
timing. I have argued before that the Tenth Amendment resolutions in Alabama, Utah and 
Arizona were meant to shape the constitutional discourse around the ACA and prepare the 
ground to legal challenges. When the Virginia resolution was passed, Attorney General 
Cuccinelli had already started the challenge to the ACA in the case Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli 
v. Sebelius444 and district judge Hudson had ruled that the individual mandate provision 
exceeded Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause and the Tax Clause. At the time 
of the passage of the resolution (January 2011) the case was pending in the Appeal Court. What 
was the aim of this resolution? The main intent of the legislators, as it appears on the video of 
the House discussion, was to send a message to Congress and to chase a repeal of specified 
federal legislation. However, the video of the house floor debates also shows that legislators 
were very keen on influencing the constitutional debate taking place in court. In particular, the 
sponsor Delegate Peace repeatedly pointed to the Anti-Commandeering doctrine as elaborated 
in New York and when asked whether the resolution promoted a narrow interpretation of the 
Tenth Amendment, namely that if a power is not enumerated in the Constitution it is a power 
on which Congress could not act, he responded: “generally speaking yes, but the resolution 
also contemplates constitutional law provisions”.445 Delegate Peace seems to use the 
expression “constitutional provisions” to refer to the  New York case and to explain that the 
                                                   
442 Virginia House of Delegates, RICHMOND SUNLIGHT (Jan. 31, 2011), 
https://www.richmondsunlight.com/bill/2011/hr46/ between 1:53:16 - 1:56:01.  
443 Id. between 1:56:01 to 1:56:23. 
444 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 268 (4th Cir. 2011). 
445 Senate Judiciary Committee, ARIZONA LEGISLATURE, (Mar. 30, 2010) between 1:57:20 to 1:58:40, 
http://azleg.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=13&clip_id=7267&meta_id=125195.  
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case had been included in the resolution to legitimize the claim of state sovereignty.  It might 
be argued, therefore, that the house passed the resolution to shed light on the Anti-
Commandeering doctrine as a potential legal expedient to push back against the 
implementation of the ACA and make the voice of the states heard in court.  The strategy was 
unsuccessful in the Court of Appeal where Circuit Judge Diana Gribbon Motz held that 
Virginia could not challenge “individual mandate” provision in Affordable Care Act for lack 
of Article III standing.446 However, on the long run, we know that the Anti-Commandeering 
doctrine became the core of the Sebelius decision on the expansion of Medicaid and have 
reason to believe that state resolutions played a part in raising the profile of the doctrine.  
  
 
 
III. Post-Sebelius Anti-Commandeering 
Arizona’s Constitutional Amendment: Proposition 122 (2014) 
 
The legislature of Arizona did not limit itself to the passage of Anti-Commandeering 
resolutions but also held a referendum to propose an Anti-Commandeering amendment to the 
state constitution. The amendment, approved at the general election ballot on November 4, 
2014,  permits the state to refuse the implementation of federal law deemed unconstitutional 
by the voters and to restrict personnel and the use of financial resources for the implementation 
of an unconstitutional federal action or program. According to the proposed amendment, the 
state could exercise its authority by passing an initiative or referendum, passing legislation or 
pursuing any other legal remedy.447 
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The constitutional amendment, also referred to as Proposition 122, is still part of the Arizona 
Constitution. The measure was introduced in the senate as Senate Concurrent Resolution 1016 
by Sen. Chester Crandell (R-6) and Sen. Judy Burges (R-22). Sen. Chester Crandell, explained 
in the Public Safety Committee that this bill was brought to him by a group (he did not specify 
any details) and that he decided to sponsor it because it was not a nullification bill but only 
allowed the people of Arizona to determine if they considered the federal legislation 
unconstitutional and then reject cooperation with the enforcement of such legislation in the 
state.448 His statement confirms that Tenth Amendment resolutions are the result of the 
lobbying of a certain, unspecified organization and, more importantly, that the states were 
claiming for themselves the capacity to determine the constitutionality of federal law.  
The question must be: why would Arizona pass this kind of resolution after Sebelius, where 
the Supreme Court held the individual mandate constitutional? Senator Crandell responded to 
a similar objection made by Sen. Ableser, a Democratic member of the Committee of the 
Whole on the constitutionality of the resolution. He used a quote from the Sebelius decision 
and recalled a passage where Chief Justice Roberts talked about states’ prerogatives and states’ 
sovereignty: 
In the typical case we look to the States to defend their prerogatives by adopting 
“the simple expedient of not yielding” to federal blandishments when they do not 
want to embrace the federal policies as their own. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 
U.S. 447, 482, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923). The States are separate and 
independent sovereigns. Sometimes they have to act like it.449   
 
                                                   
448 Senate Public Safety Committee, ARIZONA LEGISLATURE (Feb. 13, 2013) at 34:00, 
http://azleg.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=13&clip_id=11739&meta_id=233595. 
449 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 132 (2012).  
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He declared that the Sebelius decision would justify SCR 1016 and the consequent 
constitutional amendment: “This simply puts another tool in the tool box for us to stand up for 
a state sovereignty and the right of the people of the state of Arizona. Therefore I support 
putting this on the ballot. ”450 The same argument in support of the bill was confirmed during 
the hearing in the House Rules Committee by Rep. Eddie Farnsworth who stated that the 
legislature of Arizona in fact could refuse to use state resources to implement a federal law 
because it could disagree with the constitutionality of federal law:  
 
The bill -if you read the beginning- is to maintain the check and the balances of the 
sovereign states against the federal government that might pass laws that we believe 
(as sovereign states) are unconstitutional. There are laws out there that I clearly 
believe are unconstitutional even though the courts may decide otherwise. So, what 
we are doing here is saying: even though the courts may say it is unconstitutional 
we may disagree with that and that is the check on the federal government. We are 
not overturning as a matter of the law, we are simply saying because we disagree 
with the constitutionality we can’t use Arizona resources of what we believe is 
unconstitutional law. 451 
 
The resolution had been widely discussed in the House Federalism and Fiscal Responsibility 
Committee452 where it was distinguished from a nullification bill and its constitutionality again 
backed by the Anti-Commandeering doctrine. In the eyes of some Arizona legislators, the Anti-
Commandeering doctrine in Printz and presumably its expansion in Sebelius allowed a broader 
                                                   
450 Senate Floor Session Part 6 - Committee of the Whole, ARIZONA LEGISLATURE, (Feb. 28, 2012) at 23:50, 
http://azleg.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=13&clip_id=11972&meta_id=240111.  
451 05/02/2013 - House Rules, ARIZONA LEGISLATURE, (May 02, 2013) between 06:45- 07: 25,  
http://azleg.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=13&clip_id=12627&meta_id=252217. .  
452 03/12/2013 -House Federalism and Fiscal Responsibility Committee, ARIZONA LEGISLATURE, (Mar. 12, 
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capacity of the states to refuse cooperation with the federal government. This is extra-judicial 
constitutional construction in action. In passing the resolution, and consequently amending the 
state constitution, the state of Arizona stepped on the soapbox and called for a change in the 
constitutional culture around Tenth Amendment on the basis of the Supreme Court decision in 
Sebelius. We do not know the outcome of the construction but we know that the process started 
in the state legislatures, passed by the Supreme Court and returned to the legislatures for a 
further meaning manipulation. Why did the legislature of Arizona go as far as amending the 
state constitution? Prof. John Dinan noted that the early twenty-first century has seen a flurry 
of state constitutional amendments intended to advance state interests in the federal system453 
and theorized four ways that state amendment processes can play a role in safeguarding 
federalism interests, i.e.:  
- as a vehicle for protecting rights that have gone unrecognized by the United States Supreme 
Court. 
- as a vehicle for adopting policies that proved unattainable in Congress 
- for the purpose of seeking the reversal or relaxation of United States Supreme Court rulings 
seen as limiting state discretion 
- with the intent of helping to bring about the repeal or modification of congressional statutes 
seen as encroaching on state prerogatives. 454 
In the case of the Proposition 122 none of the above categories would be appropriate. This 
work argues instead that the intent of the amendment was to consolidate the broader meaning 
attributed by the Court to the Anti-Commandeering doctrine, to crystallize and therefore 
enhance the ongoing constitutional change around Tenth Amendment’s jurisprudence. In a 
                                                   
453 John Dinan, State Constitutional Amendment Processes and the Safeguards of American Federalism, 115 
PENN ST. L. REV. 1007, 1010 (2011). 
454 Id. at 1011. 
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way, the legislature of Arizona wanted to equip itself with legal devices to formally push back 
against Obamacare.   
Arizona House Bill 2643 (2015) 
Following the passage of the constitutional amendment, in 2015 the Arizona legislature passed 
an Anti-Commandeering bill in the form of House Bill 2643 sponsored by Sen. Olson and 
signed by Gov. Doug Ducey. The purpose of the bill was to use the authority provided by 
Proposition 122 to create roadblocks and refuse cooperation with Washington for the 
implementation of the ACA in the state of Arizona. The idea behind it, as expressed on the 
Tenth Amendment’s website,455  was that the federal government could not possibly manage 
the full implementation of the Act (including managing the health care exchange and IRS 
collection of the Obamacare tax) and an expectation that without the state cooperation the 
system would collapse. HB 2643 prohibited the state and its political subdivisions from using 
any personnel or financial resources to enforce, administer or cooperate with the Affordable 
Care Act.456 In particular, the bill expressly prohibited the funding or implementing of a state-
based health care exchange or marketplace; and prevented the state from taking actions to 
limit the availability of self-funded health insurance programs.  The House Federalism and 
States’ Rights Committee strongly supported the bill and the video of the meeting reveals 
criticism of the decision of the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the ACA. By 
watching the video of the Committee discussion, it is clear that the bill was being proposed to 
create a roadblock to the ACA: “Sen. Olsen: States are setting themselves under the 
constitution and under the rights that are reserved to the states, making sure that we do stand 
up for those rights  […] making sure that we maintain that balance of power that was in the 
                                                   
455 Signed by the Governor: New Arizona Law Blocks Crucial Obamacare Enforcement Mechanism, TENTH 
AMENDMENT CENTER, http://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2015/04/signed-by-the-governor-new-arizona-
law-blocks-crucial-obamacare-enforcement-mechanism/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2018).  
456 H.R. 2643, 52nd Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2015). 
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original intent of the constitution.”457 The non-cooperation spirit in Arizona was identified by 
the Rockefeller Institute of Government that expressed concern that the state agencies had not 
cooperated with the federal government: “relations between the federally managed Arizona 
exchange and other governmental entities vary greatly. There are relatively weak ties between 
state agencies and the exchange… We are aware of significant working relationships to solve 
problems, particularly those of IT, and eligibility.”458 The position of the state of Arizona is 
representative of the phenomenon of uncooperative federalism, as theorized by Jessica 
Bulman-Pozen and Heather K. Gerken in 2009459 and it is also explicative of the phenomenon 
of constitutional politics that this work has examined; the legislature proposed an amendment 
to the state constitution with the ultimate objective of providing the state with authority to 
push back on the basis of a narrow interpretation of the Tenth Amendment. This work has 
been seeking to examine precisely this use of constitutional arguments by the state legislatures 
and the polarized constitutional culture that the uncooperative federalism produces.  
Conclusion: The Gravitational Effect of Anti-Commandeering Resolutions 
on Health Care Constitutional Discourse 
 
Writing in the Indiana Law Journal, Austin Raynor argued that state opposition may influence 
adjudication by shaping the content of substantive doctrine and provided the example of 
political movements that allegedly had an impact on Supreme Court’s jurisprudence such as 
the Equal Rights Amendment movement and the Gun Rights movement. 460  When discussing 
contemporary nullification bills, however, Raynor only speculated on the influence of these 
                                                   
457 House Federalism and States’ Rights Committee, ARIZONA LEGISLATURE (Feb. 18, 2015) between 01:42:40 
– 01:43:00, http://azleg.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=13&clip_id=15143&meta_id=297730.  
458 Hall & Eden, supra note 288 at 12. 
459 Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 Yale L.J. 1256 (2009).  
460 Raynor, supra note 33 at 641. 
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on the constitutional debate461 without providing factual evidence for his claim. In particular, 
he argued that the majority of the bills are fairly recent, and thus their impact in this sphere is 
not yet fully discernible.462  I must agree on the difficulty of tracking “influence” as this has 
been a major methodological challenge of the present research as well. However, the main 
reason why Raynor could not provide evidence of his claim is that he examined state bills that 
attempted to nullify the individual mandate and the influence of these on the Supreme Court’s 
debate on the constitutionality of the individual mandate. Certainly the debate around the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate did not ignore the argument put forward by the 
states’ rights movement (as described by Raynor) but we know that ultimately the Supreme 
Court upheld the individual mandate as constitutional under the Taxing Clause. Even if the 
movement had been successful in raising the profile of the legal issues around the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate, it is inappropriate to say that state legislatures 
were successful in their battle and therefore it is challenging for a scholar to demonstrate a 
direct influence of nullification bills on the judicial process. Keeping in mind these difficulties, 
I investigated a different set of data. Instead of focusing on nullification bills, the present 
chapter analysed Tenth Amendment resolutions and provided a more convincing argument to 
support the claim that state opposition shapes (successfully) the constitutional debate. In 
particular, it has been demonstrated that the Anti-Commandeering doctrine (utilized by the 
Court to curtail the expansion of Medicaid) was first brought to light by some state legislatures 
that issued Tenth Amendment resolutions containing Anti-Commandeering claims. In this 
sense, the present chapter contributes to the literature on states’ rights rhetoric by 
demonstrating that legislatures have dictated the tone of the following constitutional debate in 
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court or —as Raynor would say— exerted a gravitational effect on the legal reasoning utilized 
by courts engaged in constitutional adjudication463.  
 
This confirms the initial assumption that states are laboratories of constitutional meaning and 
that the analysis of the state legislation may help to predict constitutional change. 
The paucity of scholarship on the topic is due to the lack of scientific method to assess the 
link between state opposition and legal challenges and only a few scholars have speculated on 
the possibility of an interconnection. This chapter has demonstrated, at the very least, the need 
for a wider enquiry on the link between the two.  
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Chapter Four: Interstate Health Care Compact Bills 
 
Introduction 
The fourth category of bills introduced to opt out of federal health care requirements provides 
for the creation of the so-called Health Care Compact (HCC), a compact of states joining efforts 
to develop their own health care regulations in opposition to federal law. Interstate compacts 
are authorized by the Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution464 and the HCC is therefore 
considered by its proponents to be a fully constitutional expedient. This chapter looks at the 
HCC as an attempt to block the implementation of the ACA at state level and therefore as 
another expression of the states’ rights battle. By promoting interstate cooperation in health 
care policies, states are in fact claiming the responsibility and authority for regulating health 
care. The interstate compact project is a strategy that Rachel Tabachnick has also defined as “a 
way to circumvent presidential veto power.”465  
This chapter explores the idea of Health Care Compact (HCC), outlines the history of this 
constitutional device, analyzes the influence of interest groups in the introduction of HCC 
bills in the state legislatures and examines the legal issues surrounding the enactment of an 
interstate compact.  
I. Definition of Interstate Compact 
Interstate compacts have recently been defined as “one of a limited number of processes 
provided in the Constitution for adjusting and regulating formal state relations, be they 
                                                   
464 U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 3: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress … enter into any Agreement 
or Compact with another State.”. 
465 Rachel Tabachnick, Ted Cruz & ALEC: Seceding from the Union One Law at a Time, POLITICAL RESEARCH 
ASSOCIATES (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.politicalresearch.org/2014/02/05/ted-cruz-alec-seceding-from-the-
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157 
 
boundaries, substantive law or even economic relationships.”466 There are numerous types 
of compacts that have traditionally been established for regional issues requiring 
intergovernmental cooperation in a variety of areas, such as “law enforcement and crime 
control, education, driver licensing and enforcement, nuclear waste control, transportation, 
insurance regulation, and disaster assistance.”467. The leading authority on interstate 
relationships, Joseph Zimmerman, recently investigated the compacts as devices of 
horizontal federalism and described them as “a tool for defining, approaching, and solving 
interstate problems without congressional intervention.”468  
A revolution in the concept of interstate compacts was initiated in December 2010 by Ted 
Cruz, at the time Senior Fellow at the Center for Tenth Amendment Studies, with his article 
“Shield of Federalism: Interstate Compacts in Our Constitution”.469 He suggested that 
interstate compacts could be used as a powerful vehicle for the states to confront Obamacare 
directly and as shield against federal overreach: “With congressional consent, federalized 
interstate compacts could shield entire areas of state regulation from the power of the federal 
government.”470 This new conception of interstate compact was echoed in the state 
legislatures’ debates about the implementation of the Affordable Care Act and provided the 
theoretical basis for the enactment of the Health Care Compact in nine states.  Interstate 
compacts were defined —for instance— “a uniform law enacted by multiple states that wish 
to have uniform governance over a particular area of law” 471 by Jason B. Long, Senior 
Assistant Revisor of Statutes of the Kansas Legislature. The explicit reference to 
                                                   
466 CAROLINE N. BROUN, ET AL., THE EVOLVING USE AND THE CHANGING ROLE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS: A 
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 2 (2006).  
467   KATHLEEN S. SWENDIMAN, CONS. RESEARCH SERV., HEALTH CARE: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND 
LEGISLATIVE POWERS 15 (2012) (unpublished report on file with the author). 
468 JOSEPH ZIMMERMAN, HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM 35 (2011).  
469 Ted Cruz, Shield of Federalism: Interstate Compacts in Our Constitution, POLICY PERSPECTIVE (December 
2010), http://www.texaspolicy.com/content/detail/shield-of-federalism-interstate-compacts. 
470 Id.  
471 STAFF OF THE HOUSE FEDERAL AND STATE COMMITTEE, SUMMARY OF HB 2553 (Feb. 18 2014) 
http://kslegislature.org/li_2014/b2013_14/committees/ctte_h_fed_st_1/documents/testimony/20140218_01.pdf.  
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“governance” is a meaningful development in the definition of compact that —as discussed 
below— is presently interpreted as a constitutional device to oppose federal regulations 
rather than a means to promoting interstate cooperation in regional policies not regulated by 
federal law.     
II. Brief History of Interstate Compacts 
The interstate compact is a very old mechanism for interstate cooperation whose roots can be 
found in the colonial era. Felix Frankfurter and James Landis suggested that Art. 3 and Art 1 
sec. 10 of the Constitution incorporated the two original modes of intercolonial settlement prior 
to the revolution: litigation on appeal to the Privy Council and royal consent on agreements 
between the colonies. They argued that the interstate compact clause is a descendant of the 
latter and that the royal prerogative was replaced by Congressional consent:  
The framers were familiar with the modes of settlement prior to the Revolution—
that controversies were determined partly through agreements confirmed by the 
Crown, and partly by litigation on appeal to the Privy Council. The Philadelphia 
Convention wrote both methods practiced by the colonies into the Constitution. 
Controversies between the colonies which came before the Privy Council were, in 
effect, precursors of the types of litigation over which the Supreme Court assumed 
jurisdiction under Article III extending the “judicial power” to “controversies 
between two or more states.” The power to negotiate settlements between the 
colonies, subject to the sanction of the royal prerogative, was written into Article 
I, Section 10.472 
                                                   
472 Felix Frankfurter & James Landis, The Commerce Clause of the Constitution. A Study in Interstate 
Adjustments, 34 Yale L. J. 694, (May 1925). 
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A similar provision - prohibiting association of states without the consent of Congress - was 
also included in art. VI of the Articles of Confederation:  “No two or more States shall enter 
into any treaty, confederation, or alliance without the consent of the United States in Congress 
assembled, specifying accurately the purpose for which the same is to be entered into, and how 
long it shall continue”.473 This provision was a precursor of what would became the Treaty 
Clause474 and the Compact Clause.475 Was this provision intended to restrain the ability of the 
states to form associations or was it meant to promote interstate collaboration under the 
supervision of the Congress?  According to Broun, “it was intended to continue the principle 
that through its consent powers, the Congress would be a counterweight against potentially 
harmful collective state action that could erode the viability and sovereignty of the national 
government”.476  The restrictive nature of the clause would be confirmed by the negative 
formulation of its wording “No two or more states shall enter…” but in the event, the Compact 
Clause allowed settlement of regional disputes and promoted interstate cooperation on a 
regional basis.  A number of compacts were established under the articles with the consent of 
the unicameral Congress, including a 1785 compact entered into by Maryland and Virginia 
establishing rules for navigation and fishing on the Chesapeake Bay and the Potomac River.477  
Between 1789 and 1920 Congress established thirty-six compacts to deal with state boundaries 
with the exception of the Virginia-West Virginia Compact of 1862 providing for the separation 
of West Virginia from Virginia. Initially, interstate compacts were mainly created to settle 
boundary disputes but their function slowly evolved into a regulatory one. “Traditionally, states 
have employed compacts to settle land disputes, but in the twentieth century states have 
                                                   
473 Articles of Confederation, art. VI (U.S. 1781).   
474 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1. “No State shall enter into Any Treaty, Alliance or Confederation.”.  
475 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3. “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress … enter into any Agreement 
or Compact with another State”.   
476 BROUN ET AL, supra note 466, at 6. 
477 ZIMMERMAN, supra note 468, at 33.  
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expanded such agreements to function as regulatory, administrative, and management tools.”478 
An early attempt to create a joint state management was the Interstate Palisades Park 
agreement479 of 1900 between New York and New Jersey which established identical state 
commissions.  Two fisheries compacts between New Jersey and Delaware in 1905480 and 
between Oregon and Washington in 1915481 were established to ensure uniformity in boundary 
water fishery regulations but never created an interstate agency. A turning point in the use of 
interstate compacts is represented by the Colorado River compact482 which addressed a 
regional issue and “devised a mechanism for regional handling of a common problem in that it 
established basic principles for the allocation of the waters of the Colorado river to be used in 
irrigation”483 and involved more than two states. Also, a demonstration of the value of interstate 
compacts for solution of regional problems was the first joint planning and administrative 
agency, created by the New York Port Authority Compact, 484 which dealt with major 
transportation problems in a metropolitan area and included a 1919 agreement called the New 
York-New Jersey Tunnel Compact.  
Between 1920 and 1969 the states entered into approximately 125 compacts, and this trend 
reflected the need for common or joint administration of interstate issues. Noteworthy are the 
Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers485 providing arrangements for 
interstate control of crime and extra-state parole administration and the Compact to Conserve 
Oil and Gas486 establishing measures for the cooperative protection of oil and gas resources. 
                                                   
478 BROUN ET AL, supra note 466, at 9, 12. 
479 50 Stat. 719 (1937). 
480 34 Stat. 858 (1905). 
481 40 Stat. 515 (1918). 
482 45 Stat. 1027(1918). 
483 FREDERICK L. ZIMMERMANN & MITCHELL WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT INTERSTATE COMPACT 
SINCE 1925 5 (1951). 
484 42 Stat. 174 (1921). 
485 UNIFORM ACT FOR OUT-OF-STATE PAROLEE SUPERVISION; see 4 U.S.C. § 111 (1952) for congressional 
authorization of this compact. 
486 49 Stat. 939 (1935). 
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The 1930s saw a renewed interest for compacts mainly due to the aversion of the Supreme 
Court to governmental action.487  
Regulatory compacts emerged in the field of pollution abatement: for example New York and 
New Jersey ratified the Interstate Sanitation Compact488 and Ohio River Valley Sanitation 
Compact.489 
Frederick L. Zimmermann and Mitchell Wendell reported a huge increase in the number of 
interstate compacts between 1941 and 1975: “between 1921 and 1940, about 20 more compacts 
were adopted. However, between 1941 and 1975, over 100 additional compacts were 
negotiated.”490 This trend was confirmed by Patricia Florestano who, drawing on a study 
conducted by Susan Welch and Cal Clark,491 observed that the growth of compacts was 
impressive between 1941 and 1969. 
During that period, in terms of scope, border compacts declined from 94 percent 
to 20 percent of the total; regional compacts increased from 2 percent to 22 
percent of the total; and nationwide compacts increased from 0 percent to 33 
percent of the total. In terms of organizational form, compacts creating 
commissions went from 0 percent to 49 percent of the total. In terms of function, 
boundary compacts went from 71 percent to 9 percent; metropolitan, from 0 
percent to 0 percent; rivers, from 23 percent to 16 percent; industrial, from 0 
percent to 0 percent; and service, from 3 percent to 58 percent.492   
                                                   
487 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The U.S. Supreme Court 
unanimously declared that the NRA law was unconstitutional, ruling that it infringed the separation of powers 
under the United States Constitution. 
488 49 Stat. 932 (1935). 
489 54 Stat. 752 (1940). 
490 ZIMMERMANN & WENDELL, supra note 483 at IX.  
491 Susan Welch & Cal Clark, Interstate Compacts and National Integration, 26 W. POL. Q. 475-484 (1973). 
492 Patricia S. Florestano, Past and Present Utilization of Interstate Compacts in the U.S., 24 PUBLIUS: THE 
JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM 13,18 (1994). 
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By 1951, the evolution in the use of interstate compacts was also noticed by Zimmermann and 
Wendell’s study: “after a century and more of narrowly restricted use, the interstate compact 
has begun to show an unsuspected versatility. New and expanded applications of the device to 
problems ranging from conservation to education have been largely spontaneous…”.493 
A further evolution is observed by Patricia Florestano: “Since 1970 the nature of compacts 
changed from boundary compacts to river waters management, environmental and 
transportation compacts.”494 The use of compacts continued in the period 1970-1992 with 
nineteen new compacts between 1970-79 and twenty-two compacts between 1980 and 1992. 
Joseph Zimmerman noted that “there had been a decline in the number of compacts entered 
into in the 90s as the result of Congress utilizing its pre-emption powers with more 
frequency.”495   
At present, there are over 200 active interstate compacts covering such diverse areas as water 
rights, transportation of criminals, education of minor dependents of active military, driver 
licenses, and life insurance.496 The oldest and largest interstate compact is the Interstate 
Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas and was established in 1935.  
The role of interstate compacts has evolved profoundly over time from boundary agreement to 
regulatory instrument and —presently— a device of federalism. Patricia S. Florestano497 has 
also observed a change in the perception of compacts in the literature noting that compacts 
were seen in 1965 as way for the states to protect their power in the federal system,498 as a 
counterbalance to federal activity in 1972499 and finally as having “unusual promise for 
                                                   
493 ZIMMERMANN & WENDELL, supra note 483 at IX. 
494 Florestano, supra note 492 at 23.  
495 JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, FEDERAL PREEMPTION: THE SILENT REVOLUTION (1991). 
496 Zimmerman, supra note 468 at 46.  
497 Florestano, supra note 492 at 13.  
498 WELDON BARTON, INTERSTATE COMPACTS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS (1965). 
499 DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 162 (1972).  
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resolving national-state and interstate conflicts and problems… in intergovernmental 
relations.”.500  
The main objective of this section was to outline the historical development of interstate 
compacts and to provide a framework to explain the current developments and the project of a 
Health Care Compact. In conclusion, it can be argued that the HCC is the product of this 
evolution and its proposal falls within an increasingly expansive interpretation of the function 
of interstate compacts as devices of federalism.  After all, as Joseph. F. Zimmermann 
suggested, “regulatory compacts often are promoted by economic interest groups seeking to 
deter Congress from pre-empting the regulatory authority of the states relative to an interstate 
problem.”501 The rest of this chapter will investigate the phenomenon more closely and will 
evaluate the influence of interest groups in its advancement.  
III. The Health Care Compact Phenomenon 
In the context of opposition to the ACA, promoters of the HCC interpret the interstate compact 
clause in such a way as to allow state legislatures to join and create an alternative to Washington 
healthcare management. It is therefore clear that for the first time a compact would be used to 
circumvent existing federal regulations. Instead of a device for interstate cooperation in 
regional issues, the HCC is mainly conceived as a vehicle to advance state sovereignty claims 
on healthcare policies, seen by its creators as desirable and constitutional but that would 
arguably fall outside the traditional purpose of an interstate compact.    
As of January 2016, a total of 26 states have considered 59 Interstate Health Care Compact 
bills, and nine states have enacted and signed statutes (Oklahoma, Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, 
                                                   
500 Richard C. Kearney & John J. Stucker, Interstate Compacts and the Management of Low-Level Radioactive 
Wastes, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 210-220 (1985).  
501 JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE RELATIONS 44 (2011). 
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Missouri, South Carolina, Texas, Utah and Kansas). 502  The table below shows the number of 
bills considered in each legislative year, the number of state legislatures that considered bills 
and the number of successful bills that have established membership of the HCC.  
Year Number of 
compact bills 
State legislatures that 
considered compact bills 
States that joined the compact 
2011 23 14 4 
2012 23 13 3 
2013 4 4 1 
2014 8 6 1 
2015 1 1 0 
Tot.  59 26 9 
   9-1=8 
Utah repealed the HHC with 
effect on July 1, 2014 with the 
passage of 2015 HB 414 
 
Just as happened with the nullification phenomenon, the number of bills considered in 2011 
declined considerably in 2013, 2014 and 2015. The decline, I suggest, is due to the fact that the 
states interested in joining the Compact had already done so in the first two years and the 
project was not appealing to other states. With nine member states, the project appeared 
feasible to its proponents and was presented to Congress in 2014 with the introduction of House 
Joint Resolution 110 and again in 2015 with House Joint Resolution 50.    
Chronology of Health Care Compact bills: The first state to establish membership of the 
Compact was Georgia on Apr. 2011. The HCC bill - GA H 46 - passed the House with 108 
                                                   
502 The National Conference of State Legislatures’ website also provides an overview of HCC bills that 
integrates my analysis. Note that, in classifying the bills, NCSL considers the year in which legislation has been 
filed while I refer to the date of last action on the bill. States Consider Health Compacts to Challenge Federal 
Ppaca, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/states-pursue-
health-compacts.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2018).  
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Yeas, 63 Nays, 2 Exc,5037 Nv,504 and the Senate with 35 Yea /18 Nay/2 Exc/ 1 Nv. and was 
finally signed by Gov. Nathan Deal.505 The HCC suffered two setbacks in Arizona and 
Montana where AZ S 1592 and MT H 526 were vetoed respectively by Gov. Jan Brewer (R) 
and Gov. Brian Schweitzer (D). The second success for the HCC came on May 18th 2011, when 
Governor Mary Fallin signed the OK S 722 as Act n. 267, the Oklahoma House passed the 
bill with 54 Yeas, 25 Nays and 22 Exc.506 On July 14th 2011 Missouri House and Senate passed 
MO H 423 and Gov. Jay Nixon (D) allowed the legislation to become law without his signature. 
The last state joining the HCC in 2011 was Texas with the enactment of TX SB 7 which passed 
the House with 96 Yeas, 48 Nays, 5 Exc., 1 Nv. and the Senate with 21 Yeas, 9 Nays and 1 
Exc. and was signed by Gov. Rick Perry (R). The establishment of the Interstate Health Care 
Compact was this time included in a broader bill relating to the administration, quality, and 
efficiency of health care.  
2012 saw the success of two bills on March 20th in Indiana and Utah. In Indiana IN H 1269 
was passed by the House and the Senate and signed by Gov. Mitch Daniels (R). In Utah UT S 
208507 was passed by the House and the Senate and signed by Gov. Gary Herbert (R) but the 
Act was then repealed with effect on July 1, 2014 with the passage of 2015 HB 414. Another 
setback for the HCC occurred on Apr. 30th, 2012 in Minnesota when Gov. Mark Dayton (D) 
vetoed MN S 1933.  The third state to join the HCC in 2012 was South Carolina on June 7, 
                                                   
503 Excused absence. 
504 No vote.  
505 Details on the Georgia State Legislature Website: 
2011-2012 Regular Session - HB 461 Health Care Compact; adopt, GEORGIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 
http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/en-US/display/20112012/HB/461 (last visited Feb. 01,2018).  
 
506 House (Yeas:54, Nays:25 , Exc:22) and Senate (Yeas:25,  Nays:20, Exc :3) For history of the bills see 
Oklahoma Legislature Bill Tracking http://www.oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=SB722&Session=1100.  
507 Legislative history on the Utah State Legislature website. S.B. 208 Healthcare Compact, UTAH STATE 
LEGISLATURE, http://le.utah.gov/~2012/bills/static/SB0208.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2018). 
  
166 
 
Gov. Nikki Haley (R) signed SC S 836 after it passed the House with 81Yeas, 31Nays and the 
Senate with 36 Ayes 0 Nays. 508  
Alabama joined in 2013 passing AL HB 109 with 25 Yeas, 5 Nays and 5 Exc.. The Act was 
signed by Gov. Robert J. Bentley. The last state to join the HCC was Kansas on April 23rd 
2014.  The bill was passed by the House with 74 Yeas, 48 Nays and the Senate with 29 Yeas, 
11 Nay. Kansas Governor Sam Brownback (R) signed HB 2533509 and included his personal 
statement in the final version of the Act, pointing out that the Compact was mainly aimed at 
preserving “individual liberty and personal control over health care decisions”510 and added: 
I would support reversal of the unfortunate Medicare cuts initiated by the federal 
Affordable Care Act. Furthermore, I would strongly oppose any effort at the state 
level to reduce Medicare benefits or coverage for Kansas seniors. I have signed 
House Bill 2553 with this understanding, and I will work to make it a reality when 
the Compact becomes effective.511 
The Ohio legislature considered a Health Care Compact bill  in April 2015 (OH HB 34)512 that 
was passed by the House but never went beyond consideration in the Ohio’s Senate Committee 
on “Government Oversight and Reform”. 
The HCC is primarily seen as a constitutional mechanism that would allow the transfer of 
responsibility for the regulation of health care goods and services from Washington to the 
states. This is explicitly declared in the preamble of state bills that enacted the HCC such as 
                                                   
508 Legislative history on the South Carolina Legislature website. S0836, SOUTH CAROLINA LEGISLATURE,  
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/billsearch.php (last visited Feb. 3, 2018). In order to access the bill’s page, select 
the 2011-2012 legislature and type 0836 in the bill search bar.   
509 Legislative history on the Kansas Legislature website.  HB 2553, KANSAS LEGISLATURE, 
http://kslegislature.org/li_2014/b2013_14/measures/hb2553/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2018). 
510 Statement of the Governor upon Signing of House Bill2553, KANSAS LEGISLATURE, 
http://kslegislature.org/li_2014/b2013_14/measures/documents/hb2553_enrolled.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2018). 
511 Id. 
512 Legislative History on the Ohio Legislature website. House Bill 34, OHIO LEGISLATURE,  
https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-status?id=GA131-HB-34 (last visited Feb. 3, 2018). 
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2013 AL HB 109: “Whereas, the member states seek to protect individual liberty and personal 
control over health care decisions, and believe the best method to achieve these ends is by 
vesting regulatory authority over health care in the states” […]513 
IV. The Health Care Compact introduced in Congress, House Joint 
Resolution 110 (2014) & House Joint Resolution 50 (2015) 
According to the Constitution, a compact must be approved by the Congress.514 In an attempt 
to obtain that consent, on February 11, 2014 James Lankford (Republican Representative for 
Oklahoma’s 5th congressional district) introduced H.J.Res.110 “Granting the consent of 
Congress to the Health Care Compact” but the resolution failed after being referred to the 
Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law. The following year, on 
Dec. 5th 2015 Rep. Doug Collins (Republican Representative for Georgia’s 9th congressional 
district) introduced H.J.Res.50, which is identical to previous H.J.Res.110. The Resolution was 
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary but never went beyond that stage.515  In terms of 
support, the resolution was introduced with 3 co-sponsors (Rep. Farenthold, Blake [R-TX-27], 
Rep. Scott, Austin [R-GA-8], Rep. Long, Billy [R-MO-7]) and has seen more sponsors joining 
in July 2015 (Rep. Jordan, Jim [R-OH-4], Rep. Buck, Ken [R-CO-4], Rep. Pompeo, Mike [R-
KS-4]), September (Rep. Westmoreland, Lynn A. [R-GA-3], Rep. Graves, Tom [R-GA-14], 
Rep. Olson, Pete [R-TX-22], Rep. Duncan, Jeff [R-SC-3]) and October 2015 (Rep. Stutzman, 
Marlin [R-IN-3], and  Rep. Mulvaney, Mick [R- SC-5]) for a total of 12 co-sponsors.516 The 
resolution is composed of nine sections that regulate the operation of the Compact. Sec. 1 
contains key definitions and defines healthcare broadly, including in the definition medical 
                                                   
513 H.R. 109, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2013). Text is publicly available online at 
http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/ALISON/SearchableInstruments/2013RS/PrintFiles/HB109-int.pdf.  
514 Art. I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution provides that “no state shall enter into an agreement or 
compact with another state” without the consent of Congress. The biggest obstacle to the effective creation of 
the HCC is the approval by Congress. 
515 H.R.J.Res. 50, 114th Congress (2015-2016).  
516 Eight of the co-sponsors also sponsored previous H.J.Res.110.  
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treatment and services, the sale and dispensing of drugs and medical devices, and individual 
and group health insurance plans.  Sec. 2 clarifies that the main objective of the HCC is “to 
return the authority to regulate Health Care to the Member States consistent with the goals and 
principles articulated in this Compact” and the concept is reiterated in Sec. 3 “The legislatures 
of the Member States have the primary responsibility to regulate Health Care in their respective 
States.” Sec.4 establishes primacy of the HCC over federal law and provides that a member 
state may enact laws that suspend the operation of federal laws, rules, regulations and orders 
that are inconsistent with state laws enacted pursuant to the Compact: “Each Member State, 
within its State, may suspend by legislation the operation of all federal laws, rules, regulations, 
and orders regarding Health Care that are inconsistent with the laws and regulations adopted 
by the Member State pursuant to this Compact.” This assertion of supremacy, that somehow 
recalls nullification language, was explained in December 2010 by Ted Cruz:  
the problem confronted by most state efforts against federal health care legislation 
is that, under the Supremacy Clause, federal law preempts state law. However, with 
congressional consent, an interstate compact is federal law. Hence, it can supersede 
all prior federal law—including ObamaCare. Critically, once Congress consents to 
an interstate compact, the compact carries the force of federal law, trumping all 
prior federal and state law.”517 
Sec. 5 provides that members of the Compact receive economic support from Washington for 
health care administration: “Each Member State shall have the right to Federal monies up to an 
amount equal to its Member State Current Year Funding Level for that Federal fiscal year”. 
Sec. 6 establishes the Interstate Advisory Health Care Commission, an organ composed of no 
more than two members appointed by each Member State that shall meet at least once a year. 
                                                   
517 Cruz, supra note 469.  
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The Commission is tasked with assisting the states in their regulation of Health Care, with 
making non-binding recommendations, studying regulations and recommending courses of 
action for member states. Sec. 7 confirms that the HCC will seek Congressional approval and 
that the Compact “shall be effective […] unless the United States Congress, in consenting to 
this Compact, alters the fundamental purposes of this Compact.”  The wording of this section 
is particularly relevant because it encapsulates the essence of the Compact in two main 
objectives:  
“(1) to secure the right of the Member States to regulate Health Care in their 
respective States pursuant to this Compact and to suspend the operation of any 
conflicting Federal laws, rules, regulations, and orders within their States; (2) to 
secure Federal funding for Member States that choose to invoke their authority 
under this Compact, as prescribed by Section 5 above.”  
This section confirms that the HCC is not only an agreement aimed at establishing 
intergovernmental cooperation across the states but that it is mainly a means to suspend the 
operation of federal law in the signatory states while maintaining the level of federal funds. 
This is a crucial characteristic of the HCC that distinguishes it from other compacts. Sec. 8 
regulates amendments to the HCC and establishes that “any amendment shall be effective 
unless, within one year, the Congress disapproves that amendment.” This provision affirms, I 
suggest, the contractual nature of the Compact and the rights of the member states to change 
the terms of their contract without prior consent of the Congress.  The last section of the 
resolution establishes six months’ notice for withdrawal of a member state and dissolution upon 
the withdrawal of all but one of the Member States.  
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V. The Interest Groups Involved in the Promotion of the Health Care 
Compact 
 
The comparison of the texts of the House Joint Resolutions presented to Congress and of the 
wording of state bills introduced across the fifty states reveals a common drafting hand: the 
language used is —in most cases— identical and also the structure of the HCC bills coincides; 
most of the bills have the same preamble (with the exception of the House Joint Resolutions 
where a preamble is absent) and the same nine sections. The uniformity of language would 
suggest that the HCC is a project piloted by an individual mind or organization and supported 
by specific interest groups. My research of organizations involved in the promotion of the HCC 
across the states led to the identification of two main organizations: the Health Care Compact 
Alliance518 and the American Legislative Exchange (ALEC).  
 
The Health Care Compact Alliance 
 
The Health Care Compact Alliance is an organization that promotes state model legislation and 
encourages activists to contact members of the U.S. House of Representatives and persuade 
them to co-sponsor H.J. Res 50, the Health Care Compact Resolution. The Alliance website 
hosts a blog with updates on the movement and invites visitors to donate for the cause, join the 
movement and register on a mailing list with weekly updates on the progress and 
accomplishments of the project. When prompted to the “About us” page, the visitor is informed 
of the fact that the Health Care Compact Alliance is, in turn, a project of Competitive 
                                                   
518 See website of the organization: HEALTH CARE COMPACT, http://www.healthcarecompact.org/ (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2018).  
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Governance Action. 519  The latter is an organization chaired by Leo Linbeck III, a Texas 
businessman co-founder and top donor of the Campaign for Primary Accountability (CPA), a 
Super PAC that campaigns against House incumbents from both parties. Leo Linbeck III is 
also lecturer in the MBA programs at Stanford and Rice universities520 and serves as president 
and CEO of Aquinas Companies, LLC521 and as executive chairman of the Linbeck Group.522 
The link between Leo Linbeck’s business and politics is apparent as Rachel Tabachnick noted 
that Competitive Governance Action shares the address of the Linbeck Group, LLC, in 
Houston.523  Competitive Governance Action is also engaged in a “Primary Pledge” to 
encourage citizens to vote in primary elections and in the attempt to build a coalition for the 
repeal of the 16th Amendment. The organization’s mission statement reads:  
Competitive Governance Action is a 501(C)(4) organization committed to 
education and advocacy to manifest the concept that problems should be solved by 
the smallest, least centralized, most local authority that may effectively address the 
matter. Central to the concept is the devolution of political power from the federal 
government to state and local governments, to individuals and to non-government 
community and religious institutions. 
Leo Linbeck III has explained the nature of the HCC phenomenon in an interview to the Texas 
Tribune where he argued: 
The focus of this group is governance reform — our ultimate goal is to restore self-
governance. It is not nullification, it is not secession. What it’s an attempt to do is 
                                                   
519 See website of the organization:  COMPETITIVE GOVERNANCE ACTION, https://www.guidestar.org/profile/20-
5792365 (last visited Feb. 4, 2018). 
520 See academic profile: Leo Edward Linbeck III, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF STANFORD,  
 at https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/faculty/leo-edward-linbeck (last visited Feb. 4, 2018). 
521 The companies of Aquinas operate in the fields of commercial construction and real estate acquisition and 
development.  
522 Linbeck is a Texas-based, technology-driven building construction firm offering construction management 
at-risk, design/build, and integrated project delivery services. 
523 See Tabachnick, supra note 465. 
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to organize the states in a way that is constitutional, to use an interstate compact to 
devolve power over health care away from a centralized federal government. 
[…]And the fundamental problem is that decisions are being made too far away 
from the people. The Health Care Compact is an attempt to reverse that. 524  
The Health Care Compact alliance is very similar to the Tenth Amendment Center in terms of 
structure and communication strategies. The organization relies on its subscribers to publicize 
the movement and persuade their state or congressional representatives to sponsor the compact 
bill; they use the mailing list extensively to engage members in the conversation and organize 
virtual meetings. On Oct. 28th, 2015, for example, I attended a Google Hang Out debate hosted 
by actress and radio host Janine Turner and Health Care Compact founder Leo Linbeck III; the 
meeting aimed at explaining to potential activists the nature and operation of the Compact, 
participants were given the opportunity to join the conversation and pose questions. Leo 
Linbeck III was very firm in defining the Compact as a powerful constitutional means to “return 
authority and dollars for healthcare to the states”525 and confirmed that the Compact is seeking 
both congressional and presidential approval in order to ensure that the states will continue to 
receive federal funds under the new scheme:  
we are not only clarifying responsibilities, we are transferring tens of billions of 
dollars to states and this require really appropriation, and appropriation- is clearly 
unambiguous- needs presidential signature. The HCC needs the presidential 
signature in order to make sure the states get the money to run their health care 
system.526     
                                                   
524 See Emily Ramshaw, Leo Linbeck III: The TT Interview, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, (March 24, 2011), 
http://www.texastribune.org/2011/03/24/leo-linbeck-iii-the-tt-interview/. 
525 Leo Linbeck III, Video of the Google Hangout can be found at 
https://plus.google.com/events/c1or9np0ibou6ne096o5th3c458 (last visited Feb. 4, 2018). 
526 Id. 
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Leo Linbeck III is also the author of the model draft of the HCC bill that can be downloaded 
from the Health Care Compact Alliance website.527 The text of this draft has been used as the 
basis of state bills that have established the HCC and for both the House Joint Resolutions 
currently pending in the House Committee. It is composed of a preamble and nine articles. The 
preamble, which has not been included in the House Joint Resolutions, states the importance 
of the separation of powers, including between federal and state authority, and the preservation 
of individual liberty and personal control over health care decisions.  
An issue with the investigation of how the HCC would practically operate is that, apart from 
the state bills to authorize the HCC and the resolutions- that are all identical- I could not find 
any official document detailing the proposal of a Health Care Compact. Leo Linbeck explained 
the vagueness of the proposal during the October Google Hangout that I attended when he said: 
“The reality is that there is nothing in the HCC that specifies policies, so it is really up to the 
states”.528  It would therefore seem that the practical operation of the Compact and policy 
decisions have been purposely left to the individual states that would fully manage their federal 
funds and develop their own health care system.   
The explicit involvement of corporations and the declarations of Leo Linbeck confirm that the 
real raison d'être of the HCC movement is deregulation and decentralization. Even if he clearly 
takes care to distance himself from the nullification movement, I believe that the aims of the 
two movements coincide and that the HHC project incorporates the contradictions of the 
nullification movement as it advances a conservative view of the Constitution together with a 
“libertarian” promotion of decentralization and deregulation. This is also confirmed by the fact 
that Leo Linbeck defined himself as a “conservative communitarian”, an oxymoron that recalls 
                                                   
527 The sample bill can be downloaded at http://www.healthcarecompact.org/HCC_Final.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 
2018). 
528 Linbeck III, supra note 525. 
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the ideological schizophrenia at the core of the nullification movement and the consequent 
struggle to find a political identity.  
The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC)  
 
The Health Care Compact Alliance is the principal organization that promotes the HCC and 
related legislation. However, my research suggests that one determinant ally for the 
advancement of state legislation is the American Legislative Exchange Council which has 
adopted the compact as model legislation529  and presumably reached nearly 2,000 state 
legislators. In order to measure the impact of ALEC on the proposal of HCC bills, I have 
compared the authors of my 59 HCC bills against the Center for Media and Democracy’ s list 
of ALEC’s members. 530 I assumed that if the same name appeared on both lists that would be 
a sufficient evidence to presume that the author had proposed the bill under the influence of 
ALEC.   
The comparison of the list of authors of HCC bills and the list of ALEC politicians shows that, 
overall, 54% of the compact bills have been introduced in state legislatures by ALEC 
members. The table below presents the number of HCC bills introduced by ALEC members 
for each year and compares that figure with the total of HCC bills introduced across state 
legislatures.  The third column provides the result of that comparison as a percentage.       
 
                                                   
529 See Health Freedom Compact Act, AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL, 
https://www.alec.org/model-policy/health-freedom-compact-act/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2018). 
530 The organization describes itself as a “nonpartisan, grassroots organization dedicated to restoring the core 
values of American democracy, reinventing an open, honest and accountable government that serves the public 
interest, and empowering ordinary people to make their voices heard in the political process.”. See more at 
http://www.commoncause.org/about/.  
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The influence of ALEC was remarkable in 2011, when 65% of the bills were proposed by state 
representatives linked to the organization. Four bills were enacted in total and three of the 
authors of those bill proved to have ties with ALEC. In particular, Rep. Burlison (R) of 
Missouri (author of MO H 423) and Rep. Nelson (R) of Texas (author of TX S 7) are mentioned 
in the Center for Media and Democracy’s Directory of the ALEC Health and Human Services 
Task Force Membership Directory, dated August 2011;531 and Rep. Bingman (R) of Oklahoma 
(author of OK S 722) appears on the ALEC Directory of Energy, Environment and Agriculture 
Task Force Membership. 532  
In 2012 ALEC’s  influence was still high: 60%. However, out of three enacted bills, only one 
was authored by a legislator with ALEC ties. I am referring to UT H 175, authored by Rep. 
Seelig (D) who used to be member of ALEC's Public Safety and Elections Task Force but who 
                                                   
531 Their names appear in the list of members of the Health and Human Services Taskforce provided by the 
Center for Media and Democracy. ALEC Health and Human Services Task Force, CENTER FOR MEDIA AND 
DEMOCRACY, https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/ALEC_Health_and_Human_Services_Task_Force (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2018). 
532 His name appears in the list of members of the Energy, Environment and Agriculture Task Force provided by 
the Center for Media and Democracy. ALEC Energy, Environment and Agriculture Task Force, CENTER FOR 
MEDIA & DEMOCRACY, 
https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/ALEC_Energy,_Environment_and_Agriculture_Task_Force (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2018). 
Year  Number of HCC 
bills introduced by 
ALEC Members in 
state legislatures 
Total of HCC bills 
introduced in state 
legislatures 
Percentage of  
nullification bills 
introduced by 
ALEC Members 
2011 15 23 65% 
2012 14 23 60% 
2013 0 4 0% 
2014 3 8 37%  
2015 0 1 0 
Tot.   54% 
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contacted ALEC to confirm that her membership would not be renewed 7 days after the 
introduction of the bill on April 9th 2012.533  
The HCC movement suffered a considerable setback in 2013 with only 4 bills proposed and 
even ALEC had no impact. ALEC returned on the scene in 2014 with three bills, one of which 
(KS H 2553) approved Kansas’ membership of the HCC. The influence of ALEC is particularly 
evident in the introduction of KS H 2553, which was officially proposed by the House Federal 
and State Affairs Committee whose 9 members (out of 22 total members) had ties with the 
organization. Specifically, Chair Rep. Steve Brunk is believed to be member of the ALEC 
Commerce, Insurance and Economic Development Task Force;534 Vice-Chair Lovelady,  Rep. 
J. R. Claeys, and Rep. Keith Esau are on the Center for Media and Democracy’s list535 and 
Rep. Susan Concannon, Rep Erin Davis, Rep. Willie Dove, Rep. Bud Estes, and Rep. Troy 
Waymaster are reported536 to have attended an ALEC meeting in Washington, DC. Hence, it 
is possible to argue that ALEC played a major role in 2011/2012 in promoting the HCC across 
the 50 states but that it backed out in 2013/2014 when the majority of states interested in the 
HCC had already joined. However, the influence of ALEC on the enactment of KS H 2553 was 
remarkable in 2014 and should be considered evidence of the influence of this organization in 
the Kansas legislature.   
                                                   
533 This is reported by the Centre for Media and Democracy that cites to an email by Chaz Cirame, Senior 
Director of Membership and Meetings, American Legislative Exchange Council to Utah. Rep. Seelig, email to 
Rep. Jennifer Seelig, April 16, 2012. 
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Utah_ALEC_Politicians#cite_note-15. 
534 His name appears in the list of members of the Commerce, Insurance and Economic Development Task 
Force provided by the Center for Media and Democracy. ALEC Commerce, Insurance and Economic 
Development Task Force, CENTER FOR MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY, 
https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/ALEC_Commerce,_Insurance_and_Economic_Development_Task_Fo
rce (last visited Jan. 24, 2018). 
535 Kansas ALEC Politicians, CENTER FOR MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY, 
https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Kansas_ALEC_Politicians (last visited Jan. 24, 2018). 
536 Peter Hancock, Kansas Lawmakers Attend ALEC Meeting in DC, LAWRENCE JOURNAL WORLD (Dec. 4, 
2014), http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2014/dec/04/kansas-lawmakers-attend-alec-meeting-dc/.  
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VI. Case Study: The Reasons for the Enactment of Kansas House Bill 
2553 (2014) 
 
Having speculated on the influence of Health Care Compact Alliance and ALEC in the 
promotion of HCC bills across the states, the question must be: what are the reasons why nine 
state legislatures have authorized participation to the HCC? In an attempt to identify the 
motivations of states’ legislatures joining the HCC, I have analysed the legislative history and 
the record of committee debates and minutes for KS H 2553. I have opted for an analysis of 
the debate of the Kansas legislature because it was the last state to approve the HCC and the 
debate that took place in that legislature arguably encapsulated the debates held in the other 
legislatures. 
In April 2014 Kansas became the ninth and last state to approve the Health Care Compact. As 
mentioned above, the bill was passed by the House with 74 Yeas, 48 Nays and the Senate with 
29 Yeas, 11 Nays. Kansas Governor Sam Brownback (R) signed KS H 2553 and included his 
personal statement in the final version of the Act, saying that suspending federal health care 
legislation would have preserved “individual liberty and personal control”.537 The HCC bill 
was first introduced on Jan. 31 and referred to the House Committee on Federal and State 
Affairs. The text of the introduced bill was identical to the text introduced in other state 
legislatures and the text introduced in Congress, H.J.Res.110 and H.J.Res.50.  At the hearings, 
held on Feb. 14, Rep. Hildabrand and Sen. Pilcher-Cook appeared in support of the bill, along 
with Secretary of State Kobach.  
                                                   
537 H.R. 2553, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2014). The final version of the bill can be retrieved on the 
Kansas Legislature website:  
http://kslegislature.org/li_2014/b2013_14/measures/documents/hb2553_enrolled.pdf.  
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Rep. Brett Hildabrand, a Republican member of the Kansas House of Representatives, 
emphasized the need to establish healthcare policies that were independent of the federal 
government; he alleged that since the implementation of the ACA, health care costs had risen 
for small firms and individuals and that the only solution would be to provide states with the 
“freedom and flexibility to address their individual needs.”538 Sen. Mary Pilcher-Cook also 
presented testimony in favor of the bill and pointed out the potential reduction of bureaucracy 
resulting from an independent administration of healthcare. She stressed the importance of 
liberty from federal mandates and the convenience of a block grant for Medicaid to Kansas:  
When Kansas has the direct authority and responsibility for meeting its citizens’ 
health care  needs through this compact, the state would have a tremendous 
reduction in bureaucracy it has to contend with that comes from compliance with 
the federal government telling the state what it can or cannot do in a large and 
complex health care system.539  
Secretary of State Kris Kobach also presented testimony in favour of the bill. He allegedly 
played an important role in supporting the bill because of his influential position as chief 
election officer and head of the Business Filing Center.540 Secretary of State Kobach called for 
the enactment of the HCC as a means to push back against the federal government’s 
“illegitimate expansion of its powers” and, citing relevant case law, emphasized that the HCC 
might have been an opportunity to suspend the operation of the Affordable Care Act in the 
state:  
                                                   
538 Health Care Compact: Hearing on HB 2553 Before the H. Comm. on Federal and State Affairs, 2013-2014 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2014) (statement of Rep. Brett Hildabrand). The testimony is available on the Kansas 
Legislature website 
http://kslegislature.org/li_2014/b2013_14/committees/ctte_h_fed_st_1/documents/?date_choice=2014-02-18.  
539 Id. (statement of Sen. Mary Pilcher-Cook)). 
540 The different functions of the Kansas Secretary of State are presented on the Secretary of State website: 
STATE OF KANSAS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.ks.gov/main.html (last visited Feb. 4, 
2018).  
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The compact speaks for itself regarding the specific structure and scope of that 
authority. Importantly, once Congress has approved the compact, the member 
states may suspend the operation of Obamacare within their jurisdiction. … This 
compact is more than a way for Kansas to protect its citizens from the high costs, 
regulatory burdens, and loss of coverage caused by Obamacare. It is a means to 
restore the constitutional framework designed by the Founding Fathers and to 
return the regulation of health care to the sovereign states. If it is approved by 
Congress, it will restore authority that the Kansas Legislature has not exercised for 
more than fifty years.541   
Written testimony in support of the bill was provided by Eric Stafford, Senior Director of 
Government Affairs for the Kansas Chamber, who reported the concern of the Chamber’s 
members about “compliance with an ever changing law” and stressed the right of employers 
“to choose which health plans are the right fit for their company, if they choose to offer that 
added benefit to their employees.”542 His testimony, for the first time, explicitly mentioned 
businesses’ concerns and did not make reference to the ideological opposition carried out by 
politicians. I should here remind the reader that the HCC is promoted by a businessman and 
that therefore businesses are the most obvious audience.  
The House Committee on Federal and State Affairs also heard two testimonies in opposition 
to the HCC bill; one presented by David Wilson, a health care volunteer and former president 
of AARP Kansas,543  the other presented by Sean Gatewood, at the time Interim Executive 
                                                   
541Health Care Compact: Hearing on HB 2553 Before the H. Comm. on Federal and State Affairs, supra note 
538. (statement of Secretary of State Kris Kobach). 
542 Id. (statement of Eric Stafford, Senior Director of Government Affairs for the Kansas Chamber). 
543 AARP is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization, with a membership of more than 37 million, that provides 
support and advocacy to families with issues in healthcare, employment security and retirement planning. See 
webpage at http://www.aarp.org/about-aarp/.  
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Director of the Kansas Health Consumer Coalition (KHCC).544 David Wilson pointed out the 
benefits of the Medicare program and warned against the dangers for seniors and people with 
disabilities who rely on the program for their health coverage:  
It would be a serious mistake to turn this program over to the state. Since 1965, 
Medicare beneficiaries have received guaranteed benefits, protections, and have 
never once had to worry about their Medicare […] By joining a health care compact 
seniors could find themselves thrown into a whole new health care system with 
different benefits, fewer choices, and less access to care. 
Sean Gatewood also called for the expansion of the Medicare and Medicaid federal programs, 
saying that the HCC would have potentially negative effects on those programs: “If expanding 
the program through the ACA is not the answer, then what is for the approximately 80,000 
Kansans that are currently uninsured and fall in the gap between Medicaid eligibility and 
Marketplace subsidy?”545  
Mitzi E. McFatrich, Executive Director of Kansas Advocates for Better Care,546 sent written 
testimony to oppose the HCC bill; the main argument was again the protection of elderly and 
Medicare benefits: “If Kansas opts out of the federal Medicare and Medicaid programs and 
oversight, Kansas will also have to opt out of reasonable health care standards and protections 
that benefit older Kansans, now and in the future.”547 
                                                   
544 The Kansas Health Consumer Coalition is a non-profit organization that advocates for affordable, accessible, 
and quality health care for all Kansans. See Kansas Health Consumer Coalition website 
http://kshealthconsumer.com/.  
545  Health Care Compact: Hearing on HB 2553 Before the H. Comm. on Federal and State Affairs, supra note 
538. (statement of Sean Gatewood, Interim Executive Director, Kansas Health Consumer Coalition). 
546 Kansas for Better Care is a no-profit organization working on behalf of elders for better long-term care. See 
Kansas for better care website http://www.kabc.org/.  
547 Health Care Compact: Hearing on HB 2553 Before the H. Comm. on Federal and State Affairs, supra note 
538. (statement of Mitzi E. McFatrich, Executive Director of Kansas Advocates for Better Care).  
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There was no neutral testimony and on Feb. 20th Rep. Brett Hildabrand made a motion to pass 
HB2553 out favourably. On the same day, the Committee recommended the bill for approval 
to the House. The bill – in its original version- was approved by the House with 74 Yea and 48 
Nay. I could not find any record of the floor debates held in the Committees of the Whole of 
the Kansas House because they are not recorded or summarized in any publication. However, 
I could access the explanation of the vote submitted during final action on the bill, recorded in 
the 2014 House Journal.548  Most of the comments recorded in the House Journal are comments 
from legislators that opposed the bill and only one comment is recorded in support of HCC. 
The examination of that comment reveals that Kansas legislators voted in favour of the HCC 
not because they believed it was a valid option but simply because they considered it a means 
to repeal Obamacare. Rep. Don Hineman, Tom Phillips, Sue Boldra, Steven C. Johnson, J. 
Russel Jennings, Stephen Alford, Diana Dierks asserted: 
I vote yes on HB 2553 because I believe the Affordable Care Act, otherwise 
known as Obamacare, is a seriously flawed federal policy. It harms hardworking 
Kansans and does not properly deliver healthcare reform. While HB 2553 would 
create serious implementation issues if it should ever be endorsed by Congress, 
I consider that to be an unlikely outcome. My vote in the affirmative is intended 
to send a message to Congress: Obamacare is an ill-conceived and unworkable 
program. I implore congress to work diligently toward effective healthcare 
reform.549  
It is therefore clear that the HCC project was approved only to “send a message”, to raise a 
voice against a reform that was repudiated from the very beginning.   
                                                   
548 H. JOURNAL, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. at 2011 (Kan. 2014). 
The 2014 Kansas House Journal can be consulted at http://li.kliss.loc/li_2014/b2013_14/chamber/journals/. 
549 Id.  
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The bill was then referred to the Senate Federal and State Affairs Committee that heard 
evidence on April 1st. The testimonies in favor of the bill were presented by Rep. Lance Kinzer, 
who appeared before the committee on behalf of Secretary of State Kris Kobach who could not 
attend the meeting because of conflicting commitments, by Sen. Mary Pilcher-Cook, Rep. Brett 
Hildabrand and Daniel Tripp, on behalf of Competitive Governance Action. The first three 
testimonies reiterated the same arguments expressed before the House Federal and State Affairs 
Committee550 and new testimony was presented on behalf of Competitive Governance Action, 
the organization behind the Health Care Compact Alliance. Daniel Dripp, in line with the other 
witnesses, emphasized the opportunity provided by this compact to “move the authority and 
funding for regulating healthcare from the federal government to the states” and highlighted 
that the compact was not aimed at “setting health care policy” but was only a “first step” before 
Congress had to pass enabling legislation.551  
The Committee also heard four witnesses in opposition to the bill, presented by George 
Lippencott, a senior citizen living in Lawrence, Judy Bellome, a Lieutenant Commander in the 
Nurse Corps, David Wilson for AARP and Sean Gatewood, Interim Executive Director of the 
Kansas Health Consumer Coalition. Written testimony was presented by Mitzi E. McFatrich, 
Executive Director of Kansas Advocates for Better Care. The opposition raised concern for the 
impact of the HHC on the Medicare program. 
George Lippencott expressed his concern for the lack of details on how the HCC would have 
worked and for the transfer of management of Medicare program to the state:  
                                                   
550 Health Care Compact: Hearing on HB 2553 Before the S. Comm. on Federal and State Affairs, 2013-2014 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2014) (statement of Rep. Lance Kinzer, Sen. Mary Pilcher Cook and Rep.Brett 
Hildabrand).  
The testimonies are available at 
http://kslegislature.org/li_2014/b2013_14/committees/ctte_s_fed_st_1/documents/?date_choice=2014-04-01. 
551 Id. (statement of Daniel Dripp). 
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I am here because I do not understand what we are trying to accomplish with 
this legislation that proposes to make Medicare a state program. … I read the 
Compact, the bill and associated comments and I find lifting words but no details 
on how this would work. … Is this another case of ‘We’ll Have to Pass the Bill 
In Order To Find What Is In It”? Many critiques were critical of that notion (real 
or imagined) when the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was passed. Why would we 
buy into such a notion here in Kansas? 
Ms. Bellome shared her concerns as a nurse that if Medicare was to be administrated by the 
state of Kansas, the complicated reimbursement of physicians, hospitals, nursing homes, and 
hospice would affect seniors’ health coverage. David Wilson, Sean Gatewood and Mitzi E. 
McFatrich reiterated the same comments presented before the House Committee.  
The Committee recommended the bill be passed and referred it to the Committee of the Whole. 
The Senate passed the bill with 29 Yeas and 11 Nays on Apr. 4th. The reasons for the passage 
of the bill by the Senate could not be examined because there was no explanation of votes filed 
in the Senate when the bill was passed by the chamber. The bill was approved by Governor 
Sam Brownback on Apr. 22nd and finally enacted as Section 1. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 65-6230. 
There have been two attempts in 2015 to repeal the Act but the bills introduced for that purpose 
never reached the Committee stage.552  
The investigation of the enactment of the HCC in Kansas suggests one main key point for my 
research: the HCC was not approved because legislators believed it was a solution for better 
healthcare administration but because it was an allegedly powerful message to Washington, a 
joint response to an undesirable reform. Even though the HCC project had no chanceof of being 
                                                   
552 H.R. 2046, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2015) sponsored by Democratic Rep. Jim Ward and H.R. 2230, 2015 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2015) sponsored by Democratic Representatives Ruiz, Burroughs, Carmichael, Curtis, 
Highberger, Lane, Ousley, Tietze, Victors and Wolfe Moore. 2015 KS H.B. 2230 was also sponsored by 
Republican Rep. Rooker. 
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approved by Congress it was a clear declaration of resistance to the Affordable Care Act and 
was enacted in the hope of influencing the ongoing debate on the repeal of the Act.   
 
VII. Legal controversies and Theoretical Principles Behind Interstate 
Compacts 
 
Article 1, Section 10 of the federal U.S. constitution prohibits states from entering into any 
alliance, confederation or treaty and is construed as a restriction upon the states entering into 
compacts with each other without the consent of Congress.553 According to James Madison in 
the Federalist No. 44 this clause was self-explanatory: “the remaining particulars of this clause 
fall within reasoning which are either obvious, or have been so fully developed, that they may 
be passed over without remark.”554 The wording of this clause, however, has been subject to 
different interpretations that still have not been settled555 and have promoted an evolving 
conception of interstate compacts: “the constitutional language of the Compact Clause is broad 
and unqualified.”556 A first comprehensive study on the Compact Clause was conducted in 
1925 by Professor Felix Frankfurter of the Harvard Law School and James M. Landis, a 
member of the Securities and Exchange Commission with the publication of the Yale Law 
Journal article “The Compact Clause of the Constitution”.557 They argued that the nature and 
                                                   
553 Article I Section 10 Clause 3. “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, 
keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with 
a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of 
delay.” 
554 Reported by ZIMMERMANN supra note 468 at 34.  
555 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Charting No Man’s Land: Applying Jurisdictional and Choice of Law Doctrines 
to Interstate Compacts, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1991 (1998) and Michael S. Smith, Murky Precedent Meets Hazy 
Air: The Compact Clause and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 390 (2007) 
(The “broad and unqualified” language of the clause has resulted in much ambiguity concerning its purpose and 
reach). 
556 Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent, 68 Mo. L. Rev. 297 (2003). 
557 Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The  Compact Clause of the Constitution—A Study in Interstate 
Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925). 
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potential of the clause was little understood and this was mostly due to the position of this 
provision in the Constitution which had minimized the significance of what was granted,558 
especially in light of the development in the use of such provision. Patch expressed the same 
opinion:  
The fact that the Compact Clause was couched in negative terms and phrased as a 
restriction on state sovereignty probably tended to discourage conclusion of 
interstate agreements. Settlement of interstate controversies was sought more often 
by institution of suit in the Supreme Court than by resort to negotiation of mutual 
agreements to be approved by Congress.”559  
Zimmermann and Wendell argued that Frankfurter and Landis already conceived the compacts 
as a means to free the states from the limiting decisions of the Supreme Court under the 
Commerce Clause.560   A different view has recently been expressed by Caroline Broun who 
has interpreted the Compact Clause as restrictive in nature: “Rather than empower, the Compact 
Clause restricts formal joint or collective state action and thus acts as a check against such 
action.”561   
The HCC project is the result of an expansive interpretation of the function of interstate 
compacts and, as explained above, of an evolution in the conception and use of this 
constitutional device. Is this evolution legally acceptable? Can interstate compacts legally 
interfere in an area of law already regulated by the Congress and therefore create a parallel 
system of health care that explicitly goes against the established system, challenging the 
                                                   
558 Id. at 691.   
559 Buel W. Patch, Interstate Compacts, in EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS 1935, at 473-92 (1935), available 
at http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre1935062600. 
560 ZIMMERMANN & WENDELL, supra note 483 at 2. 
561 BROUN ET AL., supra note 466 at 36. 
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supremacy of the United States under article I, § 10, clause 3, of the Constitution. Professor 
Marian Ridgeway expressed her concern back in 1971: 
“Interstate compacts have traditionally been used as means to reach agreement 
between two or more states on troublesome matters of a narrow, intimate kind, of 
vital importance only to the states involved. They were never used to shape and 
administer complicated and intricate problems of far-reaching state social and 
economic policy. […] It is certain that none foresaw any such uses for interstate 
compacts as are assigned today by more and more state and national legislation. It 
is also certain that if such uses had been foreseen, there would very likely have been 
extensive debate.562  
This section will examine the legal controversies surrounding interstate compacts and will 
provide a legal framework to understand the claims and hopes of proponents of the HCC. 
Firstly, this section defines the interstate compact in its dual nature of statute and contract. 
Secondly, it explores the requirement of congressional consent and presidential approval. 
Thirdly, it analyzes the claim that interstate compacts trump federal law and can pre-empt 
federal intervention.  
Legal Nature of Interstate Compacts: According to Prof. Zimmermann and Dr. Wendell 
compacts have a dual legal nature; they can be seen as statutes and as contracts. Statutes 
because they have the force of statutory law, contracts because they involve more than a party 
and the substantive law of contracts is applicable to them.563 Justice Frankfurter clearly 
attributed to compacts the status of contracts in State ex rel. Dyer v. Sims564 when he argued 
that an interstate compact could be analogized to a contract entered into by an individual or 
                                                   
562 MARIAN E. RIDGEWAY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS: A QUESTION OF FEDERALISM, VII (1971). 
563 Cfr. ZIMMERMANN AND WENDELL 3 supra note 483.  
564 State ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951). 
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corporation and defined the states as “contracting states”. Relevant literature sees the compacts 
as agreements that produce statutes: “An interstate compact is a legally binding agreement 
between states, created when states pass reciprocal statutes”;565 “More than mere statutes, 
compacts are contracts that are binding on the member states and their citizens.566 Caroline N. 
Broun emphasized the contractual nature of a compact arguing that compacts trump state 
statutory schemes: “The standing of compacts, as contracts and instruments of national law 
applicable to the member states, generally nullifies any state action inconsistent with the terms 
and conditions of the agreement.”567  
The hybrid nature of the interstate compact has been summarized by Paul T. Hardy who argued: 
“As contracts, interstate compacts are binding on the party states in the same manner and with 
the same limits as any other contract entered into by an individual or corporation. Likewise, 
because interstate compacts are created and exist in statutory form, the entire body of legal 
principles associated with the interpretation of statutes applies”.568    
Congressional Consent: The question of congressional consent has been one of the more 
litigated aspects of the interstate compact clause.569 This is because, even though the 
Constitution requires congressional consent, the Supreme Court in Virginia v. Tennessee570 
held that not all interstate agreements require congressional consent. Specifically, the Court 
argued that such consent was required only with respect to those joint state agreements “which 
may tend to increase and build up the political influence of the contracting states so as to 
                                                   
565 PAUL T. HARDY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS: THE TIES THAT BIND 2 (1982). 
566 Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of Permanency, 49 FLA. L. 
REV. 2 (1997). 
567 BROUN ET AL., supra note 466 at 23. 
568 HARDY, supra note 565 at 3. 
569 RIDGEWAY, supra note 562 at 20. 
570 Virginia v. Tennessee 148 U.S. 503 (1893). 
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encroach upon or impair the supremacy of the United States or interfere with their rightful 
management of particular subjects placed under their entire control.” 571    
For example, in the case of a compact that deals with mere state interests congressional consent 
would not be required: the compact will still be enforceable between the states but will not 
have the status of federal law. This means that federal courts will be required to interpret the 
agreement as state law, not federal law.572  The court was presented in 1991 with The Interstate 
Compact on Placement of Children that dealt with an area of jurisdiction retained by the states 
and therefore did not require congressional consent. The Court noted in Malone v. Wambaugh: 
“The Interstate Compact on Placement of Children has not received congressional consent… 
Because congressional consent was neither given nor required, the Compact does not express 
federal law. Consequently, this Compact must be construed as state law.” 573 
On the other hand, Broun argued that by obtaining the consent of Congress, states entering into 
an agreement give the contract a firmer basis and run less risk of encountering future trouble 
in the courts.574 The requirement of congressional consent would appear to be a safeguard for 
the uniform interpretation of the Compact and its recognition at federal level:  
Perhaps the greatest benefit, therefore, of congressional consent is the vesting in 
federal courts of the authority to interpret a compact in a uniform manner. Absent 
this consistency, the interpretation of compacts is left to the whim of the states, 
leading to the extreme case of one state declaring their agreement a compact (and 
therefore enforceable as contract)  and another state declaring their agreement a 
mere uniform law ( subject to unilateral amendment and change). There is generally 
                                                   
571 Id. at 517-518. 
572 Cf. BROUN ET AL., supra note 466 at 52. 
573 Malone v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 479 (3d Cir. 1991). 
574 Id.  
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no question regarding the status or enforceability of interstate compacts that 
appropriately receive congressional consent.575 
In a 1978 decision, U.S. Steel Multistate Tax Commission, the Court adopted a standard under 
which only interstate compacts that increase state power at the expense of federal supremacy 
require congressional consent.576  
With this premise, our question must be: does the Interstate Health Care Compact encroach 
upon the supremacy of the United States? The ultimate test is to assess whether or not Congress 
possesses specific legislative authority in healthcare. Sebelius resolved the issue arguing - by a 
vote of 5 to 4 - that the individual mandate to buy health insurance constituted a valid exercise 
of congressional power under the Taxing Clause. It would therefore appear that a Health Care 
Compact - aimed at transferring the authority on healthcare from federal control to the member 
states and to create an independent healthcare system - may be deemed an invalid 
encroachment upon the congressional power to tax and would therefore require congressional 
consent. This is mainly because, in its current configuration, the HCC would stand as 
oppositional to the federal system and would create intentional conflict with federal law: “One 
obvious candidate is the actual Compact Clause: no state agreement or compact without 
congressional consent, period.577  
Another disputed aspect is the form and timing of the consent. Is the consent to be explicit or 
can it be implied? Is it to be given before or after the states sign an agreement? The following 
sections will analyze the two issues in turn. 
Form of the consent: According to State v. Cunningham (1912) 578 consent may be granted 
by Congress by either a formal legislative act or by a resolution. As seen in section 4, the 
                                                   
575 BROUN ET AL., supra note 466 at 53. 
576 United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n., 434 U.S. 452, 459, 471 (1978).  
577 See Greve, supra note 556 at 294. 
578 102 Miss. 237 (1912).  
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proponents of the HCC have introduced House Res. 150 for this purpose. Caroline Broun also 
pointed out that explicit consent has an advantage over other forms of consent: “By obtaining 
explicit consent after state legislatures have adopted a compact instrument, Congress has the 
opportunity to review the purpose of the instrument and the opportunity to express its 
agreement or disagreement in clear and unambiguous terms.”579 However, when certain 
circumstances are satisfied, consent can be implied. In Virginia v. Tennessee (1893)580 it was 
held that Congressional consent to a compact may be inferred when the Congress demonstrates 
acquiescence to the compacts with its acts such as “subsequent legislation consistent with the 
terms of the compact or ratification of actions by state authorities and Congress that are 
harmonious with the purposes of the compact.”581 In particular, the case involved a boundary 
compact agreed by the two states 90 years earlier, which had not obtained the consent of the 
Congress. The Court held that since the Congress had already relied upon the compact’s terms 
for revenue and judicial purposes, that constituted recognition of the Virginia-Tennessee 
boundary established by compact, and therefore there was no need for direct action for that 
purpose: “The approval by Congress of the compact entered into between the States upon their 
ratification of the action of their commissioners is fairly implied from its subsequent legislation 
and proceedings.”582 On the basis of this decision the Court in 1914 upheld an 1821 boundary 
agreement between North Carolina and Tennessee.583Another example is the Uniform Act for 
Out-of-State Parolee Supervision, a compact for the reciprocal return of parolees that was held 
constitutional584 even without specific congressional consent because the Compact was wholly 
in accord with federal legislation promoting it.585 Broun has discouraged the states from 
                                                   
579 BROUN ET AL., supra note 466 at 36. 
580 Virginia v. Tennessee,148 U.S. 503 (1893). 
581 BROUN ET AL., supra note 466 at 38. 
582 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 522 (1893). 
583 Patch, supra note 559. 
584 Ex Parte Tenner 20 Cal.2d 670, 128 P.2d 338 (1942). 
585 Congress enacted a statute which reads as follows: ‘The consent of Congress is hereby given to any two or 
more States to enter into agreements or compacts for cooperative effort and mutual assistance in the prevention 
of crime and in the enforcement of their respective criminal laws and policies, and to establish such agencies, 
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assuming implied consent in administrative compacts: “Such method of consent can contribute 
to misunderstanding and misinterpretation of Congress’s intent, or lead to an assumption of 
consent that does not exist. Therefore, as a general proposition, states seeking to adopt interstate 
compacts should not presume congressional consent but rather obtain either explicit consent or 
rest on some form of advanced consent.”586 
Timing of the Consent: State v. Joslin (1924)587 established that consent may be given after 
the enactment of the agreement by two or more states. In the case of the HCC, nine states have 
signed the agreement and then submitted the proposal to Congress. History has also seen the 
formation of compacts with consent-in-advance, defined by Joseph Zimmerman as “a blanket 
approval.”588 This occurs when Congress adopts legislation that encourages states to enter into 
interstate compacts to deal with a specified subject; for example the Weeks Act of 1911 
provided advance consent to states to form compacts “for the purpose of conserving the forests 
and water supply” and the more recent statute 333 provides consent in advance589 to form 
interstate compacts aimed at developing and operating airport facilities. More recently, in 1996 
Congress granted blanket consent to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact that 
authorizes member states to enter into supplementary agreements with other states and renewed 
its consent in 2007 with a congressional act that authorized the International Emergency 
Assistance Memorandum of Understanding Entered between the States of Maine, New 
Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut, and the Provinces of 
                                                   
joint or otherwise, as they may deem desirable for making effective such agreements and compacts.’ 48 Stats. 
909, 18 U.S.C.A. § 420. 
586 BROUN ET AL., supra note 466 at 39. 
587 State v. Joslin, 116 Kans. 615 (1924).  
588 See JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS: INTERGOVERNMENTAL EFFORTS TO MANAGE 
AMERICA’S WATER RESOURCES 36 (2012). 
589 73 Stat. 333.  
  
192 
 
Quebec, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland.590  Broun is 
critical of the use of advance consent:  
While such consent is legally effective, its broad and advanced nature can deprive 
Congress of the opportunity to review the specific purposes of the compact and 
express its explicit approval of the agreement. This lack of specificity can lead to 
questions regarding the need for congressional consent or the intent of Congress 
in encouraging the use of a compact.591 
Presidential Approval: if Congress grants its consent to a compact by an act or a joint 
resolution, should that legislation be subject to presidential veto? The question is particularly 
relevant for the HCC because President Obama would presumably have opposed such a bill. 
The Supreme Court has never ruled in this matter and the Compact Clause only requires 
congressional consent. Historically,   President Franklin D. Roosevelt refused to approve a joint 
resolution granting consent in advance to states to enter into compacts pertaining to fishing in 
the Atlantic Ocean and wrote “it would be unwise” to grant such consent “in connection with 
subjects described only in broad outline.”592 Scholars have therefore argued that presentment 
to the President is in fact required. Frederick L. Zimmermann and Mitchell Wendell affirmed 
“The Compact Clause itself requires only the consent of Congress, but ‘settled usage’ has 
granted the President veto power over consent.”593 The same view was expressed by Joseph 
Zimmerman: “When Congress grants its consent to a compact by an act or a joint resolution, it 
is subject to a presidential veto”594   
                                                   
590 See Zimmerman supra note 588 at 37. 
591 BROUN ET AL., supra note 466 at 37. 
592 See JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE RELATIONS, supra note 501 at 38.  
593 ZIMMERMANN AND WENDELL, supra note 483 at 94. 
594 ZIMMERMAN, supra note 468 at 42.  
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Preemption of Federal Law: When introducing the HCC bill, legislators have used a powerful 
argument to persuade their peers of the benefit of enacting the compact. They have alleged that 
once the compact was approved by Congress, it would become federal law and therefore pre-
empt the implementation of the ACA in the state.  Ted Cruz stated in his article: “The fact that 
congressional consent gives the interstate compact the status of federal law means that, in 
effect, the federal government would be consenting to carve out - from the scope of its own 
ever-expanding powers - an area within which the States can retain substantial authority.”595 
This statement finds its legal basis in a consolidated Supreme Court jurisprudence that 
considered compacts sanctioned by Congress equivalent to federal law. The relevant decisions 
are Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Company596 and Cuyler v. Adams: 
 
“[W]here Congress has authorized the States to enter into a cooperative agreement, 
and where the subject matter of that agreement is an appropriate subject for 
congressional legislation, the consent of Congress transforms the States’ agreement 
into federal law under the Compact Clause.597  
By contrast, the Supreme Court in 1938 ruled in People v. Central Railroad598 and Hinderlider 
v. La Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Company that congressional consent to a compact 
does not make it equivalent to a United States treaty or statute: “a compact itself is not federal 
law even where an act of Congress consenting thereto sets forth the text of the compact being 
approved. This means that the sources of compact law are predominantly state sources.” 599 
                                                   
595 Cruz, supra note 469. 
596 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421 (1856). Once a compact is approved by the 
Congress, it becomes “law of the Union”.   
597 Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433,440 (1981). 
598 People v. Cent. R.R., 79 U.S. 455 (1872).  
599 Hinderlider v. La Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co , 204 U.S. 92 (1938). 
  
194 
 
However, Broun pointed out that the latter decisions have been overruled by Delaware River 
Commission v. Colburn600 and that consent has a transformational effect on the states’ 
agreement.601  With this premise, Joseph Zimmerman concluded that in case an approved 
compact contains conflicting provisions with an existent congressional statute, the 
congressional consent could be interpreted as repealing the conflicting provisions. If we apply 
this logic to the HCC, it is clear that it could have been a potential threat to the ACA.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the HCC as a clear sign of a contemporary crisis in federal 
relations and has demonstrated that interest groups have had a considerable influence in the 
creation, development and enactment of the compact. Having examined the HCC project, it is 
now paramount to put it in the context of today’s American states’ rights battle. 
The idea of a Health Care Compact offers interest groups an opportunity to pursue their 
objectives outside of federal lobbying and legal suits. It is an alternative way to fight back 
where political opposition and legal battles have failed. From an academic point of view, it is 
a formidable strategy elaborated by the states to resist the federal intervention and declare their 
sovereignty over health care policies. Because of its equivocal success, the HCC is excellent 
evidence of the present status of American federalism: a fragmented system victim of the 
political polarization.  
The main fallacies of this project, however, lie in its feasibility from two points of view: 
                                                   
600 Delaware River Comm’n. v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 419,439 (1940). “We now conclude that the construction of 
such a compact sanctioned by Congress by virtue of Article I, § 10, Clause 3 of the Constitution, involves a 
federal ‘title, right, privilege or immunity’ which when ‘specially set up and claimed’ in a state court may be 
reviewed here on certiorari”.  
601 BROUN ET AL., supra note 466 at 54. “Through congressional consent, where appropriate, the states’ 
agreement is changed from solely being an agreement between the states into a law of the nation”.  
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1. Legality of the use of the compact as means to circumvent federal law; 
2. Likelihood of congressional consent. 
With regard to the first point, the possibility of such expansion in the role of compacts had been 
contemplated in 1991 by Marlissa S. Briggett who proposed a Pacific States environmental 
regulatory compact after the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989:602 
Yet, the states have never used an interstate compact explicitly to circumvent 
existing federal regulations. There does not seem to be any obstacle, however, 
to using the interstate compact in this manner. When the compact becomes 
federal law upon congressional consent, the new federal law supersedes prior 
federal law just as any other new federal law would.603 
According to Briggett, the most significant aspect of an interstate compact is that congressional 
consent transforms the compact into federal law that could therefore circumvent previous 
legislation. Briggett also acknowledged that subsequent legislation may repeal the consent and 
void the compact604 and to avoid this problem, she suggested that the federal government 
should participate in the compact and be represented in the agency: “With federal participation 
and representation in the regional agency, Congress might believe that the federal interests are 
served adequately so as to allow Congress to adopt a more cooperative approach to the 
compact”605 
                                                   
602 Marlissa S. Briggett, State Supremacy in the Federal Realm: The Interstate Compact, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 
L. REV. 751 (1991). 
603 Id. at 766.  
604 Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 583, 589-90 (D. Colo. 1983) 
(congressional approval of interstate compact relating to certain navigable waterways did not 
limit congressional authority thereafter to enact the Clean Water Act, even though the Act 
was inconsistent with the compact). 
605 See Brigett supra note 602 at 766.  
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Another possibility for the compact to circumvent federal law has been explored by politician 
Ted Cruz who suggested that Congress could delegate administrative rulemaking authority to 
the HCC:   
One interesting possibility is that, because Congress may consent in advance to a 
compact, it may perhaps delegate the equivalent of administrative rulemaking 
authority to any regulatory body established by the compact. Thus, in the abstract, 
the interstate compact has as much potential as a “policymaking” device as the 
regulatory agencies of the federal government.606 
As to the likelihood of congressional consent, it is clear that present circumstances do not allow 
the enactment of the compact. This view is shared by Crady deGolian, director of the National 
Center for Interstate Compacts, an organization that manages numerous compacts for the 
Council of State Governments.  DeGolian said to The Kansas City Star that the Health Compact 
“would be a very tough ask in terms of congressional consent” and, even if consented “it would 
take years to implement, given all of the specific state legislation and administrative details 
that would need to be put in place.”607.  
As to the general explanation of the reasons that push interest groups to seek to fulfil their 
policy objectives through interstate compacts, Ann O’ Bowman has identified two main 
reasons: 
1. Once a compact is in place, policy is insulated from the vagaries of single-state politics 
and becomes the subject of multistate negotiation.  
                                                   
606 Cruz, supra note 469. 
607 Diane Stafford, Some states propose compact to give them free hand in running health care programs, THE 
KANSAS CITY STAR, (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.kansascity.com/news/business/health-
care/article1305382.html#storylink=cpy.  
  
197 
 
2. Interest groups may seek interstate compacts in cases where they find it difficult to 
achieve policy success through state institutions.608  
In the health care context, it can be argued that interest groups promoted the HCC because it 
could offer a multistate (interstate) approach to a policy issue that was in essence multistate as 
it involved the whole nation. The ultimate objective of the Heath Care Compact Alliance and 
ALEC was to strike down the Affordable Care Act and the HCC represented a constitutional 
option to join efforts in that direction, an option beyond single-state nullification or legal action.  
To conclude, the interstate compact is another strategy devised by state rights proponents to 
push back and raise their voice. Unlike nullification bills and Anti-Commandeering 
resolutions, the Health Care Compact bills did not influence the ongoing constitutional dispute 
in court but served as a political strategy to raise the voice of the states.  
What remains to be established is whether it “[I]s […] a tool to subvert established government 
or is it a constitutional doorway to the modern federalism of an adaptable kind which so many 
have been seeking?”609 
  
                                                   
608 See Anne O’ Bowman, Expanding the Scope of Conflict: Interest Groups and Interstate Compacts, 91 SOC. 
SCI. Q. 669-688 (Sep. 2010).  
609 RIDGEWAY, supra note 562 at X. 
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Chapter Five: State Applications for an Art. V Convention 
 
Introduction  
The legislature of Colorado did not pass nullification legislation or Health Care Freedom acts, 
and did not join the Health Care compact. Instead, it used a very ambitious push-back strategy 
and adopted a House Resolution to call for an Art. V Convention to propose an ad-hoc 
amendment to repeal the Obama’s Affordable Care Act in full.  
The phenomenon is of interest to this research project not only because the Colorado House 
passed an Art. V resolution to repeal the ACA, but because other legislatures 
contemporaneously passed numerous similar resolutions calling for a general convention610 or 
proposing specific amendments that range from balanced budget611 to the limitation of the 
power and jurisdiction of the federal government.612 Hence, the case study of the Colorado 
resolution provides an opportunity to reflect on Art. V Convention as a broader strategy of push 
back that has become increasingly popular in state legislatures and represents another way that 
state legislatures carried out “constitutional politics”, in this case not aiming at influencing the 
interpretation of the Constitution but at changing the Constitution itself. The rationale for the 
selection of the Colorado resolution is that it is the only resolution that explicitly calls for an 
anti-ACA amendment where others propose a balanced budget amendment that would cut the 
Medicaid funding.  
                                                   
610 See for instance 2014 GA SR 371.  
611 See OH 2013 SJR 5, 2014 LA HCR 70, 2014 MI JR V, 2014 FL S 658, 2014 H 794 (adopts the Compact for 
a Balanced Budget and promote the proposal and ratification of a balanced budget amendment), 2015 UT HJR 7 
(balanced budget amendment), 2014 TN HJR 548, 2015 MS S 2389 (Adopts the compact for a balanced 
budget), 2015 ND H 1138 (Adopts the compact for a balanced budget).  
612 See 2014 AK HJR 22, 2014 FL S 476.  
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After a brief review of the literature on Constitutional Convention and the analysis of the recent 
Colorado’s call for a Convention to repeal the ACA, this chapter explores contemporary legal 
issues surrounding the procedure. 
 
I. Context  
Art. V of the Constitution reads:  
“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall 
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures 
of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing 
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as 
part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the 
several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other 
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress.” (Italics added.) 
 
Art. V thus provides two ways to amend the Constitution, respectively by a resolution adopted 
by both the House of Representatives and the Senate with a two-thirds vote or by a Convention 
of states, called for by the Congress upon application of two thirds of the state legislatures 
(currently 34/50). In both cases, the proposed amendments must be referred to the states for 
ratification. The ratification process can take place in the legislatures or in ad hoc Conventions 
called by each state and the requirement for approval is three fourths of the states (currently 
38/50). The first method—the congressional proposal—has been used for all 27 constitutional 
amendments but the latter—the state application and convention process—has never been 
carried out to completion, mainly because the two thirds threshold (corresponding to 34/50 
legislatures) has never been reached.  For this reason, the clause has often been belittled as the 
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one of the best-known 'dead letter' clauses in the federal Constitution613 or “a constitutional 
curiosity”.614  
The origins of the of the Convention Clause can be found, according to Prof. Robert 
Natelson,615 in “comparable provisions in state constitutions that predated the U.S. 
Constitution”616 such as Article 63 of the 1777 Georgia Constitution which provided for an 
amendment convention called by a majority of counties.617  He argues that the records of the 
Constitutional Convention show that initially delegates considered the amendment convention 
as the only mechanism to propose and ratify amendments but Alexander Hamilton convinced 
the delegates that Congress should be empowered to propose amendments. The Convention 
was, according to Natelson, a safety valve for the protection of states’ rights, the idea being 
that Congress should not interfere in the process but rather limit itself to summoning a 
Convention.618 
In addition to Natelson’s findings, Thomas Neale –writing for the Congressional Research 
Services– notes that the Framers intended to craft the clause “very much in the spirit of checks 
and balances, and separations of powers, that permeates the Constitution”619 and that the two 
options are a result of this effort to balance Congress and the states. From this perspective, Art. 
V is a clear manifestation of the contrast between federalist and anti-federalist position and 
ultimately, a representation of the compromise that they found in Philadelphia. The two options 
                                                   
613 Robert G. Jr Dixon, Article I, The Comatose Article of Our Living Constitution, 66 MICH. L. REV. 931- 943 
(1968).  
614 Michael A. Almond, Amendment by Convention. Our Next Constitutional Crisis?, 53 N.C.L. REV. 491 
(1975).  
615 ROBERT G. NATELSON, AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION BY CONVENTION: A COMPLETE VIEW OF THE 
FOUNDERS’ PLAN, 20-22 (Goldwater Institute, Policy Report No. 241, September 16, 2010). Robert Natelson is 
a conservative scholar who has published widely on Constitution’s amendment procedure, including a handbook 
for legislators published by ALEC. He is currently Senior Fellow in constitutional jurisprudence at the 
Independence Institute in Denver, CO. 
616 Robert G. Natelson, Proposing Constitutional Amendments by a Convention of States: a Handbook for State 
Lawmakers 9 (American Legislative Exchange Council 2011). 
617 “The assembly [legislature] shall order a convention to be called for that purpose, specifying the alterations to 
be made, according to the petitions preferred to the assembly by the majority of the countries as aforesaid”.  
618 NATELSON, supra note 616 at 10. 
619 Thomas Neale, THE ARTICLE V CONVENTION: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES FOR CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE 8 (2012) (unpublished report on file with the author). 
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to amend the Constitution represent the two conceptions of the United States as a Union of 
people (amendments proposed by Congress) and as a Union of States (amendments proposed 
by the state legislatures).  
This is further confirmed by Alexander Hamilton who argued in the Federalist n. 85 that the 
option of a Convention was included in the Constitution to provide an alternative amendment 
mechanism for the states in case of encroachment of the national power: 
 
In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments, it has been urged that 
the persons delegated to the administration of the national government will always 
be disinclined to yield up any portion of the authority of which they were once 
possessed. […] But there is yet a further consideration, which proves beyond the 
possibility of a doubt, that the observation is futile. It is this that the national rulers, 
whenever nine States concur, will have no option upon the subject. By the fifth 
article of the plan, the Congress will be obliged “on the application of the 
legislatures of two thirds of the States which at present amount to nine, to call a 
convention for proposing amendments, which shall be valid, to all intents and 
purposes, as part of the Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three 
fourths of the States, or by conventions in three fourths thereof.'” The words of this 
article are peremptory. The Congress “shall call a convention.” Nothing in this 
particular is left to the discretion of that body. […] We may safely rely on the 
disposition of the State legislatures to erect barriers against the encroachments of 
the national authority.620 
 
                                                   
620 Alexander Hamilton, in The Federalist, Number 85, “Conclusion”.  
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Hamilton’s remarks are today used by promoters of Art. V.  They argue that the Framers 
purposely included a mechanism to safeguard the states from a tyrannical Congress and that a 
Constitutional Convention would return power in the hands of the states. This rhetoric is 
intended to legitimize the practice and to persuade legislators that the Constitution contains all 
the possible safeguards for states’ rights, if they are used appropriately. In this regard, Philip 
Kurland called the method “both its virtue and its vice”621 because it is a powerful weapon but 
the super-majority requirement (34 states threshold) is difficult to attain.  
 
II. The Literature on Art. V Constitutional Convention  
 
The scholarship on Art. V Constitutional Convention mainly revolves around commentary on 
constitutional change and the need for constitutional reform. The champion of a call for an 
Art. V Convention is Prof. Sanford Levinson who believes that “there is a connection 
between the perceived deficiencies of contemporary government and formal constitutions”622 
and that the dysfunctional aspects of the American constitutional system should be reformed. 
The premise of his work is that the Constitution is undemocratic and that the only way to fix 
it is “sending the Constitution to a new convention for repair”.623 Prof. Levinson explained 
his proposal for amendments both in his book624 and in an article published in Constitutional 
Commentary:625 His suggestions for amendments include: 
                                                   
621 Philip B. Kurlan, Article V and the Amending Process, in AN AMERICAN PRIMER 148,152 (D. Boorstin ed., 
1968). 
622 SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 5 (2012). 
623 SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND 
HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 11 (2006). 
624 Id. . 
625 Sanford Levinson, So Much to Rewrite, So Little Time . . .., 27 Const. Comment. 515, 519 (2011). 
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· the abolition of life tenure for Supreme Court justices to be replaced by 18-year terms, 
with no possibility of reappointment. With a court of 9 justices —Levinson argues—
the 18-year term would create vacancies every two years and make it impossible for 
even a two-term president to name a majority of its membership;626 
· a review of the electoral system for the Senate with a view to implement a 
proportional representation instead of the fixed two senators per state;  627 
· a parliamentary system or a presidential system with a procedure for a solemn vote of 
“no confidence”628 
· the abolition of the electoral college or, if it is retained, a change to the provision that 
in case of deadlock the House of Representatives makes the choice from the top three 
candidates on a one state/one vote basis;629  
· the elimination of the office of Vice-President or a reform of the appointment 
procedure that would include a vote of confirmation by both houses of Congress;630  
· a “significantly easier” amendment process and a procedure for a new convention 
whose delegates will be chosen by a national lottery among the voting-eligible 
citizenry. Levinson adds that delegates “will be paid for up to two years, the salaries 
received by senators, with guaranteed sufficient funding to hold hearings literally all 
over the world, as well as all over the United States, of course, on the issues they 
would necessarily confront.”631  
 
                                                   
626 Id. at 519.  
627 Id. at 521.  
628 Id. at 522. Prof Levinson does not explain in detail how the parliamentary system would work but leaved the 
matter open to discussion: “One of the reasons I support a convention is that I would very much want to hear 
what people have to say, since there are obvious strengths and weaknesses in both presidential and 
parliamentary systems”.  
629 Id. at 523.  
630 Id. at 524.   
631 Id. at 525.  
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On the other hand, Prof. Balkin (a frequent co-author with Prof. Levinson) believes that a 
Constitutional Convention would be a useful means of mobilizing politics and engaging 
citizens, but does not agree that it is necessary.632 To explain his position, he recalled 
Levinson’s distinction between “Constitution of Conversation” and the “Constitution of 
Settlement”, the first being those aspects of the Constitution subject to conversation and 
litigation about their meaning such as the Equal Protection Clause633 and the second being the 
features of the constitutional system “that are not normally litigated in courts and do not 
produce judicial decisions and judicially created doctrines”634 such as the number of members 
of the Houses of Congress, the scope of presidential and gubernatorial votes.635 This 
distinction, added Prof. Balkin, is sometimes confused with Levinson’s other distinction 
between the Hard-Wired Constitution and the Constitution of Construction. The Hard Wired 
elements of the Constitution are those that cannot be changed without a constitutional 
amendment636 whereas the construction elements are those that can be changed via 
constitutional construction, a process that takes place in many different forms.  
In Balkin’s opinion, the dysfunction of the American constitutional system actually lies in 
aspects of the Constitution of Settlement (polarized political parties, the undue influence of 
money in politics, the malapportionment of political power, and the proliferation of veto points 
in the political system)637 and can therefore be changed through the ordinary processes of 
constitutional construction with no need for amendments or a new constitutional convention.638 
                                                   
632 Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco: Why the American Political System Is Dysfunctional, 94 B.U. L. 
Rev. 1159, 1167 (2014). 
633 Sanford Levinson, "Reflection and Choice": A One-Time Experience?, 92 Neb. L. Rev. 239, 255 (2013) 
634 Definition by Jack M. Balkin, supra note 632 at 1162 (2014).  
635 See LEVINSON, supra note 622.  
636 Sanford Levinson, So Much to Rewrite, So Little Time . . . ., 27 CONST. COMMENT. 515, 516 (2011) (Prof. 
Levinson also explains that the hard-wired” features are those elements of the Constitution that “most professors 
never bother discussing with their students because they are never subject to litigation” such as bicameralism, 
the fixed presidential term and the amendment procedure).  
637 Balkin supra note 632 at 1165.  
638 Id.  
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A call for “a twenty-first century Convention”639 was put forward by Prof. Larry J. Sabato in 
his book ‘A More Perfect Constitution: Ideas to Inspire a New Generation’ (2007) arguing for 
a new Constitution and proposing a series of amendments, ranging from the expansion of 
Congress’ size (so that it is more representative) to the elimination of lifetime tenure for federal 
judges and Universal National Service. The premise of his work is – as with Levinson’s- a 
criticism of the Constitution that he defines as “the root of our current political dysfunction”.  
On the other side of the discussion are scholars that argue against an Art. V Convention and 
the possible dangers of a revision of the Constitution. An eminent commentator in this regard 
is Prof. Laurence Tribe who argued against the call for a Constitutional Convention to propose 
a balanced budget in 1979.640  His main criticism was that the Constitution embodies 
fundamental law and should not be amended to include provisions around social policies such 
as a balanced budget.641 At the basis of the argument against an Art. V Convention is the 
assumption that Congress is the most appropriate body to stimulate and implement 
constitutional change and that the amendment process should remain within the sole 
competence of the Congress. Professor Robert Dixon has argued that “piecemeal constitutional 
revision . . . is more expeditiously handled by congressional initiation.”642 Eminent Professor 
Charles Black also believed that a Constitutional Convention would be an anachronistic device: 
“In the very earliest days, before it was known that the new government would be so successful, 
it may have seemed “desirable and practical” for the States, unused to union and uncertain of 
its benefits, to have some means of compelling a thorough reconsideration of the new 
plan”643and that Congress should retain predominance over the amendment process: “I would 
                                                   
639 Larry J. Sabato, A MORE PERFECT CONSTITUTION: IDEAS TO INSPIRE A NEW GENERATION 198 (2007). 
640 Laurence Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting Congress to Call a Constitutional Convention to Propose a 
Balanced Budget Amendment, 10 Pac. L. J. 627 1979. He reports that as of Apr.1978 the application had been 
signed by 29 legislatures. 
641 Id. at 630. 
642 Robert G. Dixon, Article V: The Comatose Article of our Living Constitution? 66 MICH. L. REV. 943-46 
(1968). 
643 Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to A Congressman, 82 Yale L.J. 189, 201 (1972). 
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strongly contend that there is nothing either desirable or practical about building up the power 
of state legislatures with respect to the initiation of particular amendments to the Constitution, 
and that there is therefore no validity in attributing such “intent” to the Framers on grounds of 
desirability and wisdom.”644 Another strong opponent to the Constitutional Convention was 
Prof. Swindler645 who considered the Convention Clause as a “transitional safeguard”646 and -
as such- recommended its repeal: “the general convention provision of article V is in truth no 
longer of any effect.”647 Some scholars oppose an Art. V Convention because they fear a 
potential “runaway” convention, a convention  that would exceed its scope and make radical 
changes to the Constitution. For example, Stanford Professor Gerald Gunther warned against 
political radicals from both the left and right648  and Ralph Carson argued that a general and 
unlimited federal constitutional convention might be a disaster649 because once convened, 
attempts by Congress to impose limitations on subject matter would be of no avail.650 
The scholarly discussion around Art. V convention is very rich and it is tied to the political 
debate around constitutional amendments. The call for a convention is, like other types of 
measures explored in this work, a legal strategy used for political ends. The next section focuses 
on the recent Colorado application for an Art. V Convention to repeal the ACA where the 
revision of the Constitution was proposed to resolve the political controversies related to the 
health reform. 
                                                   
644 Id. at 200 (1972). 
645 William F. Swindler, The Current Challenge to Federalism: the Confederating Proposals, 52 GEO. L.J. 1 
(1963). 
646 Id. at 15-16. 
647 Id. at 23.  
648 Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Brinkmanship; Stumbling Towards a Convention, 65A.B.A. J. 1046 (1979). 
649 Ralph M. Carson, Disadvantages of a Federal Constitutional Convention, 66 MICH. L. REV. 921-922 
(1968). 
650 Id. at 924. 
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III. Colorado House Resolution 1003 (2012) 
 
On 01/19/2012, the Colorado House passed a resolution to call a convention for proposing an 
amendment to the United States Constitution to repeal the ACA. The resolution was sponsored 
by Rep. David Balmer and passed with a 33-31 vote.651 The vote resulted in a partisan split 
with Republicans in favor and Democrats against. The exception was Rep. Wes McKinley, D-
Cokedale who voted for the passage and Rep. Laura Bradford, R-Colbran, who voted against 
it. 
The legislative history of the resolution652 shows that Democrat representatives attempted to 
amend the resolution and to include warnings that a full repeal of the ACA would trigger an 
increase in the federal budget deficit by billions of dollars653 and that the state of Colorado 
would lose the benefits of almost $30 million654 but those amendments were not passed.  
This resolution represents a good example of the “constitutional politics” strategies that this 
work has investigated because it manifestly uses constitutional means (call of an Art. V 
Convention) and ideological claims (liberty of the individual and states’ rights) to achieve state 
preferred policy. The policy motivations of the legislators are clear from the text of the 
resolution that expresses concerns that the Affordable Care Act “will likely lead to increased 
health care spending and rationing of health care,”655 that the Act “will likely increase taxes, 
limit economic growth, increase unemployment, and reduce incentives to innovate”656 and “the 
Act will likely increase the federal deficit while simultaneously requiring unsustainable 
                                                   
651 2012 HR 1003, Title: Concerning an Application under Article V of the United States Constitution to the 
Congress of the United States to Call a Convention for Proposing an Amendment to the United States 
Constitution to Repeal the "Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act". 
652 COLORADO GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 
http://www.leg.state.co.us/CLICS/CLICS2012A/csl.nsf/BillFoldersAll?OpenFrameSet (last visited Feb. 4, 
2018)  
653 Proposed amendment by Representative Ferrandino, line 35 p. 49.  
654 Proposed amendment by Representative Ferrandino, line 22 p. 50.  
655 2012 HR 1003, point 3.  
656 Id. at point 4.  
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spending by the states, which will likely lead to catastrophic deficits at the state level, forcing 
unprecedented cutbacks in other state programs and services”.657 The Colorado House 
legislators that passed this resolution were arguably trying to enhance the strength of their 
policy objections by using a constitutional device that would attract attention and was 
constitutionally unassailable. This is the common characteristic-if any- of all the 
bills/resolution that this work has examined.  
The reasons for the passage of the resolution were further explained by House Majority Leader 
Amy Stephens: “Colorado must be a leader in advancing states’ rights against bloated federal 
government bureaucracies. House Resolution 1003 sends a crystal clear message we will do 
everything we can to protect our citizens and state from disastrous effects of federally mandated 
health care.”658  
The Colorado resolution failed to result in the actual calling of a constitutional convention 
because no other state legislature joined Colorado in a specific resolution to repeal the ACA. 
Nonetheless, the examination of the debate surrounding the Colorado resolution contributes to 
the understanding of the bigger phenomenon of states’ calls for Art. V Convention which is 
investigated in more details in the next paragraph.  
 
 
IV. The Phenomenon 
Art. V applications are not a new phenomenon and indeed have materially shaped U.S. 
Constitutional history. The very first campaign for an Art. V Convention was carried out at the 
beginning of the 20th century, when 25 states joined Pennsylvania in an application to call a 
                                                   
657 Id. at point 5.  
658 House Calls for Constitutional Amendment to Repeal Federal Health Care Law, COLORADO HOUSE 
REPUBLICANS BLOG, http://www.cohousegop.com/house-calls-for-constitutional-amendment-to-repeal-federal-
health-care-law/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2018).  
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Convention that would consider an amendment to provide popular election of U.S. Senators. 
At the time, senators were elected by state legislatures that in some cases could not agree on a 
candidate and in other cases elected candidates who were close to corporate and monopoly 
interests.659 To resolve the impasse, 25 legislatures proposed direct popular election of senators 
as a possible remedy. Even though the necessary threshold to compel Congress to call a 
Convention was not reached, the literature emphasizes the “prodding” effect of the applications 
that -we know- pushed the Senate to join the House of Representatives in proposing what 
became the 17th Amendment in 1912.660  
The second wave of applications for an Art. V Convention happened between 1963 and 1970 
in reaction to the Supreme Court’s state legislative apportionment decision Reynolds v. Sims 
(1964)661 which established that state legislatures’ electoral districts must be roughly equal in 
terms of size of population. Conservative state legislatures feared that the new “one person-
one vote” regime would favor urban interests at the expense of rural populations and mounted 
a protest based on states’ rights claims. By 1970, the protest had produced 33 applications for 
an Art. V Convention to consider amendments on legislative apportionment. However, the 
fears of a runaway convention and the campaign for equal representation induced four 
legislatures to rescind their applications and the movement lost its vitality.  
The third wave of Art. V applications involved 32 state legislatures that between 1975 - 1983 
called for an Art. V Convention to consider a balanced budget amendment.  These applications 
were due to concerns regarding the budget deficit and, drawing on a rhetoric of states’ rights 
and limited government, aimed to limit the power of the federal government to incur budget 
deficits. Again, the 32 states threshold was not met.  
                                                   
659 Thomas H. Neale, The Article V Convention for Proposing Constitutional Amendments: Historical 
Perspectives for Congress, CRS Report for Congress, 9 (2012) (unpublished report on file with the author). 
660 Thomas H. Neale, The Article V Convention to Propose Constitutional Amendments: Contemporary Issues 
for Congress, Congressional Research Service Report 3 (2016) (unpublished report on file with the author). 
661 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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Remarkably, in the last seven years, state legislatures have started a new movement to call an 
Art. V Constitutional Convention that this work interprets in the context of a broader push back 
strategy against federal policies.  Activists and advocacy groups come from a broad range of 
the political spectrum and range from grass root organizations to bigger lobbies. A big name 
in the list is ALEC which in 2011 published a Handbook662 detailing procedures and sample 
legislation to advance Art. V calls.663  The handbook was authored by Prof. Natelson and was 
intended to promote an amendment for balanced budget. Other activist groups are the Balanced 
Budget Amendment Task Force664 and the Convention of States organization665 which 
respectively advocate for a balanced budget amendment and for a General Convention that 
would “return the country to its original vision of a limited federal government”. Furthermore, 
an Art. V convention is on the agenda of conservative think tanks such as the Federalist Society 
which regularly hosts events focused on the issue. One regular speaker in such events is U.S. 
Senator Tom Coburn who discussed the opportunity to hold an Art. V Convention with Andy 
Oldham, Deputy General Counsel to Texas Governor Greg Abbott at the Texas A&M 
University School of Law on Oct. 4th, 2017.666  Another event was organized by the Ohio 
Chapter on March 31, 2017 to discuss whether Ohio would benefit from an Art. V Convention. 
The event was broadcasted and is available to the public online.667  
 
                                                   
662 Article V Handbook, AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE, https://www.alec.org/publication/article-v-
handbook/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2018).  
663 Article V Convention of States Commissioner Oath, Instructions and Recall American Legislative Exchange,  
AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE, http://www.alec.org/model-legislation/resolution-for-limitations-on-
authority-of-state-delegates-to-a-convention-for-proposing-amendments-under-article-v-of-the-us-
constitution/(last visited Feb. 5, 2018). 
664 BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT TASK FORCE, http://bba4usa.org/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2018). 
665 CONVENTION OF STATES ACTION, http://conventionofstates.com/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2018). 
666 Events listing is available online.  Hon. Tom A. Coburn, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, 
https://fedsoc.org/contributors/tom-coburn (last visited Feb. 5, 2018). 
667 The Federalist Society, Inaugural Ohio Chapters Conference 2017 Panel I: Convention of the States, 
YOUTUBE (Apr.21,2017),  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D3v025I2i6s.  
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At this point the questions must be: how widespread is the phenomenon? How many states 
have called an Art. V Convention so far?   
Until January 2015 it was virtually impossible to answer this question because there was no 
official report on the number of requests for an Art. V Constitutional Convention and Congress 
did not keep a record of petitions for a convention. However, on Jan. 6th 2015, the House of 
Representatives adopted H.Res. 5 that required the Committee on the Judiciary to make 
publicly available any application or rescission of application for an Art. V Convention 
received by Congress. The procedure, regulated by H.Res. 5, Section 3 (c), requires the Chair 
of the House Judiciary Committee to “designate any such memorial for public availability by 
the Clerk” and that the Clerk should make them publicly available in electronic form. 
At present, the Office of the Clerk website668 hosts a comprehensive database of 156 Art. V 
applications/rescissions presented to Congress since 1960.  
Unofficial information is also available in two databases respectively hosted by the association 
‘Friends of the Article V Convention (FOAVC)’669 and the website ‘The Article V Library’.670  
The FOAVC database reports a total of 743 applications/rescissions since 1789 and provides 
numerous tables that sort the application according to state, subject and contemporaneity 
(applications made in a 7 years period). The ‘Article V Library’ website reports instead a total 
of 434 applications and 31 rescissions since 1789 and sorts them according to state, subject and 
the ‘Paulsen criteria’, the criteria devised by Prof. Paulsen in 1993 to distinguish between a 
valid and invalid application.671 The next section provides a broader discussion of the 
                                                   
668 House Documents- Selected Memorials, OFFICE OF THE CLERK- U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/memorials.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2018). For the purpose of this 
investigation, I used the data published by the Office of Clerk website. 
669 Article V Amendment Applications Tables, FRIENDS OF THE ARTICLE V CONVENTION, 
http://foa5c.org/01page/Articles/AmendmentsTables.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2018). 
670 The Article V Library, STATE ARTICLE V CONVENTION APPLICATIONS, 
http://article5library.org/applications.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2018). 
671 See infra. Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment, 103 Yale L.J. 677 (1993). Prof. Paulsen believes that a valid Art. V application should not 
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controversies around the validity of an Art. V application and covers Prof. Paulsen’s 
theorization.  
This work is mainly concerned with the Art. V applications submitted in the last seven years 
and uses the Office of the Clerk’s database.  
Between 2010 and 2017 state legislatures submitted 36 applications that I classified in the 
table below according to the type of amendment requested.  
 
Amendment  States  Total: 36 
Balanced Budget  2010 Florida 
2014 Alabama 
2014 Florida 
2014 Georgia 
2014 Louisiana 
2014 Michigan 
2014 Ohio 
2015 Tennessee 
2015 South Dakota 
2015 Utah 
2015 North Dakota 
2016 Kansas 
2016 New Hampshire 
2016 West Virginia 
2017 Wyoming 
15 
                                                   
limit the purpose of the Convention and that if an application contained exclusivity provisions it would be 
invalid. Furthermore, he believes that application are only valid until rescission.  
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Fiscal restraints, power of 
federal government, terms of 
office 
2014 Alaska 
2014 Florida 
2014 Georgia 
2015 Alabama 
2016 Indiana 
2016 Oklahoma 
2017 Missouri 
2017 North Dakota 
2017 Texas 
9 
Overturning Citizens United and 
limiting corporate personhood 
for elections 
2014 Vermont 
2014 California 
2015 New Jersey 
2015 Illinois 
2016 Rhode Island 
2016 Rhode Island 
6 
Approval from majority of state 
legislatures for debt increase 
2012 Louisiana 
2012 North Dakota 
2 
Amendment for a limited 
convention 
2012 North Dakota 1 
Amendment that would 
establish that  law enacted by 
Congress can embrace only one 
subject 
2014 Florida 1 
Term limits for Congress 2016 Florida 1 
  
214 
 
Countermand amendment to 
nullify federal law 
2016 Alaska 1 
 
 
The table shows that much of the debate surrounding a constitutional convention is about 
government spending. The majority of applications (15) between 2010-2017 have been put 
forward by state legislatures (namely Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, 
Tennessee, South Dakota, Utah, North Dakota, Kansas, New Hampshire, West Virginia and 
Wyoming) calling for an Art. V Convention that would consider the inclusion of a balanced 
budget amendment in the U.S. Constitution. A balanced budget amendment would impose 
limits on Congress’ spending powers and would therefore strip Congress of the ability to fully 
fund relevant social programs such as Medicaid and Medicare, together with other federal 
programs. The text of Art. V applications suggests that the main reason for applications is that 
some state legislatures were concerned about a growing federal budget deficit (estimated in 
2010 at 13 trillion dollars)672 and believe that federal programs are unfunded or underfunded673 
at the point of constituting a danger to future generations.674  This work has considered only 
recent applications; however, the call for a balanced budget amendment is not a recent 
phenomenon. Between 1975 and 1983, 32 state legislatures petitioned Congress to consider a 
balanced federal budget amendment and reserved the right to call an Art. V Convention in case 
Congress failed to propose the amendment.675 Congress did consider a balanced budget 
amendment in 1982 but the amendment failed to meet the constitutional requirement of passage 
                                                   
672 S.J. Res. 100, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011). 
673 Id.  
674 S.Conc. Res. 10, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010). It reads “it is the firm conviction of the Legislature of the 
State of Florida that it is wrong to fund the prosperity of the present generation by robbing future Americans of 
their own”.  
675 In 1957 the state of Indiana was the first to apply for a convention to propose a balanced federal budget 
amendment to the Constitution. 
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by two thirds of Members present and voting.676 In Neale’s Congressional Research Report,677 
the event is considered a high- water mark of the balanced budget campaign since the minimum 
threshold to summon a convention is two-thirds of the states, equivalent to 34 state legislatures. 
As of November 2017, the total of valid state legislatures’ applications to call an Art. V 
Convention for the purpose of proposing a Balanced Budget Amendment amounts to 27. The 
applications are tracked by the Balanced Budget Amendment Task Force, 678 a conservative 
Florida based organization that promotes the introduction of Art. V balanced budget 
applications in the state legislatures. They work in partnership with ALEC and the National 
Federation of Independent Business (NFIB)679 to promote limited interference of the federal 
government in social policies.  
The joint action of these organizations indicates that the call for a balanced budget amendment 
is part of a broader opposition to the funding of federal social policies, including the Affordable 
Care Act and the Medicare/Medicaid programmes that have been the focus of this research 
project. The push back strategies that this work has examined have taken different forms but 
they operate within the same ideological framework and constitutional discourse. Art. V 
applications are part of the same ideological (and constitutional) project that has involved 
nullification, health care freedom acts, health care compact and Anti-Commandeering 
resolutions. This is further demonstrated by the other 9 applications for Art. V Convention that 
do not request a balanced budget amendment but instead apply for a broader Convention that 
would discuss limited government i.e. fiscal restraints for the federal government, limited 
jurisdiction of the federal government and limited terms of office for its officials. The language 
                                                   
676 The Senate passed the amendment with a vote of 69-31 and the House voted 236 to 187. Data presented in 
Thomas Neale, The Article V Convention for Proposing Constitutional Amendments: Historical Perspectives for 
Congress, Congressional Research Service (2012) (unpublished report on file with the author). 
677 Id.   
678 2017 Campaign Report, BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT TASK FORCE, http://bba4usa.org/report/ (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2018).  This figure includes all those applications that have been made and not yet rescinded. 
679 The partners organizations are listed on BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT TASK FORCE webpage 
http://bba4usa.org/partnering-organizations/.  
  
216 
 
used in these applications very much resembles the language of the measures examined in the 
previous chapters with state legislatures advocating for their “duty” to “protect the liberty of 
our people” and to protect the people from a federal government that “has invaded the 
legitimate roles of the states through the manipulative process of federal mandates” and “has 
ceased to live under a proper interpretation of the Constitution of the United States”.680  The 
applications for a Constitutional Convention that would consider limited government 
amendments are inspired by the same conservative ideologues that mounted the legal 
opposition to the ACA on a narrow interpretation of the Commerce Clause/Tenth Amendment 
grounds and that believe that Congress should not regulate health care and should have limited 
spending power. Texas Public Policy Foundation681 President and CEO Brooke Rollins and 
Director of the Center for Tenth Amendment Action Dr. Thomas Lindsay, for example, 
expressed support for the 2016 Indiana’s call for an Article V Convention of States and pointed 
out that the applications were all part of a broader movement: “The action taken this week by 
Indiana’s legislature reflects the fast-growing momentum to restore the Constitutional liberty 
our nation was founded upon” claims a press release issued on his behalf.682  
 
The application for a Constitutional Convention therefore represents another of the push back 
strategies to block the operation of the ACA and, generally, to establish a new balance of power 
between the states and federal government.  
Another battlefield that has seen applications for a constitutional convention is the repeal of 
corporate political contributions elements of the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision.683 
                                                   
680 H.J.Res. 112, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2015).  
681 The Texas Public Policy Foundation defines itself as a non-profit, non-partisan research institute with the 
objective to promote and defend liberty, personal responsibility, and free enterprise in Texas and the nation.  
682 Tppf Statement on Indiana Passage of Article V Convention Call, TEXAS PUBLIC POLICY FOUNDATION, 
https://www.texaspolicy.com/press_release/detail/tppf-statement-on-indiana-passage-of-article-v-convention-
call (last visited Feb. 5, 2018). 
683 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
  
217 
 
Between 2010 and 2017 there have been about 6 applications from ‘blue’ states (Vermont, 
California, New Jersey, Illinois and Rhode Island) that used this push back strategy to oppose 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United and “limit the corrupting influence of money 
in our political system.”684 This type of application does not fall in the same category of push 
backs that this work has examined because these state legislatures do not aim at a smaller 
government. However, it is interesting to note how different political factions have made use 
of the same strategy to achieve different objectives. It can be argued that under the Trump 
presidency blue states will continue to use push back strategies and will recycle the strategies 
used by red states during the Obama presidency.  
The remaining 6 applications are a miscellany of atypical requests. In 2012, two state 
legislatures (Louisiana and North Dakota) applied for an Art. V Convention to consider an 
amendment to the U.S. Constitution which would require that any increase in federal debt 
should be approved by a majority of the legislatures of states.  This type of application is 
inspired by the same concerns that triggered requests for a balanced budget amendment but the 
emphasis here is on state sovereignty; state legislatures demand to be involved in the budget 
process and to be active decision makers in partnership with Congress.  
From an examination of the applications made between 2010-2017 it is evident that they all 
propose a specific amendment and that there is no call for an Art. V Convention that would 
revise different parts of Constitution. However, one of the main concerns of state legislators 
was that -once called- the convention would/could go beyond the mere discussion of one 
specific amendment and result in a fully-fledged constitutional convention. The literature has 
broadly discussed whether an Art. V Convention should be limited to the consideration of the 
specific amendment requested by the legislatures or whether it should be an open Convention 
that could consider any amendments (also called ‘a runaway convention’ by opponents); the 
                                                   
684 S.J.Res. 27, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2014).  
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relevant arguments put forward by scholars pro and against a limited convention are discussed 
below, under the paragraph on legal controversies surrounding a Constitutional Convention. 
However, to address the concerns of legislators fearing a ‘runaway convention’, in 2012 North 
Dakota put forward an application for an Art. V Convention that would amend the Constitution 
to include a clarification about the scope of Art. V conventions. The amendment would provide 
that a Convention (called by 2/3 of states that request the same amendment) could “solely 
decide whether to propose that specific Amendment to the states”685 and could not therefore 
consider any other amendment to the U.S. Constitution. North Dakota has not been joined by 
any other legislatures in this effort. 
Another single application was put forward by the legislature of Florida in 2014. The 
application requested an Art. V Convention that would consider an amendment to provide that 
Congress should only pass single-subject laws. This provision-the Florida legislature argued- 
is present in 41 of the 50 states’ constitutions and “would provide the means to limit pork barrel 
spending, control the phenomenon of legislating through riders, limit omnibus legislation 
produced by logrolling, prevent public surprise and increase the institutional accountability of 
Congress and its members.”686 Florida has not been joined by other states and the application 
remains pending together with another 2016 application from the same state for a Convention 
that would consider a Congressional Term Limits amendment. The issue, settled by Supreme 
Court decision in the Term Limits687 case, is still a major concern for legislatures that claim 
authority to establish term limits for their representatives in Congress. 
The last atypical application for an Art. V Convention was submitted by the Alaska state 
legislature in 2016 and revolves around the issue of nullification. The legislature called for a 
Constitutional Convention to consider a Countermand Amendment, an amendment that would 
                                                   
685 H.Conc. Res. 3048, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2011). 
686 H.M. 261, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess (Fla.2014).  
687 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).  
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“authorize the states to nullify and repeal a federal statute, executive order, judicial decision, 
regulatory decision or government mandate that adversely affects the interests of the states.”688  
The resolution expressly condemns the federal government for infringing state sovereignty, 
the Congress for exceeding its delegated powers, the President for exceeding constitutional 
authority and the courts for issuing decisions on public policy matters reserved to the states. It 
is, without doubts, a resolution inspired by the other nullification measures considered in 
Chapter 1 and represents another attempt to voice states’ rights concerns. Alaska has not been 
joined by other state legislatures.  
 
V. The Legal Controversies Surrounding a Constitutional Convention  
 
“No one should pretend that  an  Article  V  constitutional  convention would  not  raise  many  
difficult  problems  of  its  own” stated Prof. Levinson in 1999. 689 In the hypothetical situation 
that two thirds of the states apply and an Art. V Convention is called, it would not be free of 
procedural/legal uncertainties. In part because of the vagueness of Art. V wording and in part 
because a constitutional convention has not yet taken place, there are several interpretive 
questions as to how a Convention would work in practice. In 1979 Professor Laurence Tribe 
of Harvard Law School compiled a list of “Issues raised by Requesting Congress to Call a 
Constitutional Convention to Propose a Balanced Budget Amendment”690 and more recently 
in 2008 Prof. Sabato defined the legal framework surrounding a new convention as a 
                                                   
688 H.J.Res. 14, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2016) and H.Conc.Res. 4, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2016).  
689 Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Populism: is It Time For "We The People" to Demand an Article Five 
Convention?, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 211-218 (1999). 
690 Lawrence Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting Congress to Call a Constitutional Convention to Propose a 
Balanced Budget Amendment, 10 Pac. L.J. (1979). 
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“netherworld”691 and suggested that the definitive statutory guidance in the event of a new 
Constitutional Convention could only be provided by Congress.692 Some of the fundamental 
questions that have arisen in the literature are summarized and discussed below, as they 
represent the main concern of state legislators petitioning for a Convention.  
 
 
What Constitutes a Call, Application or Petition by a State Legislature? 
 
The Constitution states that Congress shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments “on 
the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States”693 but does not specify 
the requirements for a state application to be valid. Prof. Laurence Tribe, for example, 
questions whether both houses of each state legislature must take part in making application 
for a convention to Congress or whether an application from one house would be considered 
valid.694  
Tribe’s question of 1979 is still very much open and applies to our case study, the Colorado 
resolution (2012 HR 1003) calling a convention for proposing an amendment to the United 
States Constitution to repeal the ACA, that was adopted by the House only. Prof. Natelson  
would argue that the Colorado application is not valid because the Constitution reads 
“Legislatures of two thirds of the several States”,695 however the plural may refer to the 34 
legislatures, not to the two houses of each legislature. Furthermore, Prof. Tribe questioned, by 
what vote in each house of a state legislature must application to Congress be made? Simple 
majority? Two-thirds? The applications that this work has considered are resolutions, generally 
                                                   
691 LARRY J. SABATO, A MORE PERFECT CONSTITUTION, WHY THE CONSTITUTION MUST BE REVISED: IDEAS TO 
INSPIRE A NEW GENERATION 209 (2008).  
692 Id. at 212.  
693 Art. V, U.S. Constitution.  
694 Tribe, supra note 690. 
695 Email from Prof. Natelson to the author (Sep. 25, 2017) (on file with author).  
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adopted by simple majority; however, the criteria for a majority have not been set by the 
Constitution. Another question revolves around the possibility that a State Governor might veto 
an application to Congress. According to Prof. Natelson, “the application need not be signed 
by the Governor, and may not be vetoed, anything in the state constitution or laws 
notwithstanding”.696  
Prof. Tribe, and other scholars, could not provide a definitive answer to these questions and 
dismissed them as “unanswerable.”697 To a certain extent we must agree with Prof. Tribe 
because such questions have not been considered by the courts and remain open today, until 
such time as an Art. V Convention will be seriously considered as an option rather than a 
“constitutional curiosity”.  
 
 
Is There a Timeframe Within Which the Calls Applications or Petitions Must Be Made 
And Ratified? 
 
Art. V is silent on the timeframe for the proposal and ratification of amendments. The issue  
has been widely debated both by scholars and in the courts because it involves not only the 
timing for a convention application but generally the time allowed to states to ratify an 
amendment passed by Congress.  
The Supreme Court has considered the issue of ratification time in two cases that provide the 
legal framework around timeliness of constitutional amendments.  
Plenary Congressional Power Approach: Dillon v. Gloss (1921):698 The Supreme Court 
considered the issue of time limits to constitutional amendments for the first time in 1921.  
                                                   
696 Natelson, supra note 615 at 12.  
697 Tribe, supra note 690. 
698 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921). 
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At stake was the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment adopted in 1919; its constitutionality 
was challenged because the congressional resolution proposing the amendment fixed a 7 
years’ timeframe for its ratification. The question before the Court was whether or not 
Congress had the power to fix time limits to constitutional amendments. The Supreme Court, 
in an opinion authored by Justice Van Devanter, established that Congress may attach an 
explicit time limit on ratification and that seven years was a reasonable time limit.699.  Even 
though Art. V is silent on the matter, the court argued, the Constitution invested Congress 
with a wide power of proposing amendments and therefore Congress can fix a definitive 
period for ratification “keeping within reasonable limits.”700 Scholars and commentators, 
however, focused greater attention on the reference in Dillon, to a requirement that 
ratifications should be “contemporaneous” and “reflect the will of the people in all sections 
at relatively the same period”.701 This was particularly relevant in 1992, when Michigan was 
the last and decisive state to ratify the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, which had been 
originally proposed by James Madison (hence called “the Madison Amendment”) and stood 
pending for two hundred and two years. Some commentators702 noted that the ratification of 
the Twenty-Seven Amendment did not comply with the contemporaneous consensus 
requirement suggested in Dillon However, Dillon remains good law and stands as guidance 
                                                   
699 “It is not questioned that seven years, the period fixed in this instance, was reasonable, if power existed to fix 
a definite time; nor could it well be questioned considering the periods within which prior amendments were 
ratified.” Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 376 (1921) 
700 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, (1921) 375–76. “Of the power of Congress, keeping within reasonable limits, 
to fix a definite period for the ratification we entertain no doubt. As a rule the Constitution speaks in general 
terms, leaving Congress to deal with subsidiary matters of detail as the public interests and changing conditions 
may require; and article 5 is no exception to the rule.”. 
701 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921). 
702 See for instance Christopher M. Kennedy, Is There A Twenty-Seventh Amendment? The Unconstitutionality 
of A "New" 203-Year-Old Amendment, 26 J. Marshall L. Rev. 977, 1018 (1993) (arguing that the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment should be declared unconstitutional according to a more certain approach to ratification 
procedure which is consistent with the explicit and implicit provisions of Article V.); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A 
General Theory of Article v: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 Yale L.J. 677, 
761 (1993) (arguing that Dillon wrongly asserted the additional requirement of a “contemporaneous consensus”) 
and Allison L. Held, Sheryl L. Herndon, and Danielle M. Stager, The Equal Rights Amendment: Why the ERA 
Remains Legally Viable and Properly Before the States, 3 Wm & Mary J Women & L 113, 121-23 (1997) 
(arguing that acceptance of the Madison amendment implies that there is no requirement of contemporaneous 
consensus).. 
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to Congress on Art. V procedures. The issue of timeliness was considered again by the Court 
in the Coleman case, discussed below.  
 
The Political Question Approach: Coleman v. Miller (1939) 
The Coleman case703  involved the issue of timeliness of the ratification of a Child Labor 
Amendment proposed by Congress in 1924.704 The amendment was sent for ratification to the 
states without a deadline; the legislature of Kansas first adopted a resolution rejecting the 
proposed amendment in 1925 but then ratified the amendment after 13 years, in 1937. Twenty-
four Kansas state representatives and senators challenged the ratification in court contending 
that “in the absence of a limitation by the Congress, the Court can and should decide what is a 
reasonable period within which ratification may be had.”705 The Kansas Supreme Court 
rejected the challenge and sustained the validity of the ratification. The case was appealed to 
the Supreme Court where it became a case on the justiciability of Article V questions. The 
Court decided that the issue of the timeliness of the Kansas ratification was non-justiciable 
because it implied political consideration and that the appropriate body to set a reasonable limit 
of time for ratification is the Congress.706 The Coleman case constitutes the modern doctrinal 
framework for Art. V jurisprudence. Nonetheless, scholars have continued the debate outside 
the courts and still discuss the issue of timeliness. Remarkably, the Coleman decision has been 
deprecated as an “aberration”707 by Prof. Walter Dellinger, a leading constitutional scholar and 
former United States Solicitor General. The argument put forward by Prof. Dellinger is that 
Congressional promulgation would not settle the issue in a definitive matter because one 
                                                   
703 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). 
704 H.R.J. Res. 184, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 43 Stat. 670 (1924). The proposed amendment provided that 
‘Congress shall have power to limit, regulate and prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen years of age.” 
705 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).  
706 Id. at 454.  
707 Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 Harv. L. 
Rev. 386, 389 (1983) 
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Congress cannot bind a subsequent Congress and congressional decisions would almost surely 
fail to produce usable precedents.708 Of the same idea is Prof. Paulsen who termed the decision 
“very bad law”709 and the Supreme Court formulation of the political question doctrine 
“hopelessly jumbled.”710 In his opinion, the Dillon congressional power and Coleman political 
question decision had no basis in the text of the Constitution.711  
At the other end of the spectrum of the discussion, Professor Laurence Tribe explicitly 
challenged Professor Dellinger’s defense of nondeferential judicial review of the constitutional 
amendment power and in the Harvard Law Review argued that the courts should abstain from 
substantive review of constitutional amendments because it is a “quintessentially political”712 
process and “judicial supervision would significantly undercut the independence of Article V 
from normal legal processes and erode its special role in the constitutional scheme.”713  
 
Should the Scope of the Convention Be Limited to a Single Subject or Should the 
Convention Be General?   
 
The wording of Art. V does not specify whether the convention can be general or should be 
limited to a single subject.  In other words, it is not clear whether a convention can amend any 
part of the constitution or should be limited to the amendment states have called for. A deeply 
controversial discussion also revolves around the validity of the state applications for general 
and limited conventions. The issue has been debated by leading scholars of constitutional law 
                                                   
708 Id. at 393. 
709 Paulsen, supra note 671 at 713 (1993). 
710 Id. 
711 Id at. 721.  
712 Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 Harv. L. 
Rev. 433,445 )1983. 
713 Id. at 444.  
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who in turn have provided valid arguments for both options. In a letter dated February 28, 1972 
to Congressman Emanuel Celler (at the time Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee), 
Prof. Charles Black argued that the wording of Art. V referring to “a Convention for proposing 
Amendments” was to be interpreted as referring to a convention that would propose the 
amendments to be considered, not a convention limited in its scope: “It is my contention that 
Article V, properly construed, refers, in the phrase “a Convention for proposing Amendments,” 
to a convention for proposing such amendments as to that convention seem suitable for being 
proposed.”714 The matter has also been discussed in an exchange of letters between Prof. Bruce 
Ackerman and Prof. William W. Van Alstyne in 1979.715 Prof. Ackerman in a New Republic 
editorial716 argued that an Art. V application for a Convention should be presented as an 
unrestricted convention for proposing amendments and that Congress should decline to call a 
convention restricted to a specific amendment.  He then requested the opinion of Prof. Van 
Alstyne who disagreed with Ackerman’s conclusions and published his remarks in the Duke 
Law Journal. The point made by Prof. Van Alstyne was that an Art. V Convention should not 
be viewed as a general convention like the Constitutional Convention of 1787 but rather as an 
event of different nature, whose most appropriate objective would be a “modest change” of 
certain aspects of the Constitution:  
That a general convention, itself like the one at Philadelphia, convoked deliberately 
to undertake (in your words) "an unconditional reappraisal of constitutional 
foundations" is the only kind of convention or even the typical kind of convention 
anticipated under Article V strikes me as decidedly untrue. To the contrary, while 
allowed by Article V, such a convention is the least likely to be the foreseeable 
object of states expected to make use of their collective authority in article V. An 
                                                   
714 Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to A Congressman, 82 Yale L.J. 189, 196 (1972) 
715 William W. Van Alstyne, Does Article V Restrict the States to Calling Unlimited Conventions Only?—A 
Letter to a Colleague, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1295, 1304 (1979).  
716 Bruce Ackerman, Unconstitutional Convention, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 3, 1979, at 8. 
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event most likely to provide the most expected (and legitimate) use of this power 
would be just that: a particular event, an untoward happening, itself seen as a 
departure from, or as a suddenly exposed oversight within, the Constitution.717  
More recently, Professor Paulsen has interpreted the Constitutional Convention as a fully-
fledged substitute for Congress and argued that it would have an equivalent scope of authority, 
i.e. could not be subject to limitation:  
 
there can be no such thing as a “limited” constitutional convention. A constitutional 
convention, once called, is a free agency. Even if called for a specific purpose, and 
even if Congress purports to limit its mandate to proposing (or not proposing) 
amendments reflecting that purpose, the convention may propose what it likes-and 
Congress is bound to submit its proposals for ratification.718 
 
In the same article, Professor Paulsen set out criteria to identify valid applications, the same 
criteria used by the Article V Library website719 to classify the applications. He argued that 
since Article V did not permit Congress to call a convention limited to specific subject matter, 
applications that contained exclusivity provisions i.e. provisions that limited the convention's 
agenda would not be valid applications and should not count towards the 34-application 
threshold: “If an application is thus conditioned on limiting the convention’s agenda, and if 
Article V prohibits limited conventions, then the condition is invalid and with it the entire 
application.”720 He clarified, however, that applications are invalid only if they conditioned the 
work of the convention to a certain subject matter or text, not if they specify a purpose of the 
                                                   
717 Van Alstyne, supra note 715 at 1035.  
718 Paulsen, supra note 671. 
719 Paulsen Criteria Analysis, THE ART. V LIBRARY,  http://article5library.org/paulsen.php (last visited Feb. 5, 
2018).  
720 Paulsen, supra note 671 at 744. 
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application and ask for a constitutional convention “to consider” or “for the purpose of 
proposing” a particular amendment. In other words, specifying the purpose of an application is 
different to specifying a condition of the application. This distinction is particularly relevant if 
we consider that recent applications mainly call for a limited convention and would be 
considered invalid according to Paulsen’s criteria. The reason why state legislatures have 
recently drafted their applications as conditional to the amendment specified in the text of the 
resolution is the fear of a runaway convention, a convention that would go beyond the 
consideration of a single amendment and would consider amendments that states calling for a 
convention oppose.721  
 
 The Congressional Research Services Report considered 3 kinds of conventions: 
· A general convention, which would be free to consider any and all additions to the 
Constitution, as well as alterations to existing constitutional provisions;  
· A limited convention, which would be restricted by its “call,” or authorizing legislation, 
to consideration of a single issue or group of issues, as specified by the states in their 
applications; 
· A runaway convention, frequently identified by convention opponents as one of the 
dangers inherent in the process, is essentially a limited convention that departs from 
its prescribed mandate and proceeds to consider proposals in a range of issues that 
were not included in the original “call.”722  
 
Some of the resolutions calling for a constitutional convention that I have collected are indeed 
open applications for an Art. V convention and do not define any particular scope. Open 
                                                   
721 See Michael B. Rappaport, Reforming Article V: The Problems Created by the National Convention 
Amendment Method and How to Fix Them, 96 VA. L. REV. 1509, 1533 n.47 (2010). 
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applications are also better welcomed by the courts that have ruled that a state application 
should not attempt to restrict the convention’s deliberative freedom.723 Furthermore, former 
Solicitor General Dellinger has argued that a convention, once summoned, possesses 
deliberative power and could potentially set its own agenda, i.e. propose amendments that fall 
beyond the scope of the original call: a convention “should be influenced in its agenda by the 
grievances that led the states to apply for its convocation, the authority to determine the agenda 
and draft the amendments to be proposed should rest with the convention, rather than with 
Congress or the state legislatures.”724 
On the other hand, Prof. Sabato considers that from a practical point of view it would be very 
unlikely for a Convention to ignore states’ mandates because the amendments will eventually 
need to be ratified by thirty four state legislatures.725 This view, reports Prof. Sabato,726 is also 
supported by the American Bar Association, which in a study conducted in 1974 concluded 
that Congress has the power to establish procedures limiting a convention to the subject matter 
which is stated in the applications received from the state legislatures. 727 The fear of a runaway 
convention, Prof. Sabato seems to suggest, is unjustified because any amendment passed by 
the convention would ultimately have to be approved by ¾ of the legislatures and it is unlikely 
that the legislatures would approve unreasonable amendments.  
 
Conclusion  
 
                                                   
723 State v. American Sugar Refining Company, 137 La. 407, 415, 68 So. 742, 745 (1915).  
724 See Walter E. Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the ‘Limited’ Constitutional Convention, 88 Yale L.J. 
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725 Larry Sabato, supra note 639 at 213.  
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In response to the big wave of applications (32) between 1975 and 1983 for a Constitutional 
Convention to propose a constitutional amendment requiring a balanced federal budget, 
scholars have investigated the nature of the discontent and the role of those requests in the 
debate about public debt. Russell Caplan, writing in 1988, believed that a Convention was 
imminent and argued that the calls for an Art. V Convention are part of broader strategy that 
he calls “constitutional brinksmanship”. His book was aimed at dissipating fears about a 
constitutional convention and to convince legislators of the unlikelihood of a runaway 
convention. In particular he concluded that Article V permits limited-purpose conventions and 
that Congress or, in some situations, individual plaintiffs can nullify as ultra vires any 
nonconforming amendment proposed by the convention. 728 He was obviously wrong in 
predicting an imminent convention but did find a suitable interpretive key for the phenomenon 
in his definition of the overall strategy as ‘brinksmanship’. This is further confirmed by Thomas 
Neale’s analysis of the movement for a balanced budget identifying that the National 
Taxpayers’ Union, during the 1980s campaign, expressly stated that the convention movement 
was designed to force Congress to propose an amendment, that the call for a convention was 
“just a way of getting attention—something akin to batting a mule with a board”729 and  the 
statement of the House Judiciary Committee in its 1993 print, Is There a Constitutional 
Convention in America’s Future? noting that during the 1980s a number of states had 
forwarded conditional applications that specifically stated their petitions would be canceled in 
the event Congress proposed a balanced budget amendment that incorporated the general 
principles embodied in their proposals.730 
This work assimilates the contemporary calls for art. V Convention to the events taking place 
between 1975 and 1983 and interprets them as brinkmanship strategies. In other words, just as 
                                                   
728 RUSSEL CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKSMANSHIP: AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION BY NATIONAL 
CONVENTION 150 (1988). 
729 Neale, supra note 660 at 9. 
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per nullification and health care compacts, Art. V Convention applications are a strategy to 
foster political interest; their significance -as concluded by Donna Eleanor Childers- lies in the 
power to put issues on the public agenda, to communicate policy preferences to public officials, 
and to encourage more responsive government.731  
Whether this strategy can be translated into a successful call for a convention remains an open 
question.  In the CRS report, Neale observed that the progress in technology would favor Art. 
V campaigners and the spread of the phenomenon: “An important issue in the contemporary 
context is the fact that advances in communications technology could facilitate the emergence 
of technology-driven issue advocacy groups favorable to this phenomenon.”732 However, to 
date, the 34 states threshold still remains a big obstacle and even if it will never be reached, we 
should expect legal challenges on the validity of the call and on the timeframe of the calls, as 
seen in the previous paragraphs.  
 
 
 
  
                                                   
731 Donna Eleanor Childers, The Article V Constitutional Convention: A Serious Alternative, PhD dissertation 
in Political Science, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Santa Barbara (1989). 
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Conclusions 
I. Towards a Constitutional Moment? The Political Value and Legal 
Implications of State Legislative Dissent 
 
This multi-case study has sought to identify and classify strategies of state legislative dissent 
to the implementation of federal law. In particular, the focus has been on five types of 
legislative measures considered between 2010 and 2016 in states that opposed the 
implementation of certain provisions of the ACA. The overarching aim of the analysis of bills 
and legislative measures was to provide an interpretative framework for the understanding of 
state resistance to the ACA that would ultimately provide insights about the broader dynamics 
of federal and intergovernmental relations in the U.S. 
The study was based on the following core research questions: 
1. How have state legislatures opposed the implementation of the ACA?  
2. Is it possible to find patterns of opposition across the states? 
3. Which constitutional doctrines/devices have state legislatures used to legitimate 
their opposition to the ACA?  
4. What is the role of state opposition in the dynamics of federal and 
intergovernmental relations in the U.S.?  
5. To what extent could it be argued that the introduction of opposition bills 
constituted an attempt to influence constitutional adjudication? 
The first and the second research questions have been largely satisfied by the data presented in 
chapters 1-5. I have collected anti-ACA bills and resolutions introduced across the 50 states 
  
232 
 
between 2010-2016 and identified ‘patterns of resistance’ in the constitutional arguments put 
forwards by the legislatures. The data provided convincing evidence of a link between political 
opposition and constitutional discourse; state legislatures translated their policy concerns into 
constitutional arguments put forward via legislative measures. The language used by the state 
legislature was the language of state sovereignty, a language that reflected polarization in 
Washington, and that James Read has called ‘polarized constitutional interpretation’.733  
 
As I have argued, state legislatures phrased their political opposition to federal health care 
regulation in terms of constitutional safeguards of states’ rights and revisited constitutional 
doctrines and the interpretation of constitutional provisions in order to oppose the ACA on 
constitutional grounds. Chapters 1-5 have examined the way in which the political opposition 
had been transformed into legal opposition to the ACA and found that some state legislatures 
have used legislative measures to promote an alternative understanding of certain constitutional 
provisions at their advantage. The analysis of state legislative measures in this project 
represents a means to discuss the diversity of state legislative opposition to the ACA but at the 
same time an attempt to identify patterns of resistance across the 50 states. The classification 
of legislative measures which has provided the structure of this dissertation is the result of the 
attempt to develop a theory of legislative resistance to the ACA and represents the central 
contribution of this research project to new knowledge. 
 The third and the fourth research questions are interpretative and revolve around the 
significance of the opposition to the ACA and its role. As discussed earlier, some political 
science scholars have considered those assertions of state sovereignty as political strategies, 
                                                   
733 James Read, Constitutionalizing the Dispute: Federalism in Hyper-Partisan Times, 46 PUBLIUS: THE 
JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM 337 (2016). In this paper, Prof. Read argued that political polarization in Congress 
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opportunities for states to wield influence in the U.S. federal system and “capable of 
contributing under certain conditions to safeguarding federalism”. 734 Other scholars, instead, 
mainly considered their legal value and pointed out that state nullification of federal law has 
been repeatedly rejected throughout U.S. history as an unconstitutional exercise of state power 
and that -as a consequence- current attempts by states to nullify federal health care reform are 
equally invalid and will likewise be rejected.735 
This work considered both the political value and the legal implications of the ACA opposition 
measures. In particular, the aim of the case studies on the legislative history of oppositional 
measures was to explore the reasons for the opposition, the ultimate objective of legislators and 
the role of state resistance in the federal dynamic; I examined why state legislatures were 
focused on considering bills and resolutions that had no value from a legal point of view and 
what the consequences of these legislative actions could be.  I argued that state legislators 
wanted to create momentum and that they were willing to use any strategy to make their voice 
heard in Washington and to be able to negotiate implementation of the ACA. Remarkably, this 
dissertation has demonstrated that state legislative activity has played a crucial role in 
determining the terms of constitutional bargaining and more importantly that policies are 
determined by means of a delicate equilibrium between three actors: Congress, the federal 
judiciary and state legislatures. The case studies on the legislative history of opposition bills 
demonstrate that the terms of the interaction between Congress and judiciary are often 
discussed first in the state legislatures, the laboratories of democracy736 or in this case 
“laboratories of constitutional interpretation”.  Some scholars have argued that the Courts and 
Congress engage each other on constitutional meaning and have theorized constitutional debate 
                                                   
734 Dinan, supra note 2. See also Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-Based 
Dissent to Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111 (2010). 
735 Ryan Card, Can States "Just Say No" to Federal Health Care Reform? The Constitutional and Political 
Implications of State Attempts to Nullify Federal Law, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1795, 1800 (2010).  
736 The phrase was coined by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 
285 U.S. 262 (1932) supra note 26. 
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as bilateral737 or as an interbranch exercise.738  As I have argued, constitutional interpretation 
is also an intergovernmental matter (rather than exclusively interbranch) that involves states 
legislatures in the very first instance. The main contribution of this work is to reveal the strong 
ties between state legislative measures and legal challenges; the examination of some of the 
anti-ACA measures revealed that they were preparatory strategies to the lawsuits shedding light 
on the dynamics of American federalism. The evidence in the case studies indicates that the 
constitutionality of the ACA was first debated (and challenged) in state legislatures before 
coming to the courts. I argue that legislatures are the protagonists in the very first stages of a 
constitutional interpretive issue. This study rediscovers the role of state legislatures:  
· as first port of call for interest groups and lobbies, the same organizations that then 
proceed to make their voices heard in court. 
· As valuable floors for preliminary discussion of constitutional issues before they arrive 
in court. 
· As protagonists of the process that leads to constitutional adjudication.  
More specifically, the case studies conducted in this work provide evidence to suggest that 
sovereignty bills were preparatory actions of state legislators in response to pressure from 
grassroots organizations and lobbies that ultimately aimed at influencing constitutional 
adjudication. Chapter One demonstrated that nullification bills were pushed in the legislatures 
by the Tenth Amendment Centre, a grassroots organization that promotes libertarian principles 
and an originalist interpretation of the Constitution. Chapter Two concerned ALEC and 
demonstrates that Health Care Freedom Acts were promoted by this organization with the 
express purpose of influencing incoming litigation. In particular, the case studies demonstrated 
the close link between the enactment of Health Care Freedom acts and the following lawsuits 
                                                   
737 See Fisher, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS A POLITICAL PROCESS (1988). 
738 Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1336 (2001). 
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in Virginia. As to Anti-Commandeering bills, chapter three of this work demonstrated the 
remarkable influence of Anti-Commandeering doctrine on the Sebelius decision; the measures 
examined in the same chapter had also been promoted by ALEC and the Tenth Amendment 
Center on their respective websites. Both Health Care Freedom acts and Anti-Commandeering 
bills had arguably prepared the ground for the Roberts decision in Sebelius. Respectively, 
nullification and Health Care Freedom acts paved the way for the legal challenge on the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate, and Anti-Commandeering bills anticipated the 
decision of the court on Medicaid expansion. The same influence on constitutional discourse 
and litigation could not be demonstrated for Interstate Compact and Constitutional Convention 
resolutions that did not reach the courts. Instead, those measures aimed at promoting the use of 
the compact and the convention provisions as pure political tactics for retaining power over 
health care with the states. The organizations behind the introduction in state legislatures of the 
resolutions are the Health Care Compact Alliance and the Convention of States organization. 
The Health Care Compact Alliance was joined by ALEC in the effort to promote compact bills 
and it can be argued that they did so in the hope of reinforcing state claims over health care 
powers and using them as a source of leverage in intergovernmental bargaining.739 The effect 
of this strategy has been to produce what Alex Waddan and others term the “substance of 
dissent”.740 The ObamaCare Wars authors believe that “the substance of dissent ranges from 
litigation and legislation, to quasilegal nullification manoeuvres, to political rhetoric and 
stagecraft” and that these strategies share the goal of allowing political battles to continue with 
the possibility of a larger political victory.  
The fourth research question focused on the alleged influence of the opposition on 
constitutional adjudication. The question was grounded in the extensive literature on extra- 
                                                   
739 John Dinan, Intergovernmental Bargaining and Implementation of the Affordable Care Act: The Sources and 
Extent of State and Federal Government Leverage (2013), APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper. 
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judicial constitutional interpretation741 which has examined how political actors can influence 
constitutional adjudication. The literature on extra-judicial interpretation, however, focussed 
on the means by which the Congress, the President742 and the citizens743 can influence 
constitutional interpretation but neglected to examine the role of state legislatures as 
protagonist of the same process.  
By better understanding the role of state legislatures in influencing the constitutional discourse, 
this work addressed a gap in the literature and refined the normative theories of how the states 
ought to protect their interests vis a vis the central government. This study has argued that 
theories of intergovernmental relations should reflect the important role state legislatures play 
in promoting a certain interpretation on the Constitution and are able to prepare the ground for 
constitutional adjudication.  While the courts are ultimately responsible for constitutional 
interpretation, states can promote and shape the debate on certain constitutional issues before 
they arrive to court.  To some extent, in introducing opposition measures state legislatures were 
hoping to create that constitutional conflict that Prof. Siegel believe is the crucial engine in 
constitutional development.744 The ultimate contribution of this work resides, above all, in 
shedding light on the legislative activity of states as a starting point for constitutional change 
in the United States. State legislatures, it has been argued, can influence constitutional 
adjudication and contribute to constitutional evolution and change.  
                                                   
741 See Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 
N.C. L. REV. 773 (2002); DEVINS, NEAL, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL  VALUES (1996); Mark E. Herrmann, 
Looking Down from the Hill: Factors Determining the Success of Congressional Efforts to Reverse Supreme 
Court Interpretations of the Constitution, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 543 (1992) (He examines several specific 
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Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 Duke L.J. 1335, 1336 (2001) (theory of interbranch interpretation, 
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If constitutional change may seem too ambitious an inspiration, we should remember Prof. 
Whittington’s comments: “Few political movements achieve “overnight success,” and a low-
level conflict over constitutional meaning may persist for years before culminating in a decisive 
construction… Time is necessary to demonstrate whether these conflicts are significant enough 
to be considered major battles or whether they are merely continued skirmishes, though even 
short-lived constructions may be significant.745  
This dissertation began with the question ‘Towards a constitutional moment?’ and explored the 
way in which states attempted to create a constitutional moment by opposing federal law on 
constitutional grounds. What this work suggests is that the dynamics of a ‘constitutional 
moment’ for amending the constitutional balance may not be as far away as some 
commentators have argued. At the heart of the federalism debate is the question of whether 
state oppositional strategies are legitimate tools of a vibrant but dynamic federalism (Dinan) or 
symptoms of a fundamental malaise with the potential to strike at the heart of the relationship 
between states and federal government and thus represents a major shifting of constitutional 
tectonic plates (Natelson).  
This work concludes that the dynamics for a constitutional shifting are in place, state 
legislatures put forward strong state rights claims that, at the very least, have caused a tremor 
in the American constitutional mantle.  Whether major constitutional tectonic plates yet begun 
to shift remains to be seen.  
  
                                                   
745 Keith E. Whittington, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 
15 (1999).  
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II. Directions for Future Research 
By tracking the legislation considered by the state legislatures to oppose the ACA, this study 
has explained how conservative states have used traditional constitutional controversies to push 
back on the policies of a democratic party’s president that they oppose.  The constitutional 
arguments used by the red states typify the usual positions of conservatives on major federal 
social programs. Since this research began, the political landscape in the United States has 
shifted and we now have a Republican President and a Republican Congress. The possibility 
now arises for a reversal of the ACA dynamic, i.e. can we now expect to see liberal states use 
the tactics of ‘Obamacare wars’ to push back on unpopular conservative policies? 
 An appropriate area for research is the Trump immigration policy and recent executive order746 
directing that federal funds be withheld from so called “sanctuary cities”. The term “sanctuary 
cities” is commonly used to describe jurisdictions that decline to cooperate with the federal 
government in enforcing immigration laws.  For example, sanctuary cities like San Francisco 
block their jails from turning over criminal aliens to federal authorities for deportation. The 
Washington Post reports that there are 165 to 608 local and state governments with “sanctuary” 
policies.747 
In response to the executive order, a number of sanctuary cities have brought actions against 
the President, challenging the constitutionality of the provision on Anti-Commandeering 
grounds. On Nov. 20th 2017, Circuit Judge William Orrick permanently blocked the provision, 
ruling it was “unduly coercive” and violated the separation of powers, the Tenth Amendment’s 
                                                   
746 “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States.” Exec. Order No. 137768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 
2017 WL 388889 (Jan. 25, 2017). The order explains that “those who overstay or otherwise violate the terms of 
their visas present a significant threat to national security and public safety,” and that “[t]his is particularly so 
for aliens who engage in criminal conduct in the United States,” For that reason, the order provides that “the 
Secretary of Homeland Security ... shall prioritize for removal ... aliens who: ... (b) have been charged with any 
criminal offense, where such charge has not been resolved.” The order further provides that “jurisdictions that 
willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373 (sanctuary jurisdictions) are not eligible to receive Federal grants, 
except as deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes by the Attorney General or the Secretary.”. 
747 Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Trump’s claim that sanctuary cities ‘breed crime’, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2017.  
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prohibition against commandeering local jurisdictions and the Fifth Amendment’s procedural 
due process requirements. Another battle for federalism has just started in the United States 
and the merits of the litigation could soon be with the Supreme Court. The constitutional 
dynamics are very similar to the battle against the ACA but this time the battle is spearheaded 
by state Attorneys-General and has yet to reach state legislatures.  I believe that there is ample 
scope for research on the strategies used by the states to push back and a future research project 
on the topic will certainly benefit from the findings of this dissertation.  
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When Liberty subverts Federalism: Is Nullification of 
Federal Law Legitimate? 
Ilaria Di Gioia* 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States is in the middle of a federal revolution. The idea of liberty, which animated the 
Declaration of Independence and created the basis of the nation, is now being used to subvert 
federalism. “Liberty” has become a synonym of state self-government, of freedom from big 
government’s encroachments. In the last decade, several states have maintained policies 
inconsistent with federal statutes and considered measures aimed at defying federal regulations in 
different areas: gun control, government-issued identification cards, marijuana legalization, the 
Common Core State Standards Initiative (that sets standards for K12 students in English and 
mathematics) and, most pertinently for this paper, healthcare. 
The recent opposition to the reform of the private health insurance market is perhaps the 
most instructive example of this scepticism of federal authority; states are reluctant to accept 
federal funds and to cooperate for the implementation of core measures of the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA).1 Not happy with the result of legal challenges,2 a number of state legislatures are also 
considering bills aimed at nullifying federal intervention within their boundaries. Nullification, in 
this paper, is the term used to describe a formal declaration by a state legislature that a specified 
federal regulation is void within its borders. The main argument put forward by these measures is 
the defence of a founding fathers´ principle, the idea that vertical separation of powers would best 
                                                          
*PhD candidate in American Public Law, Graduate Teaching Assistant in Law of the European Union at Birmingham 
City University Law School. I am grateful to Professor Julian Killingley and Dr Anne Richardson Oakes for their 
advice and comments on this work. However, any oversight and the opinions expressed are purely my own. 
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119, amended by Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub L No 111-152, 124 Stat 1029. 
2 As soon as it was signed into law, the constitutionality of the ACA was challenged extensively in federal courts on 
the grounds that it exceeded the legitimate bounds of federal power mentioned in Art 1 section 8 of the US 
Constitution. The controversy was resolved by the Supreme Court’s decision upholding the reform as constitutional 
in the Sebelius case but pending lawsuits are still challenging various portions of the law, including a new pending 
case before the Supreme Court challenging the legality of IRS subsidies in federal exchanges: King v Burwell No 14-
1158 (22 July 2014).  
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suit American diversity and protect individual liberty. But what kind of liberty are these measures 
really invoking? Liberty from a “coercive” federal government that “exceeds the bounds of its 
limited powers and encroaches on the authorities reserved to the states under the Tenth 
Amendment”.3 It is therefore evident that the principle of individual liberty is being used to justify 
a revival of states’ rights. In this conception, ‘liberty’ is interpreted as freedom from the authority 
of the federal government, not from that of the state authority. Some states strongly believe that 
healthcare regulation should be their exclusive province and the most radical bills against the ACA 
recall Madison’s theory of interposition and Jefferson’s theory of nullification.  
This work provides a portrait of the current nullification movement and sheds light on the 
constitutional controversies that surround it.   
 
B. THE NOBLE ORIGINS OF NULLIFICATION: FOUNDING FATHERS  
The term nullification was first used by founding father Thomas Jefferson in his Kentucky 
Resolution (1798) and the concept of states’ rights against the encroachment of the federal power 
was recalled by James Madison in his Virginia Resolution (1798).  
Jefferson formally used the term nullification in his original draft of the Kentucky 
Resolution4 and defined it as “a natural right” on the part of a sovereign state to self-defence from 
the usurpation of the federal government. He argued that “where powers are assumed which have 
not been delegated, a nullification of the act is the rightful remedy” and that the states “are not 
united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general government” but “they constituted 
a general government for special purposes” and “delegated to that government certain definite 
powers, reserving, each State to itself, the residuary mass of right to their own self-government.” 
Relevant literature5 tends to interpret Jefferson’s Resolution only as a plea for a joint nullification 
by the states but it seems to me that Jefferson was also in favour of nullification by a single state 
within its borders and was only calling for the cooperation of other states:  
 
                                                          
3 Georgia House Resolution 1045, introduced 13 Jan 2014. 
4Jefferson’s Draft, [before 4 Oct. 1798] in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Volume 30: 1 January 1798 to 31 January 
1799 (2003) at 536-43. 
5 See R Card, “Can states ‘just say no’ to federal healthcare reform? The constitutional and political implications of 
state attempts to nullify federal law” (2010) 2010 BYU LR 1795-1803 and A Johnston, American political history 
1763–1876 (1905) 197-198. 
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“every State has a natural right in cases not within the compact, (casus non fœderis) to 
nullify of their own authority all assumptions of power by others within their limits…that 
nevertheless, this commonwealth, from motives of regard and respect for its co-States, has 
wished to communicate with them [the other states]on the subject.”6  
 
In his Virginia Resolution Madison did not use the word “nullification” but introduced the 
term “interposition”, conceived as a joined intervention of the states to stop the violation of the 
Constitution and invalidate the law:  
 
“in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers, not granted by 
the said compact, the states who are parties thereto, have the right, and are in duty bound, 
to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining within their respective 
limits, the authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to them.”7 
 
The Virginia Resolution, rather than nullifying the law straight away, declares its 
unconstitutionality and invokes the concurrence of other states to take “the necessary and proper 
measures…for co-operating with this state, in maintaining the Authorities, Rights, and Liberties, 
referred to the States respectively, or to the people.” It is Madison’s formulation, I suggest, that 
has inspired a recent Virginia Senate Joint Resolution8 which does not openly declare opposition 
but makes application to Congress for calling an amendment convention pursuant to Article V of 
the United States Constitution aimed at restraining the power of the federal government. The 
convention would be “limited to proposing amendments to the United States Constitution that 
impose fiscal restraints on the federal government, limit the power and jurisdiction of the federal 
government, and limit the terms of office for its officials and for members of Congress”.9 Professor 
Levinson also described a new convention as an “opportunity for a thorough discussion about the 
                                                          
6 T Jefferson, Kentucky resolutions (Nov 10, 1798 & Nov 14, 1799). 
7 J Madison, “Virginia resolutions against the Alien and Sedition Acts” reprinted in JN Rakove, James Madison, 
writings (1999) 589–591. 
8 2015 Virginia Senate Joint Resolution no 269, Virginia 2015 Regular Session. 
9 Ibid. 24-27 
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genuine meaning of a federal system in the twenty-first century and what kinds of institutions are 
best designed to implement that meaning”.10 
Also, there is a possibility that the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions’ call for a joint effort 
by the states and for the protection of states’ rights has inspired recent bills establishing a union of 
states against the ACA. I am referring to the so-called Heath Care Compact, an agreement of a 
group of states joining together to establish broad healthcare programs that operate outside of the 
ACA.11 To date, nine states have joined the Health Care Compact (Oklahoma, Alabama, Georgia, 
Indiana, Missouri, South Carolina, Texas, Utah and Kansas), and a total of 26 states have 
considered interstate compact legislation.12 However, the Compact remains only a proposal for 
now; in order to come into effect it must be passed by both chambers of Congress.13 
The current use/misuse of Jefferson and Madison’s nullification and interposition language 
demonstrates that not only the seeds of such a controversial phenomenon can be found in the early 
days of the federation, but also that the debate about the meaning of the federation is still alive and 
reiterates the same arguments.  
 
C. THE NULLIFICATION PHENOMENON 
In my research of legislation in 50 states I have examined nullification bills proposed and enacted 
in 2014 against the ACA. From my data, collected using the NCSL Affordable Care Act 
Legislative Database powered by LexisNexis StateNet, it emerges that the legislatures of 26 states 
have considered at least 120 bills aimed at nullifying the ACA; 37 bills have been signed into law 
by ten state legislatures.  My analysis of these nullification measures not only reveals common 
“noble” ideological origins but also identifies a common argument, two common philosophical 
underpinnings and a common starting point:  
 Common argument: healthcare regulation should be the exclusive province of the states 
as no police power is conferred to the Congress by Article 1 Section 8 of the US 
Constitution.   
                                                          
10 S Levinson, “The twenty-first century rediscovery of nullification and secession in American political rhetoric: 
frivolousness incarnate or serious arguments to be wrestled with?” (2014) 67 Ark LR 17. 
11 Defined by R Cauchi in “State laws and actions challenging certain health reforms”, NCLS website (22 February 
2015), available at: http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-laws-and-actions-challenging-ppaca.aspx.   
12 Ibid “26 States consider health compacts to challenge federal PPACA”, available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/states-pursue-health-compacts.aspx.  
13 Article 1, Section 10 of the United States Constitution provides that "no state shall enter into an agreement or 
compact with another state" without the consent of Congress.  
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 Two philosophical underpinnings: the originalist interpretation of the Commerce Clause14 
and the call for protection of state rights under the Tenth Amendment15. 
 Starting point: alleged unconstitutionality of a federal bill/measure: the state legislature 
believes that a measure is unconstitutional and approves a bill to nullify its effects within 
its borders.   
 
In spite of the above mentioned common grounds, the content and aims of the bills varies 
greatly and I would suggest a classification into three groups:  
 
1. Bills declaring the ACA and its core provision “the individual mandate” unconstitutional and 
therefore inapplicable within the state; 
2. Bills adopting measures to prohibit state agencies or employees from implementing the 
individual mandate within the state; 
3. Bills establishing membership of the interstate health compact, a project that would transfer 
the authority and responsibility to make healthcare decisions from federal control to the 
member states.  
 
An instructive example of bills of the first group is South Carolina Senate Bill n. 147/ 2014 
which declares that the ACA “is not authorized by the Constitution of the United States and 
violates its true meaning and intent as given by the Founders and Ratifiers, and is invalid in this 
State, is not recognized by this State, is specifically rejected by this State, and is null and void and 
of no effect in this State.”16  
For the second group, the most recently approved nullification bill is Arizona’s Proposition 
122, approved on 4th November 2014 general election ballot. The proposition amended Article 2, 
Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution to declare the ability of the state to “exercise its sovereign 
authority to restrict the actions of its personnel and the use of its financial resources to purposes 
that are consistent with the Constitution” and that “this state and all political subdivisions of this 
                                                          
14 Article 1, Section 8. “The Congress shall have Power… To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” 
15 “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved 
to the States respectively, or to the people.” 
16 Section 38-71-2120. 
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state are prohibited from using any personnel or financial resources to enforce, administer or 
cooperate with the designated federal action or program.” The amendment enshrines the so called 
anti-commandeering doctrine, according to which the federal government cannot impose targeted, 
affirmative, coercive duties upon state legislators or executive officials.17 
Finally, with regards to the third group of bills, intended to authorize joining the Interstate 
Compact, Louisiana House Bill 1909 reads: 
 
“The federal government has enacted many laws that have pre-empted state laws with 
respect to healthcare and placed increasing strain on state budgets, impairing other 
responsibilities such as education, infrastructure, and public safety. The member states seek 
to protect individual liberty and personal control over healthcare decisions and believe the 
best method to achieve these ends is by vesting regulatory authority over healthcare with 
the states. The Interstate Health Care Compact is hereby enacted into law and entered into 
by the state of Louisiana with any other states legally joining the compact in a form 
substantially similar to the form contained in this Part.” 
 
Most of the nullification bills have been proposed by Southern States, with Tennessee, 
Oklahoma and Georgia in the front line (respectively, 14, 12 and 10 bills). Significant absences 
are Texas and Florida. Five of the states proposing nullification bills used to be part of the 
Confederacy and all the states proposing nullification bills are red, i.e. Republican, states. 
 
D. NULLIFICATION: CONSTITUTIONAL PROFANITY OR             
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY? 
Up until this point, my paper has provided a portrait of the nullification phenomenon and discussed 
its origins. In light of the current size of the phenomenon and its “noble” origins, it is now 
paramount to explore the constitutional controversies that surround the movement. Hence, the rest 
of this paper is an effort to answer the following question: is nullification a legitimate exercise of 
states’ rights? 
                                                          
17 M D Adler, “The Supreme Court's federalism: real or imagined?” in Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science vol 574 (Mar 2001) at 158. 
The anti-commandeering doctrine found modern expression in New York v United States, 505 US 144 (1992) and 
Printz v United States, 521 US 898 (1997), which will be discussed below.  
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My findings differ greatly depending on the type of nullification bill in question. For this 
reason, I will examine the constitutionality of three different types of nullification measures in 
turn.   
Specifically, referring to my previous classification, bills of type 1 (declaring the ACA and 
its core provision “the individual mandate” unconstitutional and therefore inapplicable within the 
state) would not be a valid exercise of states’ rights according to the Supremacy Clause18 which 
clearly establishes the pre-eminence of federal law over state law. As UCLA professor Adam 
Winkler comments: “Any law that interferes with a valid federal law is unconstitutional…. The 
federal government can pass legislation in an area, and people who are citizens of the states have 
to obey that legislation.”19 At this point, supporters of nullification bills would object that they are 
only invalidating legislation that they deem unconstitutional and therefore not supreme; that 
sovereign states created and ratified the Constitution and therefore retain the prerogative to 
interpret the Constitution. Considering this objection, the key question turns out to be: do state 
legislatures have the authority to declare federal legislation unconstitutional? In the American 
constitutional tradition, judicial review20 is a prerogative of the Supreme Court (Marbury v 
Madison) 21 and claiming that states can declare federal law unconstitutional would also ignore the 
unanimous Cooper v Aaron’s22 holding, according to which state attempts to nullify federal law 
are ineffective as the states are bound by US Supreme Court rulings. There are, as a consequence, 
two constitutional “obstacles” to the legitimacy of type 1 nullification bills: judicial review and 
judicial supremacy of the Supreme Court. Can these obstacles be overcome? What follows is a 
brief review of the literature dealing with those two principles.  
                                                          
18 Article 6, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution. “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the 
constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.” 
19 Quoted in K Mahnken, “Red states' legally dubious strategy to destroy ObamaCare” (28 January 2014), New 
Republic, available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116373/red-states-wage-legally-dubious-war-nullify-
obamacare.  
20 The power of the federal courts to review the constitutionality of laws. 
21 Marbury v Madison 5 US 137 (1803), the decision formally established the principle of judicial review. “It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”   
22 Cooper v Aaron’s 358 US 1 (1958). Cooper announced that “the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of 
the law of the Constitution” and further that an “interpretation of [the Constitution] enunciated by th[e] Court…is the 
supreme law of the land.” More importantly, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the doctrines of nullification 
and interposition: “the Brown case can neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state executive 
or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for segregation.” 
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With regard to judicial review, relevant conservative literature23 seems to be sceptical of 
Marbury and has developed arguments against the attribution of this power to the Supreme Court 
itself. One of the main arguments is that the Constitution does not grant this power expressly. 
Article III reads: “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, 
and in such Courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish” but never mentions 
judicial review. Also, originalists argue that the founders did not contemplate judicial nullification 
of legislation enacted by the states and by Congress. The distinguished historian Leonard Levy 
asserted: “The evidence seems to indicate that the Framers did not mean for the Supreme Court to 
have authority to void acts of Congress.”24 William Crosskey, one of the most provocative legal 
historians of recent times25, reaches the same conclusion: “The rationally indicated conclusion is 
that judicial review of congressional acts was not intended, or provided, in the Constitution.”26 A 
more recent publication by Prof. William Nelson reads: “What makes [Marbury] even more 
important is the absence of any clear plan on the part of the Constitution’s framers to provide the 
Court with this power”.27  
On the other hand, modern scholarship28 alleges that Marbury is a victim of contemporary 
revisionism and supports the legitimacy of judicial review in light of the assumption that there was 
a historical practice of judicial review in American courts before the decision in Marbury. 
Unexpectedly, even the originalist Randy Barnett supports this view: “Judicial nullification of 
unconstitutional laws is not only consistent with the frame provided by original meaning, it is 
expressly authorized by the text and is entirely justified on originalist grounds.”29 Who is right and 
who is wrong? Maybe the Supreme Court’s judicial review power is a distortion; maybe it is the 
natural creature of the ideologies and legal philosophies that surrounded the formation of the US 
                                                          
23 CS Hyneman, The Supreme Court on trial (1963) 125; HL Boudin (1911) in 26 Polit Sc Qtly 238-248; JB 
McDonough, “Usurpation of Power by Federal Courts” (1912) AMLR 45; J Choper, Judicial Review and the National 
Political Process (1980) 62-63. 
24 L Levy, Original intent and the Framers’ Constitution (1988) 100. 
25 So defined by A Krash in “The Legacy of William Crosskey” (1984) 93 Yale LJ 959. 
26 W Crosskey, Politics and the constitution (1953) 1000. 
27 W Nelson, Marbury v. Madison: The origins and legacy of Judicial Review (2000) 1. 
28 See S Snowiss, Judicial review and the law of the constitution (1990) 89; JE Pfander, “Marbury, Original 
Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court's Supervisory Powers” (2001) 101 Colum LR 1515; WM Treanor “Judicial 
Review before Marbury” (2005) 58 Stan LR 455; C Sloan & D Mckean, The great decision: Jefferson, Adams, 
Marshall, and the battle for the Supreme Court (2009).  
29 R Barnett, “The original meaning of the judicial power” (2004) 12 Sup Ct Econ R 115 at 120. 
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constitutional system;30 what is certain is that it is a 200 years old legal tradition and factual reality 
in the US. Nullification is clearly hitting right at the top of the constitutional pantheon.  
With regard to judicial supremacy, academic criticism31 has strongly opposed the idea that 
the Supreme Court should serve as the final, highest arbiter of the Constitution, as expressed in 
Marbury and Cooper v Aaron. A provocative argument is put forward by Prof. Paulsen32 who 
contends that Marbury has created a myth and that a proper reading of Marshall’s decision would 
actually suggests that judicial review is not an “exclusive” power of the judiciary but should be 
shared between the three institutional branches and the states’ government. In his view, judicial 
jurisdiction does not imply judicial supremacy over the other branches of government: 
 
“none of the hypotheticals posed by Marshall remotely suggests judicial exclusivity or even 
judicial priority in constitutional interpretation. They all involve constitutional questions 
of a type that could (and should) be considered in the ordinary course of business of the 
legislative and executive branches. There is nothing uniquely judicial about them, so as to 
suggest in any way that constitutional interpretation is a uniquely judicial activity.”33 
 
A more specific argument for judicial deference to the Congress finds corroboration in 
particular provisions of the Constitution, notably Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.34 As 
Prof. Kermit Roosevelt35 suggests, this assertion advances the argument that the Court should defer 
to the congressional interpretations upon which enforcement legislation is based. However, in my 
ACA nullification case study there is no inter-branch conflict within the federal government but a 
conflict between the federal judiciary and state legislatures representing the people. Hence, more 
pertinent to this paper, which depicts nullification as a movement aimed at protecting individual 
liberty and therefore empowering “The People”, is another challenge to interpretive judicial 
                                                          
30 I am also referring to the influence in the United States of Coke’ decision in Dr. Bonham's Case 8 Co Rep 107/ 77 
Eng Rep 638 which, despite disputes and following development of UK law, is widely recognized as establishing 
judicial review. 
31 See M Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999) 8-9, 14-15 and 22-23, and E Meese III, “The 
Law of the Constitution” (1987) 61 Tul LR 979, 986. In support of judicial supremacy arguments see L Alexander 
and F Schauer, “On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation” (1997) 110 Harv LR 1359 at 1361. 
32 M Paulsen, “The irrepressible myth of Marbury” (2003) 101 Mich LR 2706.  
33 Ibid. at 2721. 
34 “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” 
35 K Roosevelt, “Judicial supremacy, judicial activism: Cooper v. Aaron and Parents involved” (Summer 2008) 52 St 
Louis U LJ 1191, 1197.  
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supremacy which finds its ideological roots in the so called “popular constitutionalism”, the idea 
that ordinary citizens, rather than the courts, are the most authoritative interpreters of the 
Constitution. A recent elaboration of this argument can be found in an acclaimed 2004 book by 
Larry Kramer36 and in the work of Edward Hartnett: “With a Constitution made in the name of 
‘We the People,’ all of us are legitimately interested in the meaning of the Constitution--all of us 
must be welcome participants in the conversation.”37  
My findings are different with regard to type 2 bills (establishing measures to prohibit state 
agencies or employees from implementing the individual mandate within the state). Bills of this 
type38 justify the refusal of the states to comply with federal law with a long-standing legal doctrine 
which would allow the states to decide whether or not it is appropriate to participate in a federal 
act: the anti-commandeering doctrine. The doctrine claims to find its legal foundation in three 
decisions of the Supreme Court which established that states cannot be required to help the federal 
government enforce federal acts or regulatory programs. Mike Maharrey,39 Communications 
Director for the Tenth Amendment Center, cites to Prigg v Pennsylvania40 (1842), an early 
decision in which Justice Joseph Story declared the pre-eminence of federal law but acknowledged 
that states could not be compelled to enforce federal slave rendition laws. However, the revival of 
the Tenth Amendment as a limit on the power of the federal government really dates from two 
cases, New York v United States41 (1992) in which Justice Sandra O´Connor affirmed that Congress 
could not require states to “take title” to radioactive waste and therefore to compel them to 
participate in the federal regulatory program: “Either type of federal action would 'commandeer' 
state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be 
inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority between federal and state governments”;  
and Printz v United States42 (1997) in which Justice Antonin Scalia confirmed that Congress does 
not have the power to direct the actions of State executive officials and therefore cannot require 
                                                          
36 Larry Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (2004) 221. 
37 EA Hartnett, “A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion” (1999) 74 NYU LR 123. 
38 Cfr. 2014 South Carolina House Bill No. 4979, 2014 South Carolina Senate Bill 1164, 2014 Tennesse Senate Bill 
No. 2450, 2014 Tennesse House Bill 2440, 2014 Tennessee Senate Bill 1680. 
39 M Maharrey, “Anti-commandeering: the legal basis for refusing to participate”, Tenth Amendment Center, available 
at: http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2015/02/03/anti-commandeering-the-legal-basis-for-refusing-to-participate/. 
The Tenth Amendment has become the flag of an activist nullification think tank, the Tenth Amendment Center which 
provides model legislation and tips to state legislatures, and keeps track of nullification bills across fifty states via its 
website which publishes weekly updates, video, articles and book reviews.  
40 Prigg v Pennsylvania 41 US 539 (1842). 
41 New York v United States 505 US 144.  
42 Printz v United States 521 US 898 (1997).  
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“local chief law enforcement officers” (CLEOs) to perform background-checks on prospective 
handgun purchasers. The anti-commandeering principle can also be found in the recent National 
Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius43 (2012) decision. The main argument concerned 
the extent to which the single mandate provision of the ACA could be said to be authorized by the 
Commerce Clause power of the federal government. Roberts CJ, who thought that the single 
mandate was outside the scope of the Commerce clause power, sided with the liberal wing by 
upholding it as a valid exercise of the taxing power. A majority of the justices however agreed that 
another challenged provision of the ACA, a significant expansion of Medicaid, was not a valid 
exercise of Congress's spending power as it would coerce states to either accept the expansion or 
risk losing existing Medicaid funding. Justice Anthony Kennedy, found that compelling the states 
to participate in the ACA Medicaid expansion was coercive and unconstitutional under the 
Spending Clause44 thus leaving the states with a “genuine choice whether to participate in the new 
ACA Medicaid expansion.”45  
In light of the above, the question must be: does the anti-commandeering doctrine, as 
developed by the Supreme Court in Sebelius, solve the constitutionality of type 2 bills? 
Yes, this class of bills would survive the scrutiny under the Supreme Court anti-
commandeering doctrine because the doctrine provides that states (and state officials) are not 
compelled to enforce federal law and that a state can refuse to use its resources to attain federal 
goals. In other words: as long as the states engage in a passive resistance, their (in)actions will be 
constitutional; but they cannot impede the implementation of valid federal law by the federal 
government in their territory. Sebelius allowed the states to opt out of Medicaid expansion but 
states cannot avoid the implementation of the individual mandate and the creation of federal 
exchanges operating in their territory (fully administered by the federal government). Indeed, in 
case a state decides not to establish a state exchange (a marketplace where people can compare 
and purchase health coverage) the federal government will provide a “fall back” exchange for that 
state,46 usually through the well-known platform Healthcare.gov.  
                                                          
43 National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius 567 US ___ (2012), 132 SCt 2566 (unreported). 
44 See KS Swendiman and EP Baumrucker, “Selected issues related to the effect of NFIB v Sebelius on the medicaid 
expansion requirements in section 2001 of the Affordable Care Act.” (16 July 2012) Congressional Research Service. 
45 Sebelius, Roberts, C J, slip opinion at 57. 
46 If a state fails to create an Exchange under Section 1311 of the ACA, the Act directs the federal Department of 
Health and Human Services to create an Exchange for that state. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, 
Pub L N 111-152, §1204, 124 Stat 1029, 1321 (2010). 
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With regards to type 3 bills (establishing membership of an interstate compact for multiple 
states opposing enforcement), they are certainly constitutional as state compacts are provided by 
Article 1 Section 10 of the United States Constitution: "no state shall enter into an agreement or 
compact with another state" without the consent of Congress. The matter here is not the 
constitutionality of interstate compact applications but the likelihood of congressional consent to 
a parallel and independent health care system. At first reading, the compact clause would seem to 
establish that any agreement within two or more states requires congressional consent. However, 
in Virginia v Tennessee the US Supreme Court concluded that not all interstate agreements require 
congressional consent and that such consent was required only with respect to those joint state 
agreements “which may tend to increase and build up the political influence of the contracting 
states so as to encroach upon or impair the supremacy of the United States or interfere with their 
rightful management of particular subjects placed under their entire control.” 47 It would therefore 
appear that there are two kinds of compacts: those that require congressional consent because they 
affect federal interests and those that do not because no federal interests are affected.48 The Health 
Care Compact would, in light of this premise, fall within the first category because it aims at 
transferring the authority on healthcare from federal control to the member states and to create an 
independent healthcare system. Would the Congress ever approve an interstate health compact? It 
is the opinion of the author that this is quite improbable. However, with the prospect of a Tea-party 
advancement in 2016 elections, supported by the candidature of Tea-Party Senator Ted Cruz as 
president49, that improbability might be much more conceivable.  
 
E. CONCLUSION 
Much of the debate, both scholarly and political, considers nullification as buried in 1789,50 a non-
starter,51 an antebellum relic,52 a discredited theory risen from the grave,53 one example of 
                                                          
47 Virginia v Tennessee 48 U.S. 503, 517-518 (1893). 
48 CN Broun, MH Mccabe, ML Buenger and RL Masters, The evolving use and the changing role of interstate 
compacts (2007) 48. 
49 W Andrews, A Parlapiano and K Yourish for The New York Times, “Who is running for president (and who’s 
not)?” (23 March 2015).  
50 ME Brandon, “Secession and nullification in the twenty-first century” (2014) 67 Ark L Rev 91-97. 
51 J Dinan, “How states talk back to Washington and strengthen American federalism” (3 December 2013) no 744, 
Policy Analysis by Cato Institute.  
52 JH Read and N Allen, “Living, dead, and undead: nullification past and present” (Fall 2012) American Political 
Thought, vol 1, No 2, 263-297. 
53 RS Hunter, “Sound and fury, signifying nothing: nullification and the question of gubernatorial executive power in 
Idaho” (2013), 49 Idaho L Rev 659-692. 
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contemporary zombie (or dinosaur) constitutionalism.54 Nonetheless, my research of legislation in 
50 states demonstrates that nullification is very much a live issue that has even penetrated certain 
state legislatures. Beyond the nature of the phenomenon itself, this paper is concerned with the 
theory of nullification and, ultimately, with the controversies of such a radical assertion of states’ 
rights for American federalism. In particular, the revival of nullification raises deep vertical 
separation of powers questions: namely the adequacy of a growing regulatory role for the federal 
government and the desirability of federal intervention in matters of social policy in such a way as 
to materially interfere with the traditional powers of the states. On the other hand, it is also possible 
to recognize a veiled horizontal separation of powers issue55: state legislatures are claiming for 
themselves the ability to pronounce upon the constitutionality of federal laws, effectively trying to 
usurp the judicial function.  
In conclusion, a consideration, a conjecture and an admonition.  
A consideration: rebus sic stantibus, the debate on radical states’ rights movement (i.e. 
nullification) has captured the attention of enthusiastic constitutional theorists and of states’ 
legislators but has not yet reached Washington. A conjecture: in the current highly polarized 
political climate, with a Republican Party agenda dominated by the increasingly influential 
libertarian Tea Party, this is arguably what Jason Frank56 would call “a constituent moment” and 
therefore, a period of turbulence in federalism, American-style. I am referring to the same 
conjecture that I have introduced when discussing the possibility of a Congressional approval of 
the Interstate Health Care Compact. Given the rise of popular constitutionalism and originalism,57 
promoted mainly by the Tea- Party, there are reasons to speculate on the possibility that the dispute 
over the role of the federal government and its relationship to individual rights (culminated in the 
nullification discourse) could effectively evolve from mere constitutional argument to 
constitutional change. An admonition: the constitutional change would be successful and enduring 
as long the movement is able to solve the libertarian paradox that Prof. Rebecca E. Zietlow has 
delineated in her article “Popular originalism? The Tea Party movement and constitutional 
                                                          
54 Levinson (n 15) at 48. 
55 Paulsen (n 32). He pleads for a shared judicial review power between the three branches of government and the 
state governments. 
56 J Frank, Constituent Moments: enacting the people in postrevolutionary America (2010). 
57 The term popular originalism is used by JA Goldstein, “Can popular constitutionalism survive the Tea Party 
movement?” (2011) 105 N w U LR Colloquy 288 at 298.  
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theory.”58 The paradox consists in the simultaneous embracing of two different doctrines: 
originalism (the doctrine according to which the interpretation of a written constitution should seek 
the original public meaning of the words of the text or be consistent with what was meant by those 
who drafted and ratified the original meaning of the provisions at the time that they were adopted) 
and popular constitutionalism (i.e. the idea that it is desirable for people other than judges to engage 
in constitutional interpretation59). The advocates of nullification will have to make a choice: 
originalism or popular constitutionalism. This is to avoid a clash of the two holdings which would 
result in judicial activism. As Professor Zietlow has commented, those two doctrines are indeed 
incompatible: 
 
“Originalists believe that a single fixed meaning exists and is discernible by examining the 
text and the intent of the Framers or the original public meaning of the text. By contrast, 
popular constitutionalists accept the possibility that the text has multiple meanings and that 
the meaning of the text may change through the process of construction by the political 
branches. To that extent, popular constitutionalism is premised on the existence of a living 
Constitution, a concept that is antithetical to most originalists.” 
 
The nullification controversy demonstrates a fundamental concern over the role of the 
federal government and the limits of congressional power. The ACA is not the only battlefield, 
constitutional conservatives have numerous issues of concern: drug control, Second Amendment 
rights,60 Right to Try,61 Agenda 21,62 Common Core.63 This debate deserves academic attention as 
it is likely to affect lawmakers and the broad US political landscape in coming years with the 
potential to radically reshape our understanding of American federalism. 
                                                          
58 RE Zietlow, 64 Fla LR 483 (2012). 
59 See LD Kramer, Popular constitutionalism (n 48). 
60 Nine states have passed “Firearms Freedom Acts (FFAs)” which render federal laws regarding firearms inapplicable 
to firearms and ammunition produced, sold, and used exclusively within state borders. 
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62 These bills would prohibit the state, as well as cities and counties, from adopting and developing environmental and 
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